PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: LOSER TAKES ALL
Allegations of fixed elections are still the norm for the Dominican Republic: while it seemed obvious that José Peña Gómez of the Dominican Republic Party had clearly won the election, eleven weeks later, the incumbent Joaquín Balaguer announced that he had won yet another term.
By James Ferguson
How often these days does a politician who, according to all reliable sources, has clearly lost an election find himself inaugurated as president three months later? While allegations of fixed elections are no longer as commonplace as they once were in Latin America, they remain par for the course in the Dominican Republic. Indeed, in the case of veteran caudillo, Joaquín Balaguer, such allegations are almost as predictable as his electoral victories. The outcry has never been greater than on August 16 of this year, when the 88 year old was sworn in for his seventh term of office. This time, the term was fixed at only two years, a concession offered by Balaguer to his opponents who claim that he never won in the first place. The bizarre compromise which returned Baluguer to the Dominican Republic’s presidential palace was the culmination of a protracted and cynical electoral imbroglio which has cast further doubts on the country’s democratic credentials.
Three months earlier, on May 16, three hours after polls officially closed in the Dominican elections, journalists and international observers were summoned to the Santo Domingo office of the Socialist International. In a packed and stiflingly hot meeting room, Dr. José Francisco Peña Gómez, the presidential candidate of the Socialist-affiliated Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), told his audience that the elections had been marred by “colossal fraud.” Even so, he said, exit polls pointed to an overwhelming victory for the PRD. Outside the press conference, PRD supporters were gathering among a relentless warbling of mobile phones in a mood close to euphoria. An hour earlier, Luis Ayala, secretary-general of the Socialist International, had talked of the PRD winning by a margin of two to one.
The next day the euphoria was already turning sour as the first televised bulletins of the Central Electoral Junta (JCE), the nominally independent electoral board, began to give preliminary results which showed Peña Gómez trailing the incumbent president and fivetime winner, Balaguer. Eleven weeks later, the JCE had still not declared full results of presidential, congressional or local elections. With its time-honored method of procrastination and secrecy, the JCE weathered a storm of protest and criticism, insisting that it would look into any allegations of electoral irregularities but repeatedly failing to do so. Its “provisional results” in the meantime gave Balaguer a slim margin of victory of 30,000, or less than 1% of the votes. Finally, on August 2, the JCE discreetly announced that Balaguer had won the presidency by 22,281 votes.
The PRD repeatedly accused the JCE of engineering widespread fraud. In a series of statements and press conferences, Peña Gómez and other party leaders insisted that at least 200,000 PRD voters had been removed from the voters’ lists through the fraudulent alteration of the electoral register. The PRD claimed that the lists delivered to the parties on computer disks before the elections were different from those held on the day by the officials presiding over the hundreds of mesas or voting stations around the country. Certainly, many observers confirmed that PRD voters arrived at polling stations with their special ID cards, only to be told that their names did not appear on the list. Other allegations concerned the selling of ID cards, the fate of the cards sent out to regional JCE offices but not claimed by voters, and the use of state resources to finance the campaign of Balaguer’s ruling Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC).
The various bodies of international observers took different stances. While the Christian Democrat International (of which the PRSC is an affiliate) predictably dismissed the allegations of fraud, the Socialist international––just as predictably–– condemned the JCE and its handling of the election. The more impartial Washington-based International Foundation for Electoral Systems concluded that “irregularities clouded a process which was an example of civic responsibility on the part of the electorate,” The Organization of American States (OAS) also expressed “its great concern” over the allegations of fraud, while the National Democratic Institute voiced its “serious concern.”
More jaundiced commentators, meanwhile, pointed out that accusations of foul play and delays are almost synonymous with the Dominican electoral process. In each of the seven elections held since 1966, losing candidates have filed legal challenges against JCE decisions, culminating in Joan Bosch’s unsuccessful bid in 1990 to prove fraud on Balaguer’s part. In every case, the JCE has taken weeks and sometimes months to produce a final result. In 1990 it took almost two months for Balaguer’s controversial victory to be confirmed. This tradition of post-election disputes, of course, made it easier for critics of the PRD to dismiss its grievances as mere ritual.
But this year the elections were supposed to be fraud-proof and transparent. The government claimed to have spent 300 million pesos ($24 million) on computerizing the electoral lists and issuing new ID cards. Party representatives watched the voting at each mesa and were present at the opening of the ballot boxes and the counting of ballots. The JCE had been enlarged from three to five members, with guaranteed representation for opposition parties. And yet despite all such measures, suspicions of cheating appeared well-founded to Dorninicans and foreign observers alike.
