Paraguay finally put an end to 61 years of rule by the Colorado Party, formerly the world’s longest-serving party in power, in presidential elections on April 20. Despite pre-election polls that consistently predicted an opposition victory, a palpable sense of disbelief, as well as euphoria, swept the country as the election results were announced. The country now suddenly finds itself in uncharted territory, a new era, in its prolonged transition to democracy. Having seen a successful challenge to the established interests that had dominated political life, it now faces the prospect of a first-ever peaceful alternation of power, and equally important, the possibility of far-reaching structural change.
 Euphoria swept the streets of Asunción, Paraguay, after Fernando Lugo won the April presidential election. (By Laura Gallo / Latinphoto.org) |
Strikingly, the winner, Fernando Lugo, was not a traditional politician, but an ex-bishop and progressive reformist. Leading the Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC), a broad coalition of mainly center-left and left-wing parties and social movements, Lugo gained 41% of the vote, far higher than surveys had predicted. His closest opponent, Blanca Ovelar of the Colorado Party, won 31%, while the populist former general Lino Oviedo came in third with 22%. Avoiding outspoken rhetoric, Lugo said simply: “Today we can affirm that the little ones are also qualified to win.”
After years of neglect as a regional backwater, Paraguay briefly found itself in the international limelight, as the world focused on what was widely seen as another example of the poor, landless, and dispossessed majority in Latin America prevailing against corrupt, well-financed, and entrenched conservative elites—as another example, that is, of Latin America’s shift to the left. The reality, however, is far more complex.
The Colorado Party came to power via the bloody civil war of 1947, rapidly transforming itself into the pillar of the infamous dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89), and then into the initiator and dominant force in Paraguay’s elite-led, limited, and decidedly shaky transition to democracy. Since 1989 Paraguay has suffered three attempted coups d’etat (1996, 1999, 2000), the assassination of a Colorado vice president (1999), and sustained economic recession and stagnation (1996–2003), during which yearly per capita income dropped below $1,000. It has also seen the growth of pervasive, institutionalized corruption, reflected in the indictment on corruption charges of two former presidents, Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993–98) and Raúl González Macchi (1998–99). A third, outgoing president Nicanor Duarte Frutos, may soon face similar charges.
The party’s sustained hold on power was even more surprising given the growth of social inequality, poverty, and unemployment, as well as drug trafficking and money laundering, during the transition. The Colorados’ grip on power was largely a product of their effective electoral machinery, vast networks of patronage and clientelism, and support within the bloated, inefficient, and highly politicized state sector. But it also reflected the weakness of the political opposition, which was unable to build a strong alliance to challenge Colorado hegemony or exploit growing political and social discontent.
In this context, it was left to social and popular movements to offer effective, although unsustained, opposition at key moments. This ranged from a successful popular defense of democracy in 1999 (known as the marzo paraguayo, or Paraguayan March), to the blocking of both the government’s privatization program and a so-called anti-terrorism bill in 2002, to mass protests that effectively prevented Duarte from amending the Constitution in 2006. Until 2008, no political party or figure had been able to tap this significant opposition force, and the idea that the “little ones” could advance from protest to governance seemed a distant possibility.
In many ways, the 2008 election result was just as much a reflection of the Colorados’ costly mistakes as it was of Lugo’s success. First, Duarte’s popularity collapsed following a misguided bid to change the Constitution, which prohibits consecutive presidential terms, so he could run for reelection. Having reached a remarkable 70% in his reformist years (2003–5), Duarte’s approval rating slid to just 5% by April, making him the most unpopular president in Latin America by some distance. Second, when it became clear that he would not be able to run, Duarte strongly backed his ex-minister of education, Ovelar, in the Colorado Party internal primaries in December 2007, which she won by the narrowest of margins. Many saw this as typical patronage politics, and for many, a vote for Ovelar came to signify a vote for Duarte.
Meanwhile, the defeated pro-U.S. candidate, Luis Castiglioni, who was favored by many party members, bitterly denounced Ovelar’s victory as the result of electoral fraud. Unlike in previous elections, however, the Colorado Party was unable to reunite its warring factions. Instead, just one month before the elections, Castiglioni vowed not to vote for Ovelar. As a result, many Colorados appear to have rejected her at the polls, due to her association with Duarte, and instead voted for Lugo, while remaining loyal to the party in departmental and legislative elections. Had Castiglioni either run as a presidential candidate or simply thrown his weight behind Ovelar, the Colorados may well have won, and the Paraguayan elections would have passed relatively unnoticed by the world.
