PANAMA’S POLITICAL CRISIS IS HARDLY A
revolutionary one. It is a dispute among elites
which in no way challenges the status quo for the poor
majority. Since the crisis began in earnest in June 1987,
it has become ever clearer that the government and the
opposition have no fundamental policy disagreement.
They differ only on who should hold the reins of power.
This is the latest version of a battle that has raged for
much of Panama’s independent life.
Until 1968, when the National Guard rose up to put
an end to oligarchic rule, Panamanian politics were
nothing but family rivalries within the ruling caste. In
the “cousins’ republic,” as it was commonly called,
such disputes as now divide the elite were mediated by
the United States; vain old Uncle Sam sought to play
favorites with whichever nephew claimed to love him
most.
UJ LY/AUGUST 1988
The oligarchy’s parties faced stiff competition after
1936 from the Authentic Panamanian Party of Arnulfo
Arias Madrid, who died in August of this year. Arias
towered over Panama’s politics for 50 of the country’s
85 years of independent life. A rancher, coffee grower
and member of the oligarchy, Arias was at once nation-
alist, pro-United States, pro-fascist and populist, but
above all immensely proud of being one of the last
remaining caudillos in Latin America. His election to
the presidency in 1941 prompted a military coup, since
his desire to nationalize the canal-as well as his favor-
able attitude towards Hitler-were frowned upon by the
United States. Denied victory again in 1948, Arias was
installed by a coup in 1949, but was impeached and
banned from public life a year later.
In 1968, the legendary populist triumphed once
more. In that election the poor intruded on Panama’s
Church-sponsored food line in Panama City PANAMA
The grand master of Panamanian politics: Arnulfo Arias
elite political scene with increasing demands from
workers, peasants and other dispossessed. Eleven days
after Arias took office, a military coup forced him to
flee to the Canal Zone.
Although the National Guard emerged in 1968 as the
only force capable of maintaining the status quo, it had
no social base of support nor any coherent program of
government. Only after several purges, when Omar
Torrijos Herrera became strongman of the Guard and
government, did it become clear that this coup would be
unlike any other.
Torrijos sought to build a new political system in
which the poor would participate but the military would
rule in their name. He cloaked class and race divisions
under the banner of national unity, focusing Panama’s
nationalist tradition on the canal treaty negotiations
with the United States which had been underway since
1964.1 Torrijos instituted a program of labor, agrarian,
political and social reforms that responded to the needs
of the poor, while directing the embryonic popular
movement towards official channels. Although Torrijos
clearly undercut the oligarchy’s political power (parties
were banned), he also built an alliance with a sector of
the elite by developing a center for international bank-
ing and related transnational services which became the
dynamo of Panama’s growing economy.
By the end of the 1970s, Torrijos’ rule had achieved
economic growth and modernization, living standards
had improved and large sectors of the poor were
brought into the political system. More importantly,
Torrijos’ program gave birth to a “military-business
complex” which would dominate Panama’s politics
long after his demise.
In 1977, Torrijos signed treaties with President
Jimmy Carter by which the Canal would be turned over
to Panama in the year 2000. While the treaties did not
fulfill most Panamanians’ aspirations for total sover-
eignty, they did put an end to the pact of national unity
that Torrijos had been able to enforce during their nego-
tiation. Workers no longer had to contain their de-
mands, nor did the oligarchy have to check its desire to
govern without intermediaries.
TraHE UNITED STATES CONDITIONED ITS
1 ratification of the treaties on Panama’s adopting a
“democratic” form of government, clearly in the hope
that Panama’s civilian politicians would prove more
malleable than the nationalist Torrijos. The National
Guard, still the center of gravity of Panamanian politics,
and Omar Torrijos, the hub of that center, chose to drop
out of sight. He resigned from the government in Octo-
ber 1978, paving the way for the return of legal political
parties. The military founded the Democratic Revolu-
tionary Party (PRD) to carry forth its policies, and a
civilian regime drawn from the new party was inaugu-
rated.
