Nicaragua

On July 19 the revolutionary ar-
my of the Sandinista National
Liberation Front entered
Managua, victorious after a six-
teen year struggle against the dic-
tatorial regime of Anastasio
Somoza. The following day, 50,000
cheering people thronged the
newly renamed Plaza of the
Revolution in Managua to
welcome the rebel government.
When the massive celebration had
ended, however, the Sandinistas
began to confront what is perhaps
an even more difficult task-the
reconstruction of the war-torn
country and the definition of the
Nicaraguan revolutionary process.
In the words of Tomas Borge, one
of the founders of the Sandinista
movement and the new Minister of
the Interior, “The most difficult
task is yet before us. The war is
only beginning.”
Somoza and his cohorts had
literally sacked the country before
they left. They siphoned over $500
million out of Nicaragua in the two
years leading up to the Sandinista
victory. In the final days of the
regime, government ministeries
were ransacked, state bank ac-
counts were drained, and
Somoza’s son went from bank to
bank with a squad of National
Guardsmen, taking every cent of
foreign currency that remained.
Somoza did, however, leave one
thing behind-a huge foreign debt
of $1.3 billion.
The fighting and aerial bomb-
ings by the National Guard during
the final, eight-week Sandinista in-
surrection left much of the coun-
try’s economic infrastructure in
ruins. According to a September
1979 report prepared by the
Economic Commission on Latin
America (ECLA), well over half a
billion dollars in direct physical
destruction occurred before
Somoza departed. Many factories
were destroyed or severely
damaged. Most of the cotton crop
(a major foreign exchange earner)
as well as staple food crops for the
local population went unplanted.
One million people (out of
Nicaragua’s total population of 2.3
million) will need emergency food
supplies and assistance to survive
the next several months.
The devastation is inevitably
shaping the policies of the San-
dinista government in this early
stage. To rebuild the country, the
new leaders are appealing to all
governments, including the United
States, for massive relief
assistance. The Frente Sandinista
de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) has
also called on all Nicaraguan
social classes, including the sec-
tors of the bourgeoisie that par-
ticipated in the anti-Somoza move-
ment, to lend their support to the
reconstruction effort.
THE NEW GOVERNMENT
The composition of the Junta of
National Reconstruction, the San-
dinista government’s executive
body, reflects the FSLN’s decision
to create a broad-based govern-
ment. The five Junta members are
Violeta de Chomorro, wife of the
slain publisher of La Prensa, the
leading organ of the bourgeois op-
position to Somoza; Moises
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Hassan, leader of the United Peo- ple’s Movement, a Sandinista
mass organization; Sergio
Ramirez, author and university
professor; Alfonso Robelo, an in-
dustrialist; and Daniel Ortega, a
leader of the FSLN.
Standing behind the junta is the
nine-member Directorate of the
FSLN, where three seats are held
by each of the three tendencies
within the FSLN (the Terceristas,
the Prolonged People’s War, or
GPP, and the Proletarians). The
FSLN sets the political direction
for the government, is organizing
the mass movement, and controls
the army The Junta takes care of
the day to day administration of
the country. Thus far, the diverse
government leaders have
displayed a remarkable degree of
unity in their public pro-
nouncements.
The only complete program of
the reconstruction government
published to date was released
last July 9, ten days before the
Sandinista victory. Couched in
very general language, it is design-
ed to encompass the interests of
the full range of anti-Somoza
forces, ranging from sectors of the
bourgeoisie to the working class
and the peasantry.
The program, while recognizing
the right of private property, also
calls for agrarian reform and the
nationalization of all property
belonging to Somoza and his
allies. In the economic sphere, it
provides for a “mixed economy,”
one composed of both state and
private enterprises. The program
guarantees “democratic rights”
like freedom of the press, and
allows all political parties-except
for Somoza’s Liberal Party-to
resume their activities.
Ultimately, the new government’s
policies will not be determined as
SeptlOct 1979
much by this program as by the
ability of the FSLN to shape the
direction of the revolutionary pro-
cess in the interest of the popular
classes. In many of its early
moves, the government is
strengthening the new socialized
sector by placing key economic
functions under state control.
Soon after taking office, the Junta
nationalized all domestically-
owned banks, and prohibited
foreign banks from accepting
Nicaraguan deposits. The
country’s export trade has also
been taken over by the govern-
ment, with special state enter-
prises set up to export coffee, cot-
ton and sugar. Plans are also be-
ing laid for taking control of the
mines and other key natural
resources.
The nationalization of the
holdings of the Somoza clan have
made the state the largest single
economic power in the country.
Over seventy-five Somoza enter-
prises, ranging from sugar mills
and meat-packing plants to auto
dealerships and transportation
companies, have been taken over.
