SAO PAULO-Three weeks af-
ter the November 15 elections, with
95% of the vote counted, it is clear
that Brazilians gave their govern-
ment a vote of no confidence for its
18 years of military rule. For the first
time since the 1964 coup, voters in
all 23 states were allowed to
choose state governors. The elec-
torate also chose federal and state
representatives, mayors, city coun-
cil members and one third of the
Senate. Occurring “in a climate of
expectation that something is going
to change,” as one foreign observer
put it, the contest was viewed as an
important plebiscite.
Amid accusations of irregulari-
ties in the computer system used to
tally the votes, authorities have
abandoned computers altogether
and are continuing the count manu-
ally. A Rio de Janeiro court, con-
fronted with proof of fraud, ordered
a recount mid-way through that
state’s tallying. Final results for the
country are not expected for an-
other two weeks.
At presstime, the opposition
Brazilian Democratic Movement
Party (PMDB) had claimed victory in
nine state governor races: Amazo-
nas, Goias, Minas Gerais, Espirito
Santo, Sao Paulo, Para, Acre, Mato
Grosso do Sul and Parana. The
popular Leonel Brizola won the gov-
ernorship of Rio de Janeiro for his
Democratic Labor Party (PDT).
More than 67% of the Brazilian pop-
ulation lives in these 10 states
which account for 80% of the coun-
try’s gross national product.
While the government main-
tained the governorships in 12
states, it won only one of the major
industrial states, Rio Grande do Sul,
where the vote was split between
two strong opposition candidates.
Nationwide the governing Demo-
cratic Social Party (PDS) so far has
won about 38% of the vote, the
PMDB, almost 50% and the PDT,
8%. There are about 56 million eligi-
ble voters. Thanks to a change in
the rules shortly before the election,
the government also won control of
the electoral college which will
choose the president in 1985
Transition To Democracy?
As the campaign drew to a close,
there was barely a square inch left
empty on walls and lamp posts in
most Brazilian cities. Campaign
posters and graffiti covered every-
thing; cars with loudspeakers circu-
lated the streets. Rallies, fund-
raising concerts and T-shirts all
testified to the general furor. The
Two Rio opposition candidates take their campaign to Ipanema Beach.
a U)
Mimi Keck is a director of the Brazil La-
bor Information and Resource Center.
Her last contribution to the Report was
“Brazilian Labor-New Tactics, New
Victories” in the May-June 1982 issue
X NACLA Reportupdate update update update
campaign even came to the beach-
es of Rio, where one candidate’s
daughters sported bikinis bearing
his name.
On the surface, Brazil’s elections
were not unlike those that take
place in any liberal democracy. But
to see them in that light alone would
be to ignore the complexities and
contradictions of the process that
gave rise to them. Abertura-the
name given to the controlled liberal-
ization of Brazil’s military regime-
was not intended as a transition to
democracy; it was designed to de-
fuse the growing disenchantment
with military rule among key sectors
of the Brazilian elite, and to soften
growing tensions within the military
itself.*
Yet it would also be a mistake to
view the November elections as
mere farce. The political ferment
that has been generated by the
electoral campaign will have far-
reaching consequences for Brazil’s
political evolution.
Amnesty For The Torturers
Since the late 1970s, each step
toward abertura has been accom-
panied by safeguards protecting
the regime in power from any real
threat to its tenure. The repeal of the
extremely repressive Institutional
Act No. 5, the abolition of prior cen-
sorship of the media, and a partial
amnesty for political offenses which
led to the return of many exiles, all
represented significant advances.
Included in the amnesty law, how-
ever, was the stipulation that it apply
as well to all those who had prac-
ticed torture, thus eliminating the
possibility of holding these practi-
tioners responsible under the law.
At the same time, the regime re-
*For a more detailed analysis of liberali- zation, see “Brazil: Controlled Decom- pression,” NACLA Reporton the Amer- icas (May-June 1979).