This should not, however, detract from the achievements of Lugo, the former “bishop of the poor” of San Pedro, one of Paraguay’s poorest regions. A proponent of liberation theology who worked closely with peasant movements, he came to the political forefront in 2006 at the head of the mass campaign against Duarte’s alleged violation of the constitution. In December of that year, comparatively late in the day, he announced that he would run as the consensus candidate for the previously fragmented opposition Concertación Democrática. Inevitable infighting subsequently led two of the three main party backers, UNACE and Patria Querida, to withdraw, but Lugo succeeded in holding together and expanding the coalition, which evolved into the APC, the first political organization of its kind to effectively challenge the Colorados.
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Change was long overdue. Paraguay is one of the most unequal countries in Latin America, behind only Bolivia, and has one of the highest rates of poverty, while high unemployment and underemployment have led to increasing emigration. Surveys published by the Chile-based polling firm Latinobarómetro indicate deep-rooted disaffection with the democratic transition itself. Paraguay scores lowest in the whole continent in terms of support for democracy, satisfaction with democratic performance, and perception of a just distribution of wealth, while it figures second only to Peru in terms of distrust of political parties.
The election results reflected this general disillusionment and disdain toward the political class. Successive Colorado candidates have promised to fight poverty, corruption, and social injustice, while achieving very little. Duarte, for example, was elected in 2003 on a platform of opposition to what he called “savage neoliberalism,” as well as programs aimed at reducing poverty, eliminating corruption, and initiating vital reforms in the state sector. Yet few, if any, presidents have shown sustained interest in these issues once elected. Lugo’s appeal is precisely that he is not seen as a politician, but rather as a man of God with a genuine concern for the poor, untainted by political corruption, greed, or self-interest.
Nevertheless, Lugo was in one sense far more “political” than his opponents. While the 2008 election campaign characteristically contained little in terms of ideological debate, engagement with key issues clear, or discussion of social, economic, and political programs, two of Lugo’s three central policies were unprecedented and clearly resonated with many Paraguayans.
His first policy of anti-corruption was not new but nonetheless effective, given the Colorado Party’s discredited image. Lugo stood out for committing himself to a platform of progressive social and economic change, viewed by many as essential in a country where about 40% live in poverty and 20% in absolute poverty. This would include targeted poverty-reduction policies, but perhaps most significantly a bold agrarian reform program to address Paraguay’s highly unequal distribution of land.
Moreover, his third policy represented a strong stance in favor of renegotiation of the Itaipú and Yacyretá hydroelectric dam projects with Brazil and Argentina, respectively. Focusing on what he declared the unjust practices of Paraguay’s larger neighbors, his arguments clearly struck a strong chord among many Paraguayans, whose enthusiasm has since snowballed into an almost national consensus. The combination of these policies—anti-corruption, social reform in favor of the poor, and a strong stance in favor of national sovereignty—allowed Lugo to present himself as a fundamentally different candidate, offering a new way of doing politics in a country ground down by a stagnant political culture.
 Lugo’s reform efforts are likely to face widespread, organized resistance. (By Nicolas Pousthomis / Latinphoto.org) |
However, these polices will not be easy to implement. Lugo must overcome more than a half-century of Colorado control of government, state agencies, and, to a great extent, society, along with the accompanying legacies of clientelism, corruption, and authoritarian enclaves. Moreover, Lugo’s victory did not imply the collapse of the Colorado Party, which remains the largest political party in terms of departmental governorships, seats in Congress and the Senate, and membership, with vast mobilizational power and a strong base of support in the public sector. Reform efforts are therefore likely to meet with widespread, organized resistance. Indeed, a Colorado alliance of state employees has already emerged to potentially thwart any attempt to implement desperately needed public-administration reforms.
Second, the APC is a relatively shaky coalition comprising 10 political parties and almost 20 social movements and organizations, ranging from far left to right, a challenge in itself in terms of retaining any form of unity. The political backbone is the center-right Liberal Party (PLRA), the traditional opponents of the Colorados. Although they accepted Lugo as their presidential candidate (with their own Federico Franco as vice president), powerful conservative elements within the party are likely to strongly oppose Lugo’s key programs of land and tax reform.
This reliance on the PLRA is exacerbated in Congress, where the center-left and left-wing movements that backed Lugo have minimal representation, due in part to their disagreements on candidates. Thus, the main forces in Congress will be the (albeit bitterly divided) Colorado Party, the PLRA, and UNACE, the party of Lino Oviedo, who campaigned under the slogan of “God, Fatherland, and Family.” Although the latter two parties have stated that they will work with Lugo, they are far from committed to social reform.