Altogether, it is estimated that
one-tenth of the country’s labor
force will be employed in the state-
Y0
03
C,)
Throngs of supporters greeted FSLN leaders when they entered Matagalpa a few
days after the victory. Pictured from right to left are Bayardo Arce and Tomas Borge
(members of the FSLN Directorate) and Eden Pastora (Comandante “Zero”).
41update * update * update * update
owned enterprises.
The government is encouraging
the Nicaraguan private sector to
invest-both to build up the coun-
try’s productive capacity and to
provide jobs to the estimated 70
percent of the urban work force
now unemployed. But the
business community has been
slow to respond. Said one
businessperson, “The poor people
are talking about ‘our revolution’,
and I’m afraid of what they mean
by that.” Furthermore, some
members of the bourgeoisie who
left the country during the fighting
have not returned. And those who
stayed behind are reluctant to in-
vest because they know there is
little money to be made in the war-
torn economy. In the opinion of
one businessperson, “There’s no
private business in Nicaragua
that’s going to make a profit in the
next few years.”
AGRARIAN REFORM
A major concern of the new
government is agriculture. With
hunger threatening hundreds of
thousands of Nicaraguans, it is
crucial to get food production
underway. Also, three-quarters of
Nicaragua’s export earnings come
from agriculture and half the
population works in the rural sec-
tor, including a large agricultural
proletariat.
Under the direction of Agrarian
Reform Minister Jaime
Wheelock-a Marxist who is a
member of the FSLN Direc-
torate-the government has
launched a far-reaching agrarian
reform program. Already, the ex-
propriation of Somoza’s lands as
well as those belonging to former
government officials and
members of the National Guard
have placed over 51 percent of
Nicaragua’s arable land under
42
government control. The agrarian
reform ministry is also empowered
to expropriate large estates that
are not farmed efficiently by their
owners, but Wheelock says, “For
now we are going to limit
ourselves to the Somoza lands,
because we don’t need anymore.”
Plans for new agrarian
organizations are just beginning to
take shape. In cases of expropria-
tion of large agro-industrial com-
plexes (which include processing
and marketing facilities as well as
land), workers will participate in
management decisions under the
technical guidance of the state.
Smaller farms of 300 to 400 acres
will become cooperatives under
the direct control of peasants and
workers. Hospitals and schools
are to be built as part of these
cooperative communities. More
traditional peasant plots will be in-
cluded in a third type of organiza-
tion called an “associate enter-
prise,” through which peasants
will receive both land and
technical assistance.
POPULAR MOBILIZATION
Building on the close ties
developed with the masses during
the struggle against Somoza, the
FSLN is now strengthening the
organizations which incorporate
the Nicaraguan people into the
revolutionary process.
The key organization in the
countryside is the Asociacion de
Trabajadores del Campo (ATC),
which groups rural workers and
peasants, many of whom will be
the beneficiaries of the agrarian
reform program. In the urban
areas, block committees-called
Comites de Defensa Sandinista
(CDS)-have been formed. Just as
their predecessors, the Comites
de Defensa Civil (which were im-
portant in mobilizing the popula-
tion for the popular war), the
CDS’s are a key avenue for mass
participation in this period. Head-
ed by elected representatives, the
committees are responsible for
food distribution, community hous-
ing and health needs, and political
education.
Plans are also being discussed
for the formation of a Sandinista
political party. For the present,
however, the FSLN’s emphasis is
on developing the political con-
sciousness of the Nicaraguan
masses, who for decades were
deprived of exercising even the
most miminal democratic rights.
At the same time a popular ar-
my has been established to
replace the disbanded National
Guard. It will incorporate the com-
bat forces of the FSLN and also
new draftees. The army is firmly
under the control of three
members of the Directorate of the
FSLN with a representative of
each of the three tendencies shar-
ing joint command. The impor-
tance of consolidating the popular
army is underscored by the threat
of Somoza supporters launching a
counter-revolutionary invasion
from abroad. Thousands of ex-
National Guardsmen are still en-
camped in neighboring Honduras
where they fled after the San-
dinista victory.
THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT
The new government’s most
pressing international concern is
to procure financial assistance to
rebuild the war-torn country. Sum-
ming up the government’s foreign
policy, Moises Hassan declared,
“We are open to all and we don’t
want to block relations with
anyone.”
Nicaragua is seeking financial
backing from social democratic
governments in Europe, from Latin
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America, and from the socialist countries. In response, the social democratic Second International sent a mission to Managua, the
Andean Bloc countries set up an
office in Managua to coordinate
aid, and Cuba (which has warmly
welcomed several Junta delega-
tions to Havana) is sending educa-
tional and medical teams.
