On November 28, 1993, when Luis Donaldo Colosio was unveiled as the presidential candi-
date of the governing Institutional Revolution-
ary Party (PRI), the future of President Carlos Salinas’
“modernization” project-Salinismo-appeared to be
on firm footing. Public opinion polls showed President
Salinas to be widely popular; the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) guaran-
teed the continuity of the regime’s free-market eco-
nomic policy; the center-left opposition led by
Cuauht6moc C.rdenas appeared to be stalled and iso-
lated; and despite some ups and downs, the PRI had
maintained its alliance with the conservative opposi-
tion National Action Party (PAN).
Colosio was successfully being carried along by his
carefully manufactured salinista image as a young
member of the Clintonian generation of change. His
candidacy was universally interpreted as an attempt to
continue the policies of Salinas. After all, Colosio had
grown politically within the shadow of Salinas, coor-
dinating his electoral campaign in 1988, directing the
PRI, and running the ministry responsible for the
Luis Hernandez is an advisor to the National Coordinating Com-
mittee of Coffee Cooperatives (CNOC) in Mexico City, a
researcher at the Center for the Study of Change in the Mexican
Countryside (CECCAM), and a frequent contributor to the daily
paper La Jornada. Laura Carlsen is a freelance journalist based in
Mexico City.
Translated from the Spanish by NACLA.
administration of social, housing and environmental
policy. The conduct of this ministry was particularly
important because one of its arms, Pronasol-the pro-
gram designed to combat extreme poverty-was
intended to create a new social base for the Salinas
project.
Although five other precandidates-tapados (con-
cealed) as they are called in Mexican political jargon
in an allusion to cockfighting-were formally in the
running for the presidency, in fact Colosio faced only
one principal rival, Manuel Camacho. During the
course of the Salinas Administration, Camacho was
mayor of Mexico City, and was able to use the enor-
mous discretionary powers of the office to openly
negotiate conflicts with the political opposition. As a
consequence, Camacho became known as one of the
more democratic members of the regime, and simulta-
neously, earned the enmity of important groups with-
in the PRI. When Colosio was destapado-
unveiled-as the presidential candidate, Camacho
refused to follow the “rules of the game,” and did not
present himself with the rest of the aspirants to con-
gratulate the winner. On the contrary, he gave up his
post as mayor, announcing that he had aspired to be
the presidential candidate and intended to remain in
politics. Salinas then appointed him minister of exter-
nal relations. Camacho’s independent attitude was the
first lightning bolt in the impending Mexican political
storm.
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Like a stone
dropped into a pond,
the Chiapas insurrection
produced waves that rippled
through Mexican society.
These waves met waves
produced by other stones,
and old fights among
the members of the
political elite reappeared
and intensified.
On January 1, the day that NAFTA was slated to
take effect, the storm itself began to materialize. On
that date, the country was supposed to awaken as a
member of the First World. The indigenous-peasant
uprising in Chiapas, however, demonstrated that Mex-
ico was closer to Central America than to its neigh-
bors to the north.
Like a stone dropped into a pond, the Chiapas insur-
rection produced waves that rippled through Mexican
society. These waves met other waves produced by
other stones. The Chiapas uprising, led by the Zapatista
National Liberation Army (EZLN), broke the domi-
nant political bloc in two. The governing classes
found themselves divided over how to confront the
conflict-with repression, or with a negotiated solu-
tion. Old fights among the members of the political
elite reappeared and intensified.
In the same way, the armed uprising prompted the
recomposition of deeply rooted forces within the
Catholic Church, and led to a redefinition of the limits
of the church-state relationship. In the last few years
the most conservative positions within the Church had
rapidly gained ascendancy-in part due to an alliance
with the Salinas Administration-and the most pro-
gressive positions had found themselves practically
abandoned. The Chiapas conflict sparked a radical
turnaround in this correlation of forces. The Bishop of
San Crist6bal, Samuel Ruiz-a cornered figure, on the
verge of being transferred to the Vatican for his work
at the side of the poor of his diocese-quickly became
the central figure in the peace negotiations. The Papal
Nuncio, on the other hand, saw his political presence
diminish overnight. The Church, led by Bishop Ruiz,
responded forcefully to governmental accusations that
it was intellectually responsible for the indigenous
uprising, and through its actions gave support and
legitimacy to a negotiated solution to the conflict.
