Comment

On Nicaragua
The analysis of your Nicaragua is-
sue is a welcome relief from a polarized
debate. On few topics has the lack of
critical thinking of the U.S. Left been so
apparent as on the subject of Nicaragua.
Hopefully, the contribution NACLA
has made will inspire the critical per-
spective that seems so lacking. I salute
your courage in embarking upon the
task of opening discussion in the face of
what are likely to be many objections.
Michael Wyman
Maryland
I must say that I was disappointed in
the Nicaragua report. Most of my dis-
appointment comes from the tone, which
is something like this: Yeah, the Sandin-
istas faced impossible odds, but they
blew it by driving new cars and running
a fancy campaign. That is not an
analysis, but an implication wrapped in
what sounds like personal irritation. I
expected better from NACLA, and I
think the Sandinistas deserve better.
Steve Slade
California
The post mortem over the electoral
defeat of the FSLN, reflected in your
June issue, has largely revolved around
two rather sterile dichotomies. First,
did the revolution move too fast, thereby
leaving the population trailing in its
wake, or was the process of change too
slow, frustrating and disillusioning its
supporters as the FSLN tried to placate
the U.S. government and the Nicara-
guan bourgeoisie? This debate has
busied the Left since the days of Allen-
de. A second discussion is over the
balance between internal and external
factors (specifically U.S. pressure) in
causing the Sandinistas’ downfall.
The division into external and inter-
nal elements is to some extent mislead-
ing. What the Sandinistas did affected
the level of international isolation and
pressure they experienced. But more
importantly for understanding the elec-
tion result, it was precisely the unceas-
ing military and economic attack from
Washington which undermined the
FSLN from within. The war and the
economic crisis exhausted cadres and
ordinary people alike, leading to a drop-
off in popular organization that sapped
the vitality of the revolution. The eco-
nomic crisis forced the FSLN to pre-
vent the trade unions from fighting for
what their members really needed-
wage increases and food. Such growing
verticalism further discredited the mass
organizations. The FSLN’s best cadres
went into the army, leaving a higher
proportion of time-servers and party
bureaucrats in government to irritate
the public and undermine support for
the revolution.
As the political and economic op-
tions narrowed, the FSLN twisted and
turned (often up to 180 degrees). In the
process, they made mistakes, alienat-
ing key sectors of the population, but
these were generally minor errors
compared to the damage caused from
outside. The unpalatable lesson of
Nicaragua (and increasingly of El Sal-
vador) is that the United States has the
power to frustrate a revolutionary po-
litical project in Central America.
Duncan Green
Latin America Bureau, London
The FSLN’s chances for rebuilding
in the wake of its electoral defeat are
clearly linked to a thoroughgoing and
accurate analysis of the factors which
brought it about, including mistakes
committed by the Sandinistas. Hence,
we applaud NACLA’s contribution to
this debate.
But the task of deciphering the les-
sons of the last eleven years suffers
when it becomes an open invitation to
“Sandinista-bashing,” where any and
all criticisms are seen as valid. In this
regard, we would take issue with Carlos
Vilas, perhaps less for what he says
than for what he fails to say. First, the
FSLN and the Nicaraguan revolution
were the victims in an unequal battle
with the United States. Vilas’ search for
“What Went Wrong?” essentially boils
down to a “blame the victim” argu-
ment. Precisely “what went wrong” is
that Nicaragua was forced into the
boxing ring with an opponent many
times its material and military strength.
The policies and tactics employed by
the FSLN to assure the revolution’s
survival should not be evaluated as
issues of “what went wrong,” but as
the terms under.which the contest un-
folded.
The substantial issue here, as Vick-
ers mentions, is the constraints imposed
on revolutionary processes by imperi-
CONTINUED ON PAGE 3
alism and international conjunctures.
As valid as many of the concrete obser-
vations and punctual criticisms in Vilas’
article may be, they are put forward in
a fallacious framework which attempts
to separate out “internal” from ‘”exter-
nal” factors. He argues that faulty FSLN
policies and practices led the revolution
to cave in on itself, notwithstanding
external pressure. We believe the inter-
nal and external factors are inextricably
linked and attempts to treat them inde-
pendently distort, rather than clarify,
the analysis.
Kent Norsworthy
Bill Robinson
Texas
The writers are co-authors of
David and Goliath: The U.S. War
Against Nicaragua (Monthly Review
Press, 1987).
Your issue was excellent. It is hard
to imagine a better informed triumvi-
rate than Carlos Vilas, George Vickers
and Trish O’Kane. Their analyses of
the causes of the FSLN defeat and
prospects for the future are very sound.