In July 1981, an airplane carrying Gen. Torrijos
crashed suspiciously on the slopes of Cerro Marta dur-
ing a ten-minute flight and the gradual transition of
Panama’s society was thrown abruptly off course.’ The
balance between the military and the civilian govern-
ment was lost, and the only political leader who could
have beaten Amulfo Arias at the polls was gone. As
Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez put it, “Central America lost
its great moderator.”
After his death, Torrijos’ program unraveled. Under
pressure from the United States and in the context of an
economic recession and fiscal crisis, the government
weakened agrarian policy, eliminated the system of
local representation and restored the pre-1968 Legisla-
tive Assembly. It pulled the teeth from the Labor Code,
and cut back progressive health, education and housing
programs. In foreign policy, a junior role in Contadora
took the place of frontal attacks on U.S. imperialism.
One sign of the decomposition of torrijismo were
frequent changes in the nation’s leaders. In three years
there were four presidents, three commanders of the
National Guard (which became the Defense Forces in
1983) and several complete changes in the leadership
of the official party, the PRD. The man who managed
to consolidate power was Manuel Antonio Noriega,
chief of the Defense Forces as of 1983.
Panama’s economic elites and their foreign mentors
pushed hard for a return to business-as-usual politics,
where votes are bought, manipulated and influenced by
the powerful. They wanted the Defense Forces to return
to their pre-Torrijos role as guarantor of elite rule. And
despite widespread protests, they lobbied successfully
REPORT ON THE AMERICASfor the imposition of an unpopular International Mone-
tary Fund stabilization plan.
T HE SCENE WAS SET FOR THE GREAT
political battle of 1984, the first direct presidential
and vice-presidential elections in 16 years.’ The dispute
for power between the military-business alliance and
the old oligarchy was to be settled at the polls. Any
doubts about the government’s rightward trend were
put to rest in 1984 when the PRD brought the oligar-
chy’s Liberal and Republican parties into its National
Democratic Union (UNADE) coalition, along with the
business-oriented Labor Party (PALA) which, like the
PRD, is a creature of the military.
UNADE nominated World Bank vice-president
Nicolhs Ardito Barletta for president. As planning
minister, Barletta had been the brains behind the
strengthening of the international banking center and
the transnational services platform. His running mates
were made of similar cloth. First vice presidential can-
didate Erick Arturo Delvalle-later Reagan’s cause
c6l6bre-was a businessman who made millions in
sugar, television and thoroughbred horses. His party,
the Republican, is a family clan which ceases to exist
between elections. His uncle Max was vice-president in
the 1960s and led a coup attempt in 1967. UNADE’s
candidate for second vice president was the Liberal
Roderick Esquivel, an expert in political fraud and in-
trigue, tied to landowning and merchant interests.
UNADE had several sources of support: the govem-
ment, the Defense Forces, the business class linked to
transnational interests, the traditionally torrijista pub-
lic employees and grass-roots leaders as well. It even
enjoyed the support of the U.S. Embassy and Southern
Command, and most of the media. But an important
sector of the ruling party, the Torrijos Lives Movement,
put out a warning that would prove to be prophetic:
A process of “Reaganization” of the country is under-
way. It began with the physical liquidation of Torrijos
and now would like to liquidate his economic and
social program. The UNADE slate is center-Right. The
military has changed its politics, attacking the funda-
mentals oftorrijismo…. We are facing an accelerated
race towards the past in which democracy is viewed
simply as the pre-1968 political system.’
CHALLENGING UNADE WAS THE DEMO-
cratic Opposition Alliance (ADO), which gar-
nered the support of less profitable business interests,
such as landowners, real estate interests and non-export
merchants, as well as sectors of the middle class, unor-
ganized workers and poor campesinos. Most of them
were drawn by the charisma of ADO candidate Amulfo
Arias Madrid, who at 82 had been thrice elected presi-
dent, as many times overthrown, and seemed virtually
immortal.
Besides Arias’s Authentic Panamanian Party (PPA),
ADO’s principal members were the Liberal Republican
Nationalist Movement (MOLIRENA) and the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC). While the PPA was the per-
sonal vehicle of the old caudillo, MOLIRENA is a po-
litical quilt sewn from dissident patches of the oligar-
chic Liberal and Republican parties and from the de-
funct Third Nationalist Party.
