On December 17, 1996, as I was making small
talk with other guests
on the patio of the residence of
the Japanese Ambassador to
Peru, I heard a muffled blast. At
first I thought it was a car bomb
on the street, but I quickly real-
ized that it was a bomb that had
blown a huge hole in the wall
separating the Ambassador’s
residence from the house next Se
door. After the explosion, a ho
group of 14 members of the Co
Tiipac Amaru Revolutionary Move-
ment (MRTA) occupied the house
and took over 500 people hostage–
ministers of state, members of
Congress, government authorities,
ambassadors and consuls, and other
international guests attending the
event hosted by Ambassador Aoki.
The 126 days of the so-called
hostage crisis have opened a win-
dow on the current social and polit-
Javier Diez Canseco is a member of the Peruvian National Congress and was a
guest at the residence of the Japanese
Ambassador when the house was seized
by the MRTA. He was taken hostage and
subsequently released.
Translated from the Spanish by NACLA.
nator Javier Diez Canseco, one of the init
stages of the MRTA, at the Socialist Schola,
nference in New York in April, 1992.
ical situation in Peru, exposing an
acute internal conflict that has ac-
celerated the militarization of the
state and society. Also exposed is a
culture of terror and violence that
has made a profound mark on the
hearts and minds of most Peruvians,
especially the millions of children
and youth who have grown up
amidst a decade and a half of in-
tense political violence that has cost
the country almost 25,000 lives and
more than $20 billion in damages.
The military assault against the
MRTA that ended the hostage cri-
sis-with a death toll of 17, includ-
ing one hostage, two members of
the armed forces and all 14 MRTA
operatives-is not only a human
tragedy, but a political tragedy
as well. The hostage crisis
opened alternatives for a peace-
ful and negotiated resolution of
the country’s ongoing con-
flicts-alternatives which could
have been a first step towards
overcoming the deep wounds
created by 17 years of internal
strife. With the military assault
ial that brought the crisis’to an end, rs’ those wounds have only been
exacerbated.
A military solution to the hostage
crisis was a political necessity for the
Peruvian government. It is crucial to
keep in mind that Peru is presently
governed by an alliance between
Alberto Fujimori’s forces, the
National Intelligence Service (SIN)
headed by Vladimiro Montesinos (a
former army captain and lawyer for
drug traffickers), and the military
leadership headed by Commander in
Chief of the Army, General Nicol.is
de Bari Hermoza Rios. This alliance
enjoys the support of international fi-
nance capital–the principal bene-
factor of the neoliberal economic
policies currently being imple-
mented in the country.
6NMZIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NACIIAREPORT ON THE AMERICAS 6ESSAY/ PERU
The so-called hostage crisis has opened a window
on the current social and political situation in
Peru, exposing the accelerated militarization of
the state and society.
A negotiated political solution
would have been a disaster for this
governing triumvirate. The embassy
takeover-an operation that took
less than 60 seconds in which the
MRTA took control of one of the
most well-guarded buildings in the
city-was a huge embarrassment
for the SIN and the military leader-
ship, which had long claimed re-
sponsibility for the defeat of Peru’s
insurgent groups. A political solu-
tion would have exposed the failure
of the SIN and the military leader-
ship to prevent the takeover in the
first place. The only way to avoid
such a debacle was to transform
those responsible for the crisis into
the heroes of its final outcome–
making a military solution the only
alternative.
The takeover also revealed that
the SIN in particular was less con-
cerned with combating insurgency
than with harassing opposition
groups. Instead of protecting the
country, the SIN was busy threaten-
ing independent journalists, blow-
ing up the transmission towers of
television stations which were criti-
cal of the government, and harass-
ing opposition labor leaders and
parliamentarians-all of this with
the intent of deepening Peru’s cur-
rent crisis in order to make possible
the illegal and unconstitutional re-
election of Alberto Fujimori in the
year 2000.
At the same time, the military
leadership has been playing an
alarmingly central role in the
Fujimori Administration. The high
command currently occupies key
positions as both advisors and ideo-
logues to the President-forming
something akin to the central com-
mittee of a political party. This is
ironic since Fujimori’s official po-
litical party, Cambio 90-Nueva
Mayorfa, is virtually nonexistent. It
lacks a central committee, a politi-
cal commission, and anything like
an assembly of delegates.
military solution to the
hostage crisis had clearly
been in the works from the
start. The government adopted a
shifting strategy to the crisis, which
allowed it to participate in negotia-
tions and then back out whenever
partial agreements became possible.
Early on, Fujimori set in motion the
preparations for an armed assault.
Tunnels were dug, special army
troops were trained, and electronic
surveillance equipment was in-
stalled. The government’s gam-
ble-which in the end paid off-
was that if it could carry out the
assault without incurring too many
casualties, it would come out on
top.
The operation was efficient as far
as intelligence gathering and mili-
tary preparation are concerned. It
was also quite successful in terms of
rescuing the hostages and not leav-
ing enemy survivors. Yet several
hostages have testified that the as-
sault on the embassy could have un-
folded quite differently. For exam-
ple, once the operation was
underway, a heavily armed member
of the MRTA entered a room full of
hostages, including two ministers of
state and several ambassadors, but
instead of opening fire on them, he
dropped his weapon. It is also well
known that several members of the
MRTA were killed in cold blood
after having surrended to govern-
ment troops.
