On June 27, 2004, the 31st anniversary of the military coup that inaugurated a brutal 11-year dictatorship, Uruguayans chose the presidential candidates for the October 13 national elections. Signaling their desire for change, Uruguayans overwhelmingly rejected the ruling Colorado Party and confirmed the left-of-center coalition Progressive Encounter-Broad Front (EP-FA) as the country’s main political force. Forty-three percent supported the EP-FA, 16% more than in the 1999 primaries.
Yet EP-FA supporters held no jubilant celebrations. Tabaré Vázquez, the coalition’s charismatic presidential candidate, could not conceal his concern: his coalition received nearly 5% less than anticipated by most opinion polls, and almost 60% of the residents of Montevideo, an EP-FA stronghold, did not vote in this non-mandatory primary. The victory tasted of defeat, conjuring memories of their 1999 second-round loss to an alliance between the country’s traditional Colorado and Blanco (or National) parties—the twin conservative factions that have dominated national politics since the founding of the republic. Would history repeat itself?
Most surprising in the primaries was the leadership renewal within the Blanco Party. Blanco voters united behind Jorge Larrañaga, who soundly defeated former president Luís Alberto Lacalle. Larrañaga, former mayor of the northern city of Paysandú, presented himself as an outsider to the party establishment. He promised to rejuvenate the party, offering a progressive platform incorporating typical positions of the left, like the need to renegotiate foreign debt payments, create jobs and increase social spending. Larrañaga is challenging the EP-FA’s comfortable position as the country’s sole progressive force.
The outcome of the primaries sent a warning to the EP-FA. Encouraged by favorable polls and the positive outcome of a referendum they organized earlier this year against a government plan to privatize the state-owned oil refinery, the EP-FA was overly confident. It ran a low-profile campaign based on general statements of principle but short on policy details.
The EP-FA will likely receive the most votes in October. However, it may not secure the absolute majority—50% plus one—required to win the presidency. If not, it will face a Blanco-Colorado alliance and possible defeat in a second-round vote the following month. With the Colorados—largely held responsible by the public for the economic and social crisis—basically eliminated, it has become a tight race between the EP-FA and the Blanco Party. The two are competing for centrist voters whose ballots, according to most analysts, will sway the election. Lacking challengers from the left, EP-FA leaders confidently courted centrist voters during the primaries. They repeatedly promised to run a “responsible” government and that “socialism” was not on their immediate agenda. Former leader of the 1960s Tupamaro guerrilla movement and current EP-FA Senator Juan Mujica even argued that the left should merely strive to make capitalism more efficient and just. When an EP-FA adviser spoke of raising taxes on agrarian producers, coalition leaders quickly disassociated his statement from official policy.
The coalition’s advisers and Vázquez reassured private investors with the help of U.S. investment bank Merrill Lynch. Following meetings with political leaders, bank officials reported that there is “little room for experimentation” and that they were convinced the Uruguayan left would not introduce radical shifts in policy.
While this may appease investors, it troubles many leftwing activists. Especially disturbing to militants was Vázquez’s announcement that, if elected, he would offer the Minister of Finance post to Uruguayan-born Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) President Enrique Iglesias. How could Iglesias—head of an institution promoting structural reform in the region—command an economic policy to overcome the legacy of those very reforms?
When Iglesias declined, Vázquez offered the post to moderate coalition member Danilo Astori. Astori is close to traditional party leaders, has publicly opposed certain EP-FA standpoints and criticized Argentina’s handling of its debt. His designation, which suggests that the EP-FA will not radically alter macroeconomic policy, provoked criticism even from vice-presidential candidate Rodolfo Nin Novoa, who commented: “We are sending too many signals to the markets and not enough to the people.”
Vázquez also came under fire in July upon assuring Spanish businesspersons, including representatives of two water companies operating in Uruguay, that an EP-FA administration would respect all commitments made by previous governments. The EP-FA belongs to the National Commission for the Defense of Water and Life, a coalition campaigning to amend the constitution to declare the country’s water resources off-limits to private companies. Commission leader María Selva Ortíz asserted that if the pending referendum on this question succeeds, existing contracts with private water companies would have to be cancelled, Vázquez conceded.
Grassroots activists are complaining that by accommodating the center the coalition is losing its identity. Alienating its base supporters is risky for the EP-FA. Lacking the resources of traditional parties, the coalition depends on supporters to actively engage in its campaigns. Although EP-FA support has risen dramatically, activist involvement has plummeted. The coalition’s courtship of the center is likely to exacerbate this so-called “crisis of participation.”
If the EP-FA wins the election, it will face great challenges. The first will be the immediate expectations and needs of many Uruguayans. Knowing they will inherit a crisis, coalition leaders have avoided inflating expectations. Unemployment, currently at 14%, has nearly doubled since 1990. Informal employment is increasing while real salaries have declined by almost 30% since 2000. An unprecedented 40% of Uruguayan families are living below the poverty line. Public education and healthcare are undergoing their worst crises ever. The gap between rich and poor has widened and trust in the political system has never been lower. Emigration has reached record numbers as the young migrate to Europe seeking work. The EP-FA will be hard-pressed even to alleviate the symptoms of these problems in the short term.
The second challenge will be to develop a coherent, long-term development strategy. EP-FA leaders already announced their support for regional integration through MERCOSUR, proposed by Brazil and Argentina in opposition to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). While this constitutes a constructive long-term plan for regional development, its effects will not be immediate.
The third challenge is the foreign debt. Vázquez made it clear that while the EP-FA will not default on debt payments, it will pursue renegotiation. Yet, given Uruguay’s weak economy, the EP-FA has little leverage; it will likely negotiate by presenting a workable plan to manage the crisis.
The fourth challenge is the EP-FA’s commitment to investigate human rights abuses under military rule. The amnesty law, approved following the 1985 return to democracy, forgave all the dictatorship’s abuses. Article 4, however, required an investigation of all incidents of abuse to establish the truth. EP-FA leaders promise to fully implement Article 4. Though necessary, this would produce conflict with an unrepentant military and may alienate those who prefer not to revisit the past.
Despite these challenges, the EP-FA seems well positioned to lead Uruguay out of its crisis and onto a path of equitable social and economic development. It enjoys widespread support from a unified union movement, grassroots organizations, social movement activists and youth. Its management of Montevideo’s municipal government for the past 14 years enhances its credibility. There, its decentralization program promoted citizen participation and resource redistribution to benefit the urban poor, earning an approval rate of over 60% from city residents.
The EP-FA has the political will to address the country’s ills. Understanding that sustainable economic growth requires redistribution and equity, the EP-FA proposes to build a “productive” and “solidary” country, as opposed to the “speculative” and “exclusionary” market-based model of past Colorado and Blanco governments.
The EP-FA, however, has yet to explain how its laudable goals can be achieved. How to avoid a fiscal deficit while addressing the social emergency? How to finance social spending without raising taxes? How to increase production and redistribution simultaneously? Without specifying such policies, coalition principles sound hollow to many. Nonetheless, withholding detail appears to be a campaign strategy to avoid scaring centrist voters. This may become the Achilles’ heel of the EP-FA campaign.
In October, Uruguayans will choose the candidate most persuasive in presenting policies to overcome the legacy of Colorado rule. The left has the historic opportunity to capture the presidency, if it is able to inspire fellow citizens to embark on a journey of hope and transformation.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Eduardo Canel, born in Uruguay, teaches Latin American and Caribbean studies and international development at York University in Toronto. He is currently in Montevideo researching the EP-FA municipal decentralization program and citizen participation in poor neighborhoods.