The Christian Democrats are a different kettle of
fish. As elsewhere in Latin America, Panama’s PDC is
a middle-class reformist party. Heavily influenced by
the right wing of the Christian Democratic Intema-
tional, it is one of the most conservative of Central
America’s PDCs. Many view it as the opposition party
of the future which, with the demise of Amulfo Arias,
will inherit his base of popular support.
Despite such strident slogans as “Let us drive away
from our shores the threat of violent and enslaving
Castro-communism!” ADO did not put forth a specific
platform. Rather, the campaign churned out an unend-
ing stream of snippets from “The Leader’s” half-cen-
tury of political speech-making. ADO did have the
support of some of the media and the ideologues in the
Reagan Administration, but when it promised to try
military officers for human rights abuses, it picked a
fight with a powerful enemy.
The elections held in May and June were tumultu-
ous, and the vote-counting even more so. Evidence of
fraud abounded. According to the official results, Bar-
Leaflets have become the opposition’s press
JULY/AUGUST 1988
— — ——- —-PANAMA
letta won by only 1,713 votes. 6 The opposition protested
bitterly, but little came of it. Many thought the 1984
elections would build sufficient consensus among poli-
ticians, businessmen and the United States, to carry
through the modernization begun under Torrijos. In-
stead, internecine struggles over how to continue ruling
Panama only grew worse, until they boiled over in June
of last year.
W HEN COL. ROBERTO DIAZ HERRERA DETO-
nated the current political crisis with his accusa-
tions against Noriega, he unleashed pent-up tension at
all levels of Panamanian society. 7 Thousands of dem-
onstrators took to the streets, raising barricades, stoning
buildings and burning automobiles. The opposition
moved quickly to harness anti-government sentiment,
forming the National Civic Crusade to direct anti-gov-
ernment activities. Despite its name and the member-
ship of dozens of professional, civic and business or-
ganizations, the real movers and shakers behind the
Crusade are the major political parties which united to
contest the 1984 elections: PPA, MOLIRENA and
PDC.
Until February, the Crusade was able to muster a
great degree of unity. Even the parties toed the line,
although, beyond the goal of removing Gen. Noriega,
they had their differences. But once Delvalle turned on
Noriega (apparently at Elliott Abrams’ request) and was
dismissed, the business leaders, the PDC and MOLI-
RENA-making up the majority of the opposition-fol-
lowed President Reagan’s lead and called for the rein-
statement of the government they had been fiercely
struggling to oust! The one exception, the PPA, contin-
ued insisting on the immediate enthronement of Arnulfo
Arias, and in practice pulled out of the Crusade. But
with his death in August, the PPA lost its drawing card
and its strength.
The Left is small and divided, with the communist
People’s Party (PdelP) offering the government un-
bridled support, the Revolutionary Workers Party
(PRT) giving it critical support, and the Trotskyite So-
cialist Workers Party (PST) first taking a stance parallel
to that of the Civic Crusade, then working with the anti-
imperialist and anti-military Popular Civic Movement
(MCP) headed up by Dr. Mario Ztifiiga, who led dem-
onstrations against the IMF austerity package in 1984-
85.
G ENERAL NORIEGA, MEANWHILE, SEEMS
to have consolidated the support of the Defense
Forces, after the U.S.-inspired coup attempt on March
16 provided him with an opportunity to identify and
purge dissidents. The loyal PRD-“Gen. Noriega is not
negotiable”‘ ‘-remains in control of the Legislative As-
sembly, most municipalities and most cabinet positions.
The Labor Party (PALA), the next strongest party in the
ruling UNADE coalition, has adopted a more concili-
atory attitude towards the opposition. Without specify-
ing just what is negotiable, it is as firm as the PRD in
rejecting U.S. interference.