The issue of balance in Congress is especially important in Paraguay, since the 1992 Constitution gives extensive powers to the legislature at the expense of the executive. Lugo’s challenge is therefore not only to maintain an alliance, but also to lead it in a direction in line with his electoral promises, navigating reforms through a powerful and conservative Congress.
Finally, key to Lugo’s success will be his performance in terms of agrarian reform, a central component of his electoral campaign, and poverty-reduction strategy. According to a popular saying, Paraguay is home to “land without people and people without land,” a reference to the country’s large number of landless farmers amid vast tracks of land, often in the hands of a few of absentee landlords. Indeed, Paraguay has one of Latin America’s most distorted territorial distributions, with about 300,000 families without access to arable land. However, this campaign will meet fierce opposition from the powerful Rural Association of Paraguay, led by elites from across the political spectrum, including from within the PLRA. Brazilian soy producers, who together own more than 2 million acres, will also oppose land reform. How he deals with these groups will to an extent determine his success on the agrarian question.
How he deals with Brazil will also influence the success of his administration. For the first time in the transition, relations with Paraguay’s neighbor strongly influenced the elections and will affect Lugo’s ability to finance and implement his social reform program. The Itaipú dam treaty signed in 1973 between two military governments (two illegitimate governments, as Paraguayans often point out) obliges Paraguay to sell any unused electricity to Brazil rather than to third parties. In practice, Paraguay uses barely 7% of the energy output and sells the remainder of its half-share to Brazil. Since prices for sales to Brazil are set at levels vastly below market rates, Paraguay effectively subsidizes about 20% of Brazilian domestic energy use, a subsidy reckoned to be worth about $3 billion per year.
Lugo’s electoral policy of renegotiation as a basis of financing social programs (especially in the agrarian field) clearly struck a chord with the electorate, as did his threat to take Brazil to the International Court of Justice at the Hague if necessary. The blunt refusals to negotiate until 2023 by both Lula and his foreign minister, Celso Amorim, as well as the hostile and sensationalist reaction of the Brazilian popular press, have further inflamed Paraguayan public opinion, creating a groundswell of support for Lugo’s stance.
In addition, Brazil is a key player in the soy industry, of which Paraguay is now the world’s fourth-largest exporter. Brazilians operating in Paraguay, or brasiguayos, own most of the soy fields, and it is they who have deforested vast tracts to land, creating notorious “green deserts.” In the process, they have become the richest economic group in the country and look very much to Brazil for representation and support, paying minimal income tax and virtually no taxes on soy exports. Lugo’s tax reform policies will no doubt be met with the same scale of protests that derailed Duarte’s attempts to bring soy producers and exporters into the tax system, raising the prospect of future conflict.
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Given these difficulties, parallels between events in Paraguay and the growth of the left in Latin America, casting Lugo as a Paraguayan Chávez or Morales, should be treated with extreme caution. The Paraguayan left remains divided in political terms, with minimal representation in the legislature. It certainly does not provide Lugo with a strong base of support. The APC is a diffuse, ideologically fragmented alliance that lacks an absolute majority, meaning his reforms will depend on cooperation from conservative groups in Congress.
Perhaps this explains Lugo’s own caution. Having survived a brutal electoral smear campaign that linked him with FARC guerrillas, Chávez, Morales, and even the kidnapping and murder in 2005 of Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of a former president, Lugo has been keen to present himself as a moderate. While he talks of transforming Paraguay, his discourse also emphasizes reconciliation, the defense of private property, and a “socially responsible capitalism” more akin to Michele Bachelet’s policies than those of Chávez.
Nevertheless, in a country with such low support for elite politics, a feeling of hope and optimism has replaced the usual cynicism and disenchantment. For the first time in the transition, many Paraguayans have high expectations of the president-elect’s ability to tackle the raft of social, political, and economic problems facing the country.
Lugo has a huge task on his hands. He is effectively a political novice confronting powerful political and economic vested interests. But he has widespread political support, as well as huge political capital, legitimacy, and approval, which should translate into a popular mandate for far-reaching social reform to address Paraguay’s indefensible inequalities and corruption. He also faces a weakened and divided Colorado Party in Congress. All this should encourage him to rock the boat. However narrow it may be, Lugo does have a small window of opportunity to, as he has promised, “transform Paraguay.”
Peter Lambert is Head of Spanish and Latin American Studies at the University of Bath, United Kingdom. He has lived in and written extensively on Paraguay.