The new government has
also approached the United States
for aid. As the FSLN is well aware,
the Carter Administration had
maneuvered to prevent the San-
dinistas from taking power up to
the last minute-by proposing an
OAS peacekeeping force, and by
pressuring for the inclusion of
Somoza associates in the new
government and for the preserva-
tion of the National Guard.
While preserving a well-founded
distrust of the United States, the
Nicaraguans clearly intend to take
all the assistance they can get
from the United States. In so do-
ing, however, they have adamently
refused to cave in to political
pressure from Washington or any
other source. As Tomas Borge
states, “We would prefer to die of
hunger rather than accept aid with
strings attached.”
The Carter Administration, for
its part, has suddenly assumed a
public posture of amicable rela-
tions with the new government.
Shortly after the Sandinista victory
Carter himself was emphasizing
his administration’s “good rela-
tionship” with Nicaragua and
refusing to blame the turn of
events in Nicaragua on the old
U.S. bugaboo of Cuba. The new
U.S. ambassador to Managua,
Lawrence A. Pezzullo, went even
further, declaring that “our rela-
tions are as cordial and as easy as
I’ve ever witnessed with any
government.”
SeptiOct 1979
0
Voluntary work brigades are helping to reconstruct the war-torn country. Pictured here is a neighborhood brigade in Managua replacing stones used by Sandinista sup- porters to build street barricades during the fighting,
THE U.S. STRATEGY
What accounts for this about-
face in the Carter Administration’s
policy? The overriding objective of
U.S. imperialism is still to contain
the revolutionary process in
Nicaragua and prevent “another
Cuba.” But according to Washing-
ton sources, State Department of-
ficials are now arguing that a
policy of open hostility would only
serve to further radicalize the new
government. Instead, they argue,
the U.S. should accept the unplea-
sant reality of a Sandinista victory
and try to push the government in
a more moderate, social
democratic direction.
In line with this strategy, the
U.S. is undoubtedly hoping that
some of the more anti-communist
Latin American leaders who sup-
ported the struggle against
Somoza will use their influence
and their money to bolster the
moderate forces in the Nicara-
guan government. A flurry of visits
by State Department officials to
various Latin capitals in the after-
math of the Sandinista victory
gave the Carter Administration
ample opportunity to coordinate its
43update * update update* update
strategy with leaders there.
Already Venezuela is reported to
have pressured the Sandinistas to
include a Christian Democrat in
the government as a condition for
receiving aid from Venezuela, an
attempt denounced by the
Nicaraguans.
In addition, the Carter Ad-
ministration is clearly hoping to
use U.S. economic assistance as
a lever of influence. In late August
the Administration announced it
would release approximately $30
million in loans granted to the
Somoza government last year, but
frozen when Somoza refused to
accede to U.S. wishes that he
resign. Also in early September the
State Department received con-
gressional approval for over $8
million in emergency funds for
Nicaragua. The Administration has
also announced it may make a re-
quest to Congress for $200 million
in economic aid to Nicaragua over
the next two years.
Thus far, however, the Carter
Administration has been long on
promises of assistance but short
on delivery. By mid-September,
actual U.S. emergency aid
amounted to only $7.9 million (in-
cluding transportation costs)-far
less than the massive flow of U.S.
aid monies to Somoza immediate-
ly after the 1972 earthquake. U.S.
footdragging has brought sharp
denunciations from the
Nicaraguans. “The North-
americans,” accused one FSLN
commander, Eden Pastora, “are
speculating with the hunger of the
Nicaraguan people.”
THE HURDLES AHEAD
In the coming year the FSLN is
likely to face some formidable
hurdles in its determination to
forge ahead in a revolutionary
44
direction. With U.S. ruling circles
carefully watching the new
government as it defines itself
politically, the danger of the U.S.
reverting to a more interventionist
posture are very real. Already, ac-
cording to the Washington Post,
the CIA and the Pentagon have
argued that the U.S. should take a
hard-line position in response to
the Sandinista victory.
in addition, the latent conflict
between the bourgeoisie and the
popular forces will inevitably sur-
face, eroding the alliance between
Nicaragua’s business sectors and
the FSLN. Already a group of
social democrats who claim to
have the backing of former
Venezuelan President Carlos An-
dres Perez have formed a new
political party (Partido Social
Democratica Sandinista) under
the slogan, “Sandinismo, si, Com-
unismo, no.” A spokesperson for
the FSLN has denounced the new
party, calling it “counter-
revolutionary.”
Only time will tell how suc-
cessfully the Sandinistas can
navigate the turbulent waters
ahead. Thus far they have begun
to forge some of the essential
building blocks-an army under
popular control and the political
mobilization of the masses-that
make a revolutionary restructuring
of Nicaragua possible.