On December 29, 1996, the “Firm and Lasting Peace” Agreement was signed between the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). A period of four years was established for the implementation of the agreement, and the international community, which played a key role in the peace process, committed itself to fully supporting implementation. Recent events, however, including the May 16 defeat of the constitutional reforms in a referendum mandated by the Accords and the growing importance of the extreme right, cast doubt upon the full implementation of the Accords.
The Accords established hundreds of new commitments for state and society in Guatemala. But only a few were considered cornerstones of the process: full respect for the right to life and liberty; human rights guarantees; demobilization of the insurgent forces together with a process of demilitarization; the report of the Commission for Historical Clarification (Guatemala’s truth commission); and constitutional reforms to institutionalize fundamental transformations of state and society.
Demobilization of the URNG forces was fully achieved according to the timetable. The government was supposed to start a process of demilitarization simultaneously—downsizing troops and relocating them, dismantling paramilitary groups, and redefining the role, mission, doctrine and education of the armed forces, among other things—but this was only partially accomplished. Although state-sponsored violence no longer exists, the right to life is still in jeopardy. Security is one of the most pressing issues in Guatemala. There is a growing spiral of violence, due mainly to criminality and common delinquency, but also to “social cleansing” death squads and the lynching of presumed delinquents.
Meanwhile, former members of army and security forces direct or participate in organized crime and extrajudicial executions. The impunity they enjoyed in the past continues to exist, partly because of fear in the population and partly because of the protection that powerful sectors provide. A clear example of impunity is the still-unsolved assassination of Bishop Juan Gerardi on April 26, 1998 and the tainted investigation of the crime. Undoubtedly, state agents still maintain their capacity for repression.
Among the most important achievements of the Peace Accords was the “Memory of Silence” report presented by the Clarification Commission on February 25, 1999, the best so far by any Latin American truth commission. The history of Guatemala from 1962 to 1996 was accurately presented, and an important set of recommendations issued. Unfortunately, both the government and powerful sectors in Guatemala are trying to ignore the appalling evidence of state criminality, and demonstrate no willingness to follow up on the Commission’s recommendations.
Approving constitutional reforms was the most important step toward institutionalizing the Accords. The proceedings in Congress were complex and full of obstacles, and right-wing parties delayed passage for more than a year. Congress finally approved the reforms in October 1998, including recognition of the identity and rights of indigenous peoples; elimination of the framework of the national security doctrine; judicial reforms; and new checks and balances to executive power.
The Constitution mandated that citizens ratify the reforms in a referendum, but conservative sectors of Guatemalan society succeeded in creating a great deal of confusion about the reforms, using lies and half-truths that played on fears and special interests. Racist attitudes against indigenous peoples were exacerbated among the ladino population, and fundamentalist churches intimidated indigenous populations with apocalyptic visions.
Many people responded by not voting—only 18% of registered voters participated—and urban voters were led by the media, under the control of the right, to believe that in case of doubts the most responsible action was to vote against the reforms. Under these circumstances, the “NO” vote was triumphant by 49% to 43%. Other factors that explain this outcome were that no political party promoted the “YES” vote as its responsibility, transportation was scarce and expensive for the poor, and some middle-class sectors expressed their rejection of the ruling party—and the political system in general—by voting “NO.”
The “NO” vote was a significant setback for the Peace Accords because the new character of Guatemala as a multicultural and multilingual nation does not yet have constitutional backing. Demilitarization of state and society will be constitutionally halted, and other important changes in the Guatemalan state will be postponed.
The setback has also affected the momentum of progressive forces. A new center-left alliance was recently formed to participate in the general elections scheduled for November 7. The New Nation Alliance (ANN) includes the URNG, which has become a political party, the New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG), and two other new political forces. This alliance has taken significant steps and is now nominating candidates for president and other major offices. Although ANN is already the country’s third political force, the results of the referendum indicate that important sectors of the urban areas, where racism is stronger, are still hesitant about making fundamental changes in the country. Convincing them is key for the continuation of the peace-building process, as well as for increasing the political fortunes of ANN.
The peace-building process, however, should not wait for the November elections to regain momentum. The electoral process must be used to achieve a renewed commitment to the Peace Accords by all political forces. With the support of the international community, including MINUGUA (the UN Mission), democratic forces should reaffirm the responsibility of Guatemalan state and society to fully implement all the provisions of the “Firm and Lasting Peace Agreement.” Once again, international pressure and cooperation are crucial to guarantee peace in Guatemala.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Raúl Molina Mejía is Executive Director of CEDMUC, a Guatemalan nongovernmental organization involved with municipal and community development, and Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the New Guatemala Democratic Front. He was Dean of the School of Engineering (1976-1980) and acting Rector (1980) of San Carlos National University in Guatemala City.