The only significant criticism I
would offer concerns one factual error
which appears in the Vilas article (p. 17)
and is echoed by the editor in his intro-
duction (p.9). In predicting that “a rapid
decline of Daniel Ortega is…likely,”
Vilas states that “Already he has been
removed from the party leadership,
replaced by a triumvirate made up of
Commanders Lufs Carri6n as coordi-
nator, Bayardo Arce as treasurer, and
Henry Ruiz in charge of foreign rela-
tions.”
I checked with Paul Oquist, a Sandin-
ista advisor and head of the new Insti-
tute for Nicaraguan Studies, and with
Reinaldo Tefel, the former Minister of
Social Welfare and a current FSLN
deputy in the National Assembly. Oquist
confirmed my understanding that
Ortega is the coordinator of the FSLN
Executive Committee, Luis Carri6n is
his chief of staff, and the other two
members are Arce and Rufz in the
positions indicated by Vilas. In Oquist’s
words, “The four of them make up the
top echelon of the National Directorate
office. Ortega is the undisputed head of
the party.” Tefel and his former vice
minister, Ricardo Chavarrfa, when read
the NACLA phraseology, gave essen-
tially the same response and informa-
tion as Oquist.
In addition, recent events would
seem to undermine Vilas’ assertion that
“Ortega’s position in the party seems
quite precarious.” It was Ortega who
negotiated the accord with the UNO
government which ended the July
strikes. And it was Ortega who gave the
principal speech before the crowd of
60,000 that gathered on July 19 (in spite
of the UNO government’s suspension
that day of all public transportation) to
commemorate the eleventh anniversary
of the revolution. Given this and his
superbly graceful handling of the elec-
toral defeat, I would not count him out
quite yet.
Thomas W. Walker
University of Ohio
The writer is the author
of several books on Nicaragua.
Vilas Replies
Certainly, Daniel Ortega is the head
of the FSLN, but many high-level
Sandinistas, as well as rank-and-file
members and observers, interpreted the
appointment of Carri6n, Arce and Ruiz
as I did. Since early April, changes in
some aspects of the FSLN dynamic
reinforce my position: the May and
July strikes, the relative autonomy
achieved by the Sandinista labor lead-
ership, the celebration of the “Asam-
blea de Militantes Sandinistas” with
intense internal debate, the municipal
and departmental elections of new party
cadres, and the preparations for the first
FSLN congress. Yes, Ortega gave the
July 19 anniversary speech, as he has
done every year since 1980. I will not
dispute Tom’s interpretation of this.
But I must correct his sources regarding
the agreement that ended the July strikes.
Even if, as a political scientist, I don’t
consider signatures on documents a
reliable indicator of popularity, Ortega’s
signature does not appear on the accord
(Barricada, July 13, 1990, p. 3).
Opportunities to agree with Robin-
son and Norsworthy are so infrequent
that I am happy to have the chance to
stress our basic concurrence on the
impact of war upon the elections. I start
my analysis by asserting that the voting
was conditioned by a decade of counter-
revolutionary war (p. 11), although ap-
parently they jumped over it. But my
article goes beyond this, exploring
additional factors, such as economic
policies, cultural traits, party politics,
mass demobilization, “spite voting,”
uneven distribution of gains and losses,
and other elements recognized by the
FSLN (Barricada, June 26-29, 1990).
Robinson and Norsworthy’s, and to
a certain extent Green’s, argument on
“internal” and “external” factors is
more formal than substantial. Being
from, and in, the Third World, I recog-
nize a strong “First World bias” in the
argument. For us, the most practical
way to fight imperialism starts at home.
The question is not just war (history
teaches us that social revolutions have
always faced counterrevolution and
imperialist aggression) but the way a
revolution confronts war. Either it is an
obstacle that lowers the intensity of
social and economic change, reduces
the level and extent of people’s partici-
pation, and encourages leaders’ self-
indulgence; or it is an extremely painful
but unavoidable means to advance
political and economic transformation
and to ensure people’s direct involve-
ment in the process. Military defense
can be based on the political protag-
onism of the masses.
My commentators take a one-sided
approach that has been useful in gener-
ating U.S. and Western European grass-
roots solidarity, but has made it very
difficult for revolutionaries to confront
their own contradictions and distortions.
This very approach indirectly contrib-
uted to increased popular frustration,
strengthened the arguments of the
opposition, and-like it or not-nur-
tured anti-Sandinista voting.
I suppose much of our disagreement
stems from a different relationship to
the Sandinista Revolution. Robinson
and Norsworthy’s work was mostly with
solidarity networks, independent agen-
cies and the international community.
Mine has been with peasant co-ops,
rural workers, Indian communities and
mass organizations.
Green’s final statement, that in or-
der to survive Central American gov-
ernments must come to terms with U.S.
domination in the region, is descrip-
tively accurate. But what about the
people’s survival?
Carlos M. Vilas