Reinventing Solidarity In an otherwise fine essay about
North-South solidarity and human
rights activism [“A Typology of
Activism,” March/April 1995],
Margaret Keck claims that “the
human rights methodology has not
included expressions of shared vulnerability.”
In fact, organizations such as
Peace Brigades International (PBI)
have explicitly made shared risk an
important vehicle for their human
rights work. PBI has fielded teams
of international volunteers who
accompany activists and groups
threatened by political violence in
Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia,
indigenous communities in Canada,
and now Haiti. The aim is to be the
eyes and ears of the international
community in places where human
rights violations occur. PBI does not
primarily gather information about
human rights abuses, but attempts
to use governments’ concern for
their international human rights
image as a way to protect and maintain
the space in which local organizations
can carry out their work
nonviolently. Similar work has
been done by Witness for Peace and
Christian Peacemaker Teams.
Implicit in this methodology is
the assumption of risk by those who
can make use of Northern privilege
to protect on-the-ground organizing
for peace and justice. PBI has been
subjected to threats, a bombing and
a stabbing incident in Guatemala,
and other forms of repression. PBI
does not intervene in the work of
local activists, but by physically
accompanying them, we raise the
stakes for those who contemplate
violence against nonviolent
activists and communities.
John Lindsay-Poland
PBI Colombia Project
San Francisco, CA
Readers are invited to address letters to
The Editors, NACLA Report on the
Americas, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 454,
New York, NY 10115. Letters can be sent
by e-mail to: NACLA @igc.apc.org.
Margaret Keck responds:
would characterize PBI, Witness
for Peace, and others who do this
kind of work as solidarity organizations
precisely because they take on
the element of shared risk in their
methods. When I differentiate
between solidarity and human
rights organizations, I do not mean
to imply that solidarity organizations
are not concerned with human
rights, but that by placing themselves
beside people at risk, they
stress a commonality of fate in very
concrete terms. Normally they do
this in relation to people whom they
believe to be engaged in worthwhile
activities-resisting oppression
and so forth. The human rights
work to which I referred in the
typology, on the other hand, is the
information-gathering and verification
methodology pioneered by
Amnesty International and the
Watch Committees. Here, “rights”
pertain to prisoners of conscience
of all persuasions, and their defense
is justified under explicit provisions
of international law. Thus, in my
view, the notion of solidarity
implies a broader commitment to
the goals or philosophies of those to
whom it is extended than does the
defense of human rights. In practice,
of course, one can stand proxy
for the other; nonetheless, in principle
there are real differences.
L aura Macdonald is mistaken
when she suggests that
OXFAM-Canada adopted a paternalistic,
developmentalist approach
to fisheries programming in Nicaragua
and ignored issues of political
organization prior to 1989 [“A
Mixed Blessing: The NGO Boom
in Latin America,” March/April,
(Continued on page 45)
Erratum
Due to an editing error on page 9 of
Carlos Vilas’ “El Salvador After the
Accords”[May/June,1995], the sentence
that begins “The question of poverty…”
should read: “The question of land has
been…ignored in the latest World Bank
report.”
1995]. OXFAM’s contribution to
the emergence of a national organization
of Nicaraguan fishermen in
1992 did not stem from a sudden
recognition of the limitations of
technology transfer. It was the
result of patient political work over
an extended period of time inspired
by a fundamental commitment to
autonomous and democratic producer-
controlled organizations.
OXFAM-Canada began programming
in the fisheries sector in
Nicaragua in 1985. From its inception,
the program had three components:
1) the experimental introduction
of Canadian technology aimed
at increasing production in the artisanal
fisheries sector; 2) the collection
of used fishing gear in Atlantic
Canada to provide both material aid
and to extend the Nicaraguan solidarity
movement into Canadian
coastal communities; and 3) the
organization of Nicaraguan fishermen
in order to address their political
marginalization vis-a-vis the state.
In addition to technology transfer
and political solidarity, OXFAM
believed that the Canadian fishermen
had a lot of organizing experience
to offer their Nicaraguan
counterparts. The Nicaraguan government’s
fisheries model was an
extreme version of the monolith
that many Canadian fishermen
were struggling against in Canada.
INPESCA, the Nicaraguan Ministry
of Fisheries, was the country’s
only fish company, with a vertically
integrated trawler fleet and a
monopoly over the purchasing, processing
and marketing of fish.
Moreover, it had the power to
decide which forms of legal organization
were appropriate for fishermen.
By 1987 discontent with
INPESCA amongst fishermen was
widespread as the ministry’s corporate
arm tried to extract more and
more surplus from the small producers
in order to generate foreignexchange
earnings. This context
made the organization of inshore
fishermen that much more urgent.
OXFAM’s involvement in the organization
of Nicaraguan fishermen,
however, was a very delicate matter.
OXFAM was, after all, a foreign
NGO pursuing an agenda that,
to many, was pushing the boundaries
of acceptable solidarity.
OXFAM worked diligently and
discreetly to involve other NGOs–
both foreign and domestic-in
direct relationships with the pockets
of organized fishermen. It also tried
to draw both the farmworkers’ and
farmers’ unions (ATC and UNAG)
into organizing fishermen either as
affiliates or towards an independent
national fishermen’s organization.
Unfortunately, INPESCA was quite
content with its hegemonic role and,
unlike many other Sandinista ministries,
had totally abandoned any
pretense of supporting meaningful
social transformation. INPESCA
remained the main obstacle to the
organization of fishermen in
Nicaragua until the Sandinista
defeat in 1990.
While the work of OXFAMCanada
was not without its contradictions
and mistakes, it was clearly
on the side of popular empowerment,
and deserves a bit more prodding
and sophisticated analysis.
Marc Allain
OXFAM-Canada
Nicaragua Program Officer
1982-1988
Halifax, Nova Scotia
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