While the government used the
media to wage a huge publicity
campaign against the MRTA, daily
news reports showcased a benevo-
lent government that allowed gui-
tars, books and meals into the
Ambassador’s residence. This rein-
forced the government’s image as
willing negotiator-an image that
obviously influenced the MRTA’s
analysis of the situation.
At the same time, however, the
government repeatedly instigated
conflicts which disrupted the nego-
tiations. The campaign against the
International Red Cross, which pro-
government media accused of hav-
ing “terrorist” sympathies, is a case
in point. Time and again, the gov-
ernment undermined the negotia-
tion process in order to set the stage
for its military solution.
The militarist perspective that
dominated the MRTA’s analysis of
the situation also contributed to this
outcome. Ndstor Cerpa Cartolini,
the leader of the MRTA forces in the
embassy, fell prey to the govern-
ment’s tactics. Believing the gov-
ernment had been forced into nego-
tiating, Cerpa continued to demand
the liberation of all MRTA prison-
ers. This helped to create the im-
pression that a peaceful and negoti-
ated solution was impossible. In
fact, with 90% of its leadership in
prison, and with its principal mili-
tary fronts destroyed, the MRTA
could not impose the release of its
militants-or even of its leader-
ship-on the government. A civil-
ian-military government like
Fujimori’s could not concede to
such demands without losing all
credibility. Cerpa wrongly assumed
that the embassy takeover had com-
pletely transformed the political,
military and social balance of power
in the country. This false perception
prevented him from seeing that the
time frame of the negotiations
Vol XXXI, No 2 SEr’rIOa 1997 7 Vol XXXI, No 2 SEPTIOCT 1997 7ESSAY/ I PERU
needed to be radically
different, and the goals
more modest-less mili-
tary and more political in
nature.
These circumstances
made the search for ne-
gotiated alternatives ap-
pear increasingly impos-
sible. An important group
of hostages, among them
Peru’s Minister of For-
eign Affairs, suggested a
negotiated political alter-
native that was for-
warded to President
Fujimori, the MRTA and
the ambassadors of the
nations affected by the
takeover. Yet it received
little serious attention.
The proposal called
President Fujimori, left, talks with the Japanese Ambassac Morihisa Aoke, in wheelchair inside the Ambassador’ residence the day following the military assault. The Ar wife, Naoki Aoki, is on the right.
for the
MRTA and the Peruvian state to
commit to uphold democratic prin-
ciples in resolving the conflict; to
embrace dialogue and negotiation
as the means to resolve the crisis af-
fecting the country; to negotiate the
demilitarization of the conflict; and
to discuss the possibilities of reduc-
ing jail sentences and freeing pris-
oners under the aegis of interna-
tional organizations. It laid out a
concrete plan that included the lib-
eration of the hostages, the safe pas-
sage of the MRTA operatives out of
Peru, and subsequently, the opening
of a negotiation process that could
create the conditions for a political
solution to the violence.
The proposal was rejected from
the outset by Fujimori, and was not
clearly or consistently embraced by
the MRTA, which insisted, time and
time again, on the liberation of all of
its prisoners as part of the solution.
Such inflexibility resulted in a dead-
end situation that created the con-
text for a military solution. Once the
military solution to the hostage situ-
ation had been implemented, the
possibilities for a political solution
to the larger internal conflicts af-
fecting the country declined dramat-
ically. The violent unraveling of the
hostage crisis has since been show-
cased by the military as evidence
that a military solution is the only
possible alternative given the coun-
try’s conflicts. It is also likely to
serve as an argument for armed
groups to dismiss any possibilities
for dialogue and political negotia-
tion as means of resolving internal
strife.
Armed hostilities within nations
are expressions of deep political, so-
cial and cultural divides. They also
result from the absence of legiti-
mate democratic institutions to re-
solve political and social conflicts.
Recent events have shown that such
institutions are sorely lacking in
Peru. The lack of institutionalized
checks and balances, or of avenues
for civic participation in the struc-
tures of political decision making is
glaring. During the hostage crisis,
for example, Congress was kept
completely on the margins, and at
no point did the Fujimori
Administration take any steps to
keep legislators informed of the sit-
uation. Once the hostages had been
freed, both the congressional major-
ity and the judiciary refused to carry
out an investigation.
dor to Peru, burnt-out nbassador’s
In fact, only the Su-
preme Council of Mil-
itary Justice and the
military courts have in-
vestigated the events
which violently ended
the crisis. The autopsies
of the 17 people killed
during the assault have
been witnessed only by
members of these insti-
tutions, and only they
have written the official
accounts of what took
place inside the Am-
bassador’s residence.
Civilian participation in
these matters has been
nonexistent. In addition,
family members were
permitted to view and
identify only two of the 17 bodies of
those killed during the assault:
Supreme Court judge Dr. Giusti,
who was shot in the leg and bled to
death due to lack of medical atten-
tion; and Rolly Rojas, an MRTA
leader who was shot six times.