NoviDec1982
Toasting his hosts in “Bolivia, ” an embarrassed Reagan greets Figueiredo.
tained the right to declare and ex-
tend a state of emergency in trou-
blesome areas, and the draconian
National Security Law, whose terms
are vague enough to include virtu-
ally any act of opposition to the re-
gime or the armed forces. And
while prior censorship was abol-
ished, a number of journalists and
their newspapers have been
charged under the Security Law for
publishing articles injurious to the
regime.
In addition to these constraints on
the full exercise of political rights,
abertura has done little to protect
the rights of those traditionally ex-
cluded from Brazilian politics-the
working class and the poor. Unions
on strike continue to face violent re-
pression by the military police. Per-
secution of rural unions has
stepped up dramatically as have
the number of violent expulsions of
peasants from their lands-aimed
at clearing the way for multinational
mining and agribusiness firms.
In poor neighborhoods, the spe-
cial crime squads of the military po-
lice usually “shoot first and ask
questions later,” and civilian courts
have no jurisdiction over their activi-
ties. While torture is no longer used
against political prisoners, it is often
used in criminal cases, again,
among the poor.
Changing The Game’s Rules
In 1965, Brazil’s military rulers im-
posed a rigid, two-party system de-
signed to perpetuate their tenure
while maintaining a pretense of tol-
erance for dissident voices. The
1979 law which abolished that sys-
tem, opening the door to a broader
spectrum of opposition, was clearly
a response to the growing electoral
strength of the Brazilian Democratic
Movement (MDB).
With the defeat of armed move-
ments by the early 1970s, and the
lack of alternative avenues of dis-
sent, the MDB had become a mag-
net for opposition forces, particu-
larly disenchanted sectors of the
elite and professionals. The party
scored a strong victory in the 1974
senatorial elections and, for the first
37update update update update
time, began to project itself as more
than a “loyal opposition” to military
rule.
Surprised by this show of
strength, Brazil’s military rulers
sought mechanisms to contain the
opposition’s challenge. Because
the MDB had made effective use of
the media in its campaign, the
government issued the Falcao Law
(named for the Minister of Justice) in
1976, prohibiting the’ use of radio
and television for debate among
candidates for two months prior to
elections. In 1977, the “April
Package” changed the composi-
tion of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to ensure a majori-
ty for the government party. As a
result, the MDB did not gain much
ground in the 1976 local elections
and the 1978 general elections.
An unanticipated consequence
of the media ban, however, was that
the MDB was forced to go to the
people directly. By 1978, social
movements in neighborhoods and
unions had become increasingly
organized and, for the first time, im-
portant links were established be-
tween elite opposition forces and
the growing popular opposition to
military rule.
It soon became clear to the
regime that to maintain the MDB as
the only legal opposition vehicle
was dangerous. The 1979 party
reform was therefore an attempt to
encourage divisions within the
heterogeneous opposition forces,
A jubilant Leonel Brizola flashes V for victory.
X
while maintaining the government
party intact. Giving itself an image
lift, the military/right-wing party in
power changed its name from
ARENA to the Democratic Social
Party.
Divide and Conquer
As expected, the opposition did
divide–into five different parts. The
MDB, attempting to preserve con-
tinuity in its name, became the Party
of the Brazilian Democratic Move-
ment (PMDB) and retained most of
its original membership. A new
Popular Party (PP), widely referred
to as the bankers’ party, drewfrom
the governing party and the more
conservative ranks of the old MDB.
A former state governor and
BRIZOLA ON TOP
by Cesar Caldeira
RIO DE JANEIRO-When and if democratic-socialist Leonel Brizola assumes the governorship of Rio de Janeiro next March, Bra- zilian abertura will have reached a significant milestone. A key tar- get of the 1964 military takeover, his election as leader of the coun- try’s second most important state is widely viewed as one of the most significant developments in Brazil’s process of political lib- eralization.