Despite the JCE’s claims to political neutrality, three out of the five members are perceived as Balagueristas. As the JCE works on a simple majority vote, many critics have pointed out that Balaguer enjoys an automatic inbuilt majority. A “revision committee,” established by the JCE to investigate the fraud allegations, found that more than 28,000 voters had been deliberately disenfranchised by having their names removed from electoral lists at the 1,500 polling stations which it investigated. Since the 1,500 polling stations represent about 16% of the country’s total, simple arithmetic supports the PRD figure of 200.000 frustrated voters nationwide. In the end, the JCE merely ignored the committee’s findings.
The JCE’s delaying tactics allowed some of the popular anger at the conduct of the election to fizzle into apathy and resignation. It also allowed Balaguer and his supporters to engineer a deal with Peña Gómez and the PRD. Essentially this consisted of allowing Balaguer to reassume the presidency for a limited timespan while introducing a series of constitutional changes. An agreement signed on August 10 spoke of abolishing the right to run for consecutive presidential terms, establishing an independent electoral commission, and revising the electoral lists.
The agreement also stipulated a term of only 18 months for Balaguer. This part of the deal, however, was summarily dumped two days later when Congress met and an alliance between the PRSC and the Party of Dominican Liberation (PLD) amended the period to two years. The move provoked a PRD walk-out from the Congressional session and widespread doubts that any of the other provisions would actually materialize.
Normally the outcome of a Dominican election would not have caused much excitement in the wider world. But with the Haitian crisis, the UN embargo and the scenario of U.S. military intervention, the result took on increased significance. The main issue was whether a Peña Gómez government would take a strong line against Haiti’s de facto military regime and stop the flow of fuel and other embargoed items across the border. President Balaguer’s official indifference to the embargo and alleged encouragement of crossborder trade had been irritating Washington for several months. With his dislike of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide all too wellknown, Balagucr simply saw no reason to deprive the Dominican military and certain enterpreneurs of lucrative business with Haiti for a political objective which he did not share. He cloaked his tacit support for the Haitian regime and his own military profiteers in humanitarian rhetoric, describing the embargo as “inhumane” and “a way to punish the poor.”
A PRD government might well have been the Clinton Administration’s refer ence if it would enforce the embargo and cut off a lifeline to the military dictatorship in Haiti, Peña Gómez had strongly hinted at taking this course of action during the earlier part of the election campaign. But as the campaign developed, it became apparent that the Haitian issue was much more of a liability than an asset to Peña Gómez, and he avoided it whever possible. To enforce the embargo would have meant an immediate confromation with the Dominican military––historically more inclined to support Balaguer than the PRD––and the logistical problems of sealing the 170-mile border. It could well have raised the stakes in other unpredictable ways, perhaps sparking an exodus of Haitian refugees across the border or provoking armed confrontation with the Haitian military.
Gradually, Haiti came to dominate the election campaign. The issue of the embargo ruer.ged with a campaign against Peña Gómez which sought to exploit longstanding racist and xenophobic attitudes towards Haiti by depicting the PRD leader as a covert. Haitian agent hell-bent on destroying Dominican sovereignty and secretly planning to fuse the two nations. The question of Peña Gómez’s color and ancestry––he was born in the Dominican Republic of Haitian parentage––has long been a controversial issue in Dominican politics, but during this election the racist campaign reached an unprecedented intensity. TV commercials showed a gesticulating Peña Gómez accompanied by frenzied drumming or a map of Hispaniola in which a dark brown Haiti gradually spread over and covered a bright green Dominican Republic. Cartoons showing Peña Gómez as a witch doctor were anonymnusly faxed to offices, while a video in which the PRD leader attended a faith-healing session was widely touted as proof of his taste for “voodoo.”