None of the other bodies have been
seen, and most of them have been
anonymously buried in cemeteries
throughout the capital with no civil-
ian witnesses present.
Throughout the hostage crisis,
public opinion polls showed that the
majority of the population did not
favor a military solution. Once such
an alternative was implemented,
however, it was approved by 67%
of the population. Even so, shortly
after the storming of the embassy,
the government’s popularity began
to drop dramatically. Just ten days
after the crisis ended, only 35% of
the population supported the
Fujimori Administration, while 65%
voiced their rejection.
These dramatic shifts in public
opinion must be understood in the
context of the culture of fear that
has taken hold in Peru over the past
17 years. The fear which power can
produce wanes when people begin
to feel the effects of the economic
B NALILA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NACILA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 8ESSAY/ PERU
Fujimori’s waning popularity is partly the result
of the growing conflicts within the armed forces
that began to surface prior to the hostage crisis.
It is also the result of government harassment of
opposition groups.
crisis-starvation wages, 50% of
the population in poverty, 25% in
extreme poverty, 52% of children
undernourished, 10% unemploy-
ment, 75% underemployment, and
the lack of prospects for the future.
Discontent over these persistent
problems was beginning to be ex-
pressed even before the hostage
crisis.
Fujimori’s waning popularity is
also the result of growing conflicts
within the armed forces that began
to surface prior to the hostage crisis
and the government’s harassment of
opposition groups. In November, 1996, for example, the media re-
ported on the SIN’s involvement in
the bombing of a local television
station and the arrest of a retired
army general, Rodolfo Robles, who
had denounced the existence of
death squads sponsored by the SIN
and the military. The attempt to si-
lence opposition continued even as
the hostage crisis was being played
out.
hortly after being released by
the MRTA from the Ambass-
ador’s residence, two ex-
hostages became the targets of state
repression. The residence of Gustavo
Saberbein-former Minister of
Finance under the administration of
Alan Garcia (1985-90) and strong
critic of Fujimori-was attacked
with machine gun fire as he and his
family were entering the house. The
government stated that common
criminals were responsible.
Two weeks later, my own car was
intercepted by three others. Nine
heavily armed men, whose faces
were uncovered and who were
wearing bullet-proof vests with the
National Police insignia, got out of
the cars. They fired their weapons to
intimidate my security personnel,
detained everyone for an hour, in-
terrogated us, then finally released
us. Two days later, my car was
found-torched to the ground.
According to the government, those
responsible were common criminals
as well. But it seems curious that
these thieves burn stolen cars as
well as identity documents and
credit cards that might be useful to
them. Two weeks later, the Editor-
in-Chief of La Repablica, the main
opposition newspaper, was kid-
napped, interrogated and released
an hour later. Her kidnappers did
not take her purse, and they aban-
doned her car without even taking
the spare tire.
A few days after the hostage crisis
had ended, the press reported that
Leonor La Rosa, a SIN agent, had
been brutally tortured. Her torturers
were trying to get her to confess that
she was responsible for leaking SIN
plans to harass the independent and
opposition press. In April, La Rosa
declared on television that she had
been tortured in the basement of the
General Military Command, where
the Army Intelligence Service has
its base of operations.
A few days later, the press re-
ported that another SIN agent–
who happened to be the former
lover of Santiago Martin Rivas, chief of the Colina paramilitary
group, with whom she had a son-
had been kidnapped, tortured, killed
and dismembered. Her body, decap-
itated and without hands or feet, had
been found on the outskirts of Lima
and was identified by her father.
The Colina group is responsible for
the murder of nine students and a
professor in 1992, at the Enrique
Guzman y Valle University, widely
known as “La Cantuta,” as well as
the 1991 massacre of a group of
Lima street vendors attending a
barbecue in Barrios Altos, among
whom the army says there was a
member of Shining Path.
For most Peruvians, the hostage
crisis opened the possibility of a ne-
gotiated solution to the country’s vi-
olent political conflict. Largely for
this reason, more than 70% of the
population favored a peaceful and
negotiated solution. The broader
conflict can only be resolved politi-
cally, as other cases from Latin
America clearly demonstrate. Poli-
tical solutions to such conflicts are
not only possible when the insur-
gent forces have military strength
comparable to that of the govern-
ment, as was the case in El
Salvador. Nor are they only possible
when they have the support of large
sectors of the population, as was the
case with the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and
the indigenous population in
Guatemala. Even in countries where
insurgencies have been militarily
defeated, like Argentina and
Uruguay, a political solution can be
found. This can be done through the
freeing of prisoners, the incorpora-
tion of former insurgents into polit-
ical life, and through negotiation
with the military leaders that im-
posed authoritarian regimes as a so-
lution to internal conflict.
It is the Peruvian people who
must create the possibilities for their
future. The solution will not come
from the outside; it will come from
Peruvians themselves. Yet interna-
tional assistance will be crucial in
the search for realistic alternatives
to end the crisis gripping Peru. Only
through such alternatives can we
put an end to this authoritarian
regime.
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