The peasant insurrection precipitated a significant
rebirth of civil, popular and peasant movements. Peo-
ple poured into the streets to demand an end to the
hostilities. Thousands of peasants and members of
indigenous communities demonstrated their solidarity
with the EZLN. This civic effervescence was
enhanced by media coverage-mainly by the sheer
number of articles and editorials explaining or justify-
ing the uprising in independent newspapers and maga-
zines. Establishment writers, appearing in mainstream
Mexican magazines like Vuelta and Nexos, saw in this
coverage a dangerous apology for violence. Their
opinions, however, were drowned out in the clamor.
for peace, international pressure, and the strug-
gle of those within the Administration who
wanted a negotiated solution led to a governmental
policy of negotiation. Salinas named Manuel Cama-
cho commissioner of peace, and the conflicting parties
agreed that Samuel Ruiz would serve as mediator.
Meanwhile, Patrocinio Gonzalez, the Minister of the
Interior-ex-governor and strong man of Chiapas-
had to give up his position, as did the present Gover-
nor of Chiapas, Elmer Seltzer. In the Ministry of the
Interior, Jorge Carpizo, a former police chief close to
Salinas but distant from the PRI was named defender
of human rights.
The charismatic political figure of Camacho and the
enormous importance of the negotiating process over-
shadowed the presidential candidates and the electoral
campaign. Colosio and his political platform were rel-
egated to the interior pages of the national newspa-
pers. Only Cuauht6moc Cdrdenas was able, despite his
initial stumbling, to emerge relatively unscathed from
the conflict. Camacho’s favorable publicity combined
with his refusal to endorse the candidacy of Colosio
made him appear to be the real force for change. In
fact, he used the situation to try to construct a democ-
ratic center both within and outside the PRI. The con-
fusion was such that President Salinas felt obligated to
unveil Colosio for a second time as the candidate of
the PRI, thus violating the commitment of the Chief
Executive not to engage-overtly-in partisan poli-
tics.
Meanwhile, other pieces of the national political
puzzle were rapidly shifting. The armed uprising
waved the banner of Zapata and zapatismo in the face
VOL XXVIII, No 1JULY/AuGusT 1994 19 VOL XXVIII, No 1 JULY/AUGusT 1994 19REPORT ON MEXICO
A peasant march on April 10, 1994, commemorating the 75th anniversary of the death of Emiliano Zapata.
of the Salinas Administration which had attempted to
clothe its agrarian reforms in the image of el Caudillo
del Sur, Zapata himself. This demonstrated that while
the salinista agrarian reforms (primarily the reform of
Article 27 of the Constitution, privatizing peasants’
ejido holdings) might be supported by the national
directors of peasant organizations, and perhaps by the
legislative powers, they were a long way from being
endorsed by the peasants themselves. At the same
time, the uprising radically called into question the
pact between ethnic groups and the government. From
one day to the next, groups of rural producers who had
basically identified themselves as peasants began to
assume the identity of indigenous people. Above all,
the armed insurgency showed, with absolute clarity,
the enormous importance of the rural question for
national stability, despite the fact that only a quarter of
the workforce is rural. It made clear that any policy of
modernization would have to take the existing rural
population into account, and that any attempt to leave
this sector out would have immense social and politi-
cal consequences.
In the course of just a few weeks, non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) came to play a very impor-
tant role as “windows” through which the Chiapas
insurgency could be related to the rest of the country.
NGOs like the Chiapas-based Convergence For Peace
(CONPAZ) and the Fray Bartolom6 de las Casas
Center for Human Rights were crucial in organizing
popular sympathy for the uprising, and formulating a
series of relevant political responses to the initial
demands of the EZLN to democratize the country. As
a result, eight of the nine registered political parties
(with the exception of only the small center-Left Pop-
ular Socialist Party) signed an Agreement for Peace,
Democracy and Clean Elections with the objective of
giving credibility to the August 21 vote.
On February 20, 51 days into the uprising, the
“Working Days for Peace and Reconciliation” were
initiated. In the Cathedral of San Crist6bal de las
Casas, negotiations began between the government
and the EZLN. The government’s responses to the
indigenous demands were then brought back to the
communities-in-arms for consultation.
Colosio’s campaign was nonetheless unable to take
off. In early March, the center-left candidacy of Cdr-
denas’ Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)
gained sympathy day by day, as the campaign of the
other important opposition party, the PAN, was deflat-
ing. In response, Colosio began to take more radical
stands in his campaign. On March 6, at a rally com-
memorating the sixty-fifth anniversary of the PRI, he
proposed the necessity of separating the party from the
state. Little by little, he began to adopt many of the
opposition’s demands as his own-among them, the
presence of electoral observors, and electoral trans-
parency. In a private meeting on March 16, Colosio
and Camacho signed an alliance. The new pact implic-
itly broke a series of alliances Colosio had made with
more established interest groups to secure his nomina-
tion. In a March 22 press conference, Camacho ended
speculation about his intentions by announcing that he
would not seek the presidency this year. One day later,
on March 23, Colosio was assassinated.
The assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio sank
the country into a trough of insecurity and anxi-
ety. To begin with, many believed the murder
was a crime of the state, a settling of accounts within
the system, evidence of a war among the distinct clans
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As the political crisis
intensified,
the Mexican economy
showed the weakness
that belied its apparent strength.
The Clinton Administration
even felt compelled
to authorize a line of credit
of $6 billion to prop
the economy up and
ensure political stability.
of the “revolutionary family.” It became very quickly
apparent that it was not the work of a lunatic, but the
result of a conspiracy. The corpse of the candidate was
transformed into part of the internal war. The most
hardline sector of the PRI immediately mobilized to
place responsibility for the assassination on the shoul-
ders of Camacho, and thereby derail any attempt on
his part to reemerge as a candidate. The modernizers
filtered information to the press, attempting to impli-
cate members of the old political class in the assassi-
nation. For their part, members of the Jurassic political
establishment spread the version of a settling of
accounts within Salinismo which resulted from the
candidate’s break with the President.
Any solution to the Chiapas conflict immediately
froze, since rumors of Camacho’s involvement in the
assassination weakened his ability to negotiate. The
Zapatistas suspended the process of consultation and
placed themselves on “red alert.” They indicated that
they thought Colosio had been assassinated at the
orders of those who wanted a military solution to the
Chiapas conflict. The ranchers from Chiapas and the
rest of the country began to actively mobilize, seeking
to put a brake on land seizures-around 125,000 acres
to date-and to force a resolution of the conflict in
their favor. The prospects for a peaceful solution
diminished in the short run.
The internal struggle to designate a new candidate
of the official party was, once again, contentious,
bloody and difficult. When the dust settled, Salinas
chose Ernesto Zedillo, a young technocrat without
deep roots in the party. Many old members of the PRI
saw the nomination as an affront which would cost the
party dearly. The nomination of Zedillo opened yet
more wounds in this internal war, and simultaneously
sowed more doubts about the possibility of a victory
in clean elections.
As the political crisis intensified, the Mexican econ-
omy showed the weakness that belied its apparent
strength. The rapid slide of the value of the peso-8%
between January and March-produced a capital flight
of about $11 billion; there was a drastic rise in interest
rates, and inflation grew beyond all expectations. The
year seemed to have left behind all possibilities for
economic growth. The Clinton Administration even
felt compelled to send in reinforcements. The U.S.
government underwrote its commercial partner by
authorizing a line of credit of $6 billion to prop up the
Mexican economy and ensure political stability.
But the climate continued to worsen. Two important
businessmen were kidnapped. And a few days after
the nomination of Zedillo, an explosion shattered a
bank in the city of Monterrey. While the government
announced that the explosion was an accident caused
by a gas leak, private experts asserted that the bank
had been bombed. This added yet another element of
uncertainty to the picture. People became convinced
that an unknown war was raging within the country.
This political conflict is now developing within the
framework of the August 21 presidential elections.
Whatever the electoral results may be, it is of para-
mount importance that they be credible. Despite modi-
fications to the electoral law, the governing party con-
tinues to have a substantial organizing and
administrative role in the electoral process. The elec-
tions are being held in a context of a generalized lack
of credibility, in which the democratic citizenry are
not inclined to support any more hoaxes.
The Chiapas conflict also remains alive, though the
civic and peasant mobilization initiated by the indige-
nous rebellion never quite succeeded in articulating
itself on a national basis. Its momentum was slowed by
the assassination and the ensuing climate of political
decomposition and uncertainty. In mid-June, the
Zapatistas rejected the government’s 34-point peace
plan, mainly because it did not adequately deal with
questions of political democracy. Zedillo then declared
the talks a “failure” and Camacho, citing a lack of offi-
cial support, resigned as negotiator. All this adds
another element of uncertainty to the possibility of a
post-electoral political explosion.
Mexico is living at the end of an era, as the 65-year-
old regime of an official state party draws to a close.
One of two scenarios is likely to be played out in the
country’s immediate political future: either the various
parties will agree to a national pact of conciliation, and
a fragile coalition government will lead a transition to
political democracy, or a full-fledged political con-
frontation will occur, and Mexico’s future will become
even more uncertain than ever.
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