The anti-Peña Gómez campaign was in part a direct and racist attack on the PRD leader himself and it part a crude appeal to nationalisi sentiment in the Dominicar Republic. Washington’s pressure to tighten the embargo coincided with the furor over Peña Gómcz’ supposedly pro-Haitian sympathies and allowed Balaguer to present himself as the defender of Dominican sovereignty and his rival as a U.S. pawn. A bizarre conspiracy theory was widely circulated which suggested that the United States, France, Canada and Venezuela intended to merge the Dominican Republic and Haiti with Peña Gómez acting as the “instrument of fusion.” The PRD’ support for the embargo, it was claimed, was merely proof of his anti-patriotic intentions. The final, to the Haiti scare campaign came on polling day itself when Santo Domingo reverberated with the rumor that U.S. Marines were already in Port-au-Prince and that hundreds of thousands of fleeing Haitians were streaming across the border. With the four-day radio and TV news blackout mandated by the JCE, such rumors were highly effective.
Whatever the impact of the alleged fraud, there is little doubt that Balaguer polled strongly. Although blind and physically frail, the veteran skillfully played the Haiti bogey card as well as offering his usual recipe of paternalism and populism. Backed by the considerable financial resources of his vice-presidential candidate, Jacinto Peynado, as well as those of the state, Balaguer toured the country by helicopter or balaguermóvil, inaugurating a seemingly endless number of schools, irrigation systems and health clinics. His economic record was also an asset, since he could claim to have reduced inflation from more than 100% to single figures, to have renegotiated the $4.5 billion debt, and to have presided over strong economic growth.
Ultimately, the fear factor appeared to work against Peña Gómez. As the campaign ended in a tense polarization between the PRD and the PRSC, other parties and contenders faded away. Juan Bosch, in particular, made little impact. Running as a PLD candidate, the former president scored only 15%, performing much worse than opinion polls had suggested.
Balaguer’s political acumen is inseparable from his unpredictability. In the confused and volatile aftermath of the elections, he suddenly took the initiative on May 25 when he declared that he would “seal” tire border with Haiti and prevent any further supplies of fuel from reaching Port-au-Prince. The declaration, following a meeting with U.S. and UN special envoys William Gray and Dante Caputo, came three days after the strict UN embargo against Haiti went into effect. Balaguer said that he was ordering 10.000 troops to the border and that they would fully cooperate with the handful of UN monitors sent to observe the enforcement of sanctions.
On June 15, the State Department entered the controversy with a statement urging the Dominican authorities to review the fraud allegations and, if necessary, to hold by-elections in districts where proven irregularities occurred. The statement was rejected by JCE president García Lizardo who protested that he could not “accept guidelines from any international institution.” U.S. criticism of the election nonetheless persisted, with new Ambassador Donna Hrinak describing the result as “not legitimate” and the State Department declaring itself “disappointed” with the JCE’s statement.
Whether the Clinton Administration, preoccupied by events in Haiti and Cuba, will continue to put pressure on Balaguer remains to be seen. There have been rumors in Santo Domingo that the United States might impose economic sanctions, or reassess the country’s eligibility for special trade status under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The State Department is. however, no doubt wary of encouraging instability and anti-U.S. sentiment in the increasingly volatile Caribbean region.
The United States achieved one of its objectives with the tightening of the Haitian embargo, though recent events have rendered Dominican cooperation moot. It is less certain whether the United States will achieve its goal of nurturing “good governance” in the Dominican Republic. There is still enormous anger among Peña Gómez’ supporters, especially in the slums of Santo Domingo. This anger could explode into violence as it did in the so-called anti-IMF riots of April, 1984. Then it was the PRD government which ordered the troops to crush the rioting, with the loss of more than 100 lives. Peña Gómez has been careful to urge restraint among his militants and had called for “Gandhian” civil disobedience before the apparent compromise settlement.
Peña Gómez and his advisors are doubtless calculating that a fair election in May, 1996 cannot fail to bring them victory. With the announcement of Juan Bosch’s retirement in July, the opposition PLD will almost certainly lose more of its already declining popularity. If Balaguer honors his pledge not to run again, the PRSC will probably undergo a damaging split as rivals such as Vice-President Peynado and Carlos Morales Troncoso, a former vice-president, fight it out.
In any case, the recent elections have done little to enhance the Dominican Republic’s international standing or to improve relations with Washington. A recent editorial in the conservative daily Listín Diario mused on the gradual “Haitianization” of the country. It referred not to Haitian immigration or the spectre of a unitary state, but rather to the fact that the Dominican Republic is in danger of following its tortured neighbor in losing its slim democratic credibility and already precarious social stability.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
James Ferguson works at the Latin America Bureau in London, and is the author of Dominican Republic: Beyond The Lighthouse, distributed by Monthly Review Press.