During his tenure (1958-1961) as governor of the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola had ex- propriated a local telephone com- pany which was a subsidiary of ITT. Moreover, Brizola had organ- ized mass demonstrations and promised armed resistance against the military’s efforts to stop the succession of Joao Goulart to the presidency in 1961. This was one of the few occasions in contemporary Brazilian history when a civilian leader prevailed over the will of the armed forces. It was not until 1964, with the sup- port of the Johnson Administra- tion, that the Brazilian military overthrew President Goulart, and Brizola went into exile.
NACLA Repedupdate update update update
political exile, Leonel Brizola, tried
to revive the Brazilian Workers Par-
ty(PTB) and recapture the sizeable
populist base it enjoyed in the six-
ties. Deftly blocking Brizola’s plan,
the government granted the party’s
name to a group led by Ivete Vargas
-the niece of a former president
and close friend of the abertura
mastermind, General Golbery do
Couto e Silva. Brizola’s forces
became instead the Democratic
Labor Party (PDT).
The fifth opposition party to
achieve provisional legal status
under the new law was the Workers
Party (PT), which grew out of the
social movements and union strug-
gles of the late 1970s. The national
president of the party is Luis inacio
0
Lula addresses a PT campaign rally.
da Silva (“Lula”), who gained
notoriety as leader of the
Metalworkers’ Union of Sao Bernar-
do do Campo and Diadema. He
was removed from that position by
the government in 1980 and put on
trial for leading an “illegal” strike.
The matter ended when a military
tribunal declared itself incompetent
to hear the case.
The Workers Party calls itself
socialist, although it refuses to
espouse any existing model of
socialism and includes within its
ranks many different tendencies
within the Left and trade union
movement. Its goal is to build a
mass party, based on active broad-
based participation of the working
class in defining its program. The
Throughout his years abroad, Brizola changed significantly, eventually joining the Socialist In- ternational. Now his own organi- zation-the Democratic Labor Party (PDT)–is also associated with the international social dem- ocratic movement.
Paternalistic Populist
Brizola is first and foremost a
charismatic mass leader. In Brazil
today, there is only one other poli-
tical leader with more popular ap-
peal: Lula, president of the Work-
ers Party (PT). Brizola’s appeal Is
messianic and populist. In con-
trast, Lula stirs a sense of dignity
and self-reliance in skilled work-
ers and educated youth. Brizola’s
following comes mainly from the
unorganized-urban poor, In partic-
ular slum-dwellers who are one
third of Rio’s population, and
those sectors of the middle class
that are near despair in face of the
country’s most severe economic
recession since 1930.
To prevent police brutality
against the poor and workers, Bri-
zola plans to establish human
rights watch groups with a direct
IvID”Rlm
phone link to his desk in the gov-
ernor’s mansion. This paternalis-
tic style is even more pronounced
in regard to the welfare of the
thousands of abandoned children
who live on Rio’s streets: he prom-
ises that all will be fed, schooled
and placed in day care centers.
The poor and sick will have ac-
cess to free health care, including
free medicine; secure jobs will be
found for the unemployed. All
these promises are what Brizola
calls “moreno socialism,” a
catchy slogan for a type of in-
digenous socialism that means
something close to traditional no-
tions of what Christian charity is
all about.
Swallowing Bitter Pills
Brizola is wrongly viewed by the
military elite as well as the conser-
vative press as a “firebrand,” to
use Air Force Minister Delio de
Matos’ word. Asked by a journalist
to comment on Brizola’s victory, General Euclides de Oliveira Fi-
gueiredo, the President’s brother
and military commander of the
Amazon Region, said, “For sure
we must swallow a few bitter pills.
But we digest them, and when the
right time comes, expel them.”
Brizola, meanwhile, seems inter-
ested in allaying the military’s
fears about any residual radical-
ism. After his victory was assured, he had subtly measured words for
President Joao Figueiredo:
“Figueiredo will be judged by his-
tory less for the progress he
brought than for what he pre- vented others from doing against
the democratic reconstruction in
Brazil.”