Other components of his government, meanwhile,
have not been such easy partners. All the members of
the UNADE slate in the last elections-Barletta, Del-
valle and Esquivel-have been pushed out of office and
into the opposition. As might be expected, the Republi-
can Party of ex-president Delvalle is to all practical
purposes out of UNADE. Noriega’s predecessor as
commander-in-chief (Gen. Paredes) and the officer who
was second-in-command until 1987 (Col. Diaz Her-
rera), as well as a part of the officer corps who were
loyal only a few months ago, are now against the strong-
man. In addition, a cohort of bureaucrats and business-
men, many of them beneficiaries of Torrijos’ policies,
now wave white handkerchiefs with the Crusade on
Panama City’s exclusive Calle 50 or lobby against
Noriega in the halls of the Pentagon, the State Depart-
ment or the White House.
Noriega’s great achievement has been to hang on to
power with so many lined up against him. He has done
so by knowing how to ignite Panamanian pride, the
essence of the country’s past and the key to its future.
Noriega has sung all the high notes of the nationalist
hymn: the fatherland under attack, imperial arrogance,
the lyrical and emotional value of land, ethnicity and
culture.
Arias’ death seems to have ended all hope for a
negotiated settlement prior to the elections still sched-
uled for May 1989. His death deprived the opposition
of its only legitimate spokesperson, and vastly im-
proved the government’s chances of winning at the
polls. No candidates have been put forth on either side,
although the name of Noriega himself has been bandied
about.
The outlines of next year’s campaign are already
evident in the two strains of crisis discourse broadcast
to the Panamanian people. One is the PRD’s neo-
torrijista rhetoric promising to reweave a process
which is hopelessly unraveled. The other is the rhetoric
of the opposition, which promises a democracy more
formal than real. Both would like the people to forget
the 1984 elections, and all of Panama’s electoral history
for that matter, where the parties of the rich treated
voters as consumers to be swindled with empty market-
ing techniques.
For the time being, Panama’s poor seem to be mes-
merized by the political battle between Noriega and his
foes. But neither side addresses the deeper crisis of
Panamanian society: its poverty and underdevelopment.
When those who dispute power eventually reach a set-
tlement, the poor will be no more than spectators and
victims of whatever deal is finally struck. And the poor
will then face once again the need to build their own
alternative, where democracy and nationalism are more
than the empty rhetoric of politicians.
The Cousins’ Republic
1. The United States agreed to renegotiate the canal treaty fol-
lowing the January 1964 “flag riots,” in which U.S. troops and
Canal Zone residents killed 21 Panamanian demonstrators and
wounded over 400. The demonstrators, mostly students, had at-
tempted to peacefully raise Panamanian flags within the Zone, in
accordance with a 1963 U.S.-Panama agreement.
2. Most Panamanians blame the United States. Torrijos
earned U.S. enmity by providing the Sandinistas with material aid
in their struggle against Somoza, and was a major obstacle to U.S.
plans for the region. Within months, two other key opponents of
U.S. policy, President Rold6s of Ecuador and Gen. Hoyos of the
Peruvian Air Force, died in similar “accidents.”
3. Legislative electionshad been held in 1972, 1978 and 1980;
a plebiscite on the Canal Treaties was held in 1978; and in 1983 a
referendum on constitutional amendments was approved.
4. Movimiento Torrijos Vive, February 1984.
5. There were other candidates. The social democratic Popu-
lar Action Party (PAPO) ran Dr. Carlos Ivan Zufiiga; the centrist
Popular Nationalist Party (PNP) ran ex-commander of the National
Guard Rub6n DArio Paredes; and three leftist parties ran Jos6 Rendn
Esquivel (PRT), Ricardo Barria (PST) and Carlos del Cid (P del P)
respectively.
6. The voters did give more votes to Arias’ Authentic Pana-
manian Party than to any other, with the ruling PRD at its heels. Of
the 12 other parties, seven received less than 3% of the vote and
thus were ruled off the ballot. Most of these were new progressive
parties with few resources. Six of the seven that survived were
traditional old-style oligarchic parties from the pre-Torrijos period.
The Republican and Liberal parties showed little strength, as did
the three Left parties.
7. Four days after being forcibly retired as second-in-com-
mand of the Defense Forces, he accused Gen. Noriega of being
involved in the death of Gen. Torrijos, the murder of Left opposi-
tion figure Hugo Spadafora, the electoral fraud of 1984, and the
1985 resignation of President Barletta.
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