Breaking Haiti

On the bicentennial of Haiti’s independence, the country once again disintegrated into an orgy of bloodletting. Corruption, abuse of power, partisan goon squads, criminal gangs, an intransigent opposition and finally an armed revolt all contributed significantly to the human tragedy of Haiti. But blame must be prominently placed on Washington for squeezing Haiti until it bled.

The overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti is perfectly consistent with the age-old U.S. government strategy of breaking, destabilizing and ultimately ousting Latin American leaders it deems “inappropriate.” At best, U.S. diplomats in the presence of U.S. Marines deposed Aristide when they forced on him the non-choice of fleeing or dying. In its totality, recent U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti is akin to counterinsurgency tactics: fortifying the opposition, strangling the life-blood of the enemy, disinformation campaigns and eventually the “rehabilitation” of the enemy. The Bush administration had two choices when faced with February’s violence: defend democracy or undermine it. As was the case with the April 2002 coup in Venezuela, they chose the latter. But the revolt was only the final straw that snapped the fragile back of Haiti’s hard-fought democracy and Washington jumped at the chance to break the beleaguered president.

As in other Latin American countries, the U.S. government’s enthusiastic support of Haiti’s dictatorships during the Cold War created repressive military and security apparatuses. They have again reared their ugly head and continue to undermine democratic institutions and human rights. Emerging from the torrent of military atrocity, Haitians freely elected Aristide on a tide of popular support in 1990. He was then ousted only nine months into his term; the new military junta went on to kill some 4,000 Haitians. Faced with the domestic political crisis of boatloads of refugees fleeing the brutal dictatorship, the Clinton administration restored Aristide to power.

The intervention was warranted, but recent events show all too clearly that the deal struck in 1994 played no small part in the violent political quagmire that directly preceded the recent revolt. As part of the agreement, Aristide demobilized the army and conceded to stringent neoliberal reforms. The military was disbanded but not disarmed, leaving a disgruntled, politicized former military and a politically polarized and armed civilian population. In the place of the army, a woefully tiny U.S.-trained police force of only 4,000 officers was created with the mandate of providing security to a country of eight million. The police became the first targets of the insurgents, whose leaders are those the United States ostensibly removed from power in 1994. Leaders of the so-called rebels who rode triumphantly into Port-au-Prince, with U.S.-made weapons, include former military, convicted criminals and indicted death squad leaders.

Economically, the U.S. succeeded in “making the economy scream,” as Nixon referred to the comparable sabotage used against Chile. Besides the already staggering economic depravity and non-existent social services, international development aid promised to Haiti was blocked in 2000 in an effort spearheaded by the virulently racist U.S. Senator Jesse Helms. The aid was frozen because of eight disputed senatorial seats in Haiti’s parliament. The senators eventually stepped down at the behest of Aristide, making the sanctions baseless.

Poverty, sanctions, insecurity and violence intensified the political polarization, which is ultimately what made Haiti ungovernable. The political opposition knew their non-negotiation on a proposed settlement was backed by non-intervention (political or otherwise) by Washington—a situation they rightly believed would oust Aristide. Their intransigence was emboldened by what one Haitian official characterized as “a wink and a nod of the U.S.” government. Indeed, while Haiti’s development aid was frozen, the little money that did trickle into the country funded opposition groups via the National Endowment for Democracy and the International Republican Institute. Historically, the NED’s other nefarious projects include funding opposition parties in Nicaragua, Panama and even Costa Rica in the 1980s.

The U.S. government’s position on Aristide during the armed revolt flip-flopped daily. In the end, they did nothing. Donald Rumsfeld gave a typically convoluted summation of their position on Haiti: “We have no plans to do anything. By that, I don’t mean we have no plans. Obviously, we have plans to do everything in the world that we can think of. But we—there’s no intention at the present time, or no reason to believe, that any of the thinking…would have to be utilized.”

Aristide finally fled and Bush immediately announced the deployment of U.S. Marines. In doing so, the White House expressed concern that the insurgent “thugs” might seize power, claiming they wanted to defend “democracy” by ensuring the survival of a “constitutionally-established” transitional government. The Bush administration like those before it (Eisenhower, Kennedy, Papa Bush, Clinton) got its wish: regime change in Haiti. Still, administration officials toss their hands in the air with a “Who me?” attitude, implying that what happened in Haiti was an internal, domestic, “political solution;” and an acceptable, favorable one at that.

About the Authors
Garry Leech is the Interim Editor of the NACLA Report on the Americas. Teo Ballvé is NACLA’s associate editor and a contributing news editor for the Resource Center of the America’s Connection to the Americas www.americas.org.