In fact, Brizola is viewed as a humane and intuitive mass leader
who does have a deep commit-
ment to the poor and downtrod-
den. His chosen people regard him as a savior. During this past electoral campaign, it became a
common scene in Rio-even in
the conservative middle class
neighborhood of Tijuca-to see thousands of people wait in pour-
ing rain for three hours to hear the
words of Brizola. Whenever he ar-
rived, smiles would light up faces.
It was Carnival all over again. Peo-
ple would chant with emotion, endlessly. “Bri-zo-la! Bri-zo-la!
Brizola on Top! Brizola for Presi- dent!”
3update update update update
1982 elections, then, were a vehicle
for building the party’ s base, and ar-
ticulating the interests of sectors
that rarely have had a voice in
Brazil’s politics. The PT made its
strongest showing in the industrial
state of Sao Paulo, where Lula was
its candidate for governor, earning
about 10% of the vote. Overall, the
PT’s electoral performance was
well below the party’ s expectations.
The most gains were won in areas
where it had concentrated grass-
roots organizing efforts.
Voting Straight Tickets
Despite divisions within the op-
position, by late 1981, it was clear
to the government that the Popular
Party and the PMDB were likely to
win the governorships (appointed
by the government since 1965) of
Brazil’s most important states. The
regime’s response was again to
change the rules.
Whereas the 1979 party reform
had left open the possibility of coali-
tions in gubernatorial and senatorial
elections, the regime’s “November
Package” of 1981 prohibited them.
Moreover, it introduced a new re-
quirement into the electoral pro-
cedure: voters would have to vote a
straight ticket, and any ballots mark-
ed for candidates from more than
one party would be nullified. The
government party had the most to
gain from the new procedure, since
its political machine is more
developed and can reach into even
the most remote villages.
The unintended consequence of
the November Package, however,
was to provoke a merger of the
Popular Party into the PMDB-and
a strengthening of the latter, now by
far the largest opposition party.
While improving the PMDB’s elec-
toral chances, however, the new
merger emphasized the front-like
character of the party. Working
40
within it are independent
democrats, communists of as-
sorted stripes, members of the
former bankers’ party and more.
This extreme heterogeneity makes
it more than likely that the party will
break apart now that the 1982 elec-
tions are past. Leonel Brizola has
made overtures to PMDB’s left wing
as well as Lula’s PT about a post
electoral merger toward building a
mass based socialist party. The PT
has rejected the proposal outright.
The most recent change in the
rules of the game came in August
1982, with the introduction of a new
ballot designed to compound the
confusion. Formerly, the names of
candidates for governors, senators
and mayors, and their party affilia-
tions, had been clearly printed on
the ballot. The new ballot was
blank, requiring the voter to fill in the
correct name or number of the can-
didate on the correct line. Though
the opposition feared (and the PDS
hoped) that this would favor the
government, which can maintain a
presence in every voting place to
make sure that PDS voters fill in the
ballot correctly, pre-election educa-
tion seemed to pay off. So far, only
about 3% of the ballots were
nullified.
Policymakers from D.C.
Even with the opposition’s
respectable showing in November,
it is farfrom clear what it will portend
for the future of abertura. Specula-
tion that Brizola may not ever be
allowed to assume office, for exam-
ple, is widespread. (See sidebar.)
With power heavily concentrated
in the executive branch, the degree
of congressional and gubernatorial
initiative also remains to be tested. If
the PMDB governor takes over in
Para, for example, the government
is expected to carve out the region
around Carajas, placing it under
federal administration in order to
avoid opposition control over its
grandiose but controversial mining
project. Significant proportions of
state resources are controlled by
the federal government, as is the
military police, which is under the
direct control of the Army. And
while many opposition parties favor
turning the next Congress into a
Constituent Assembly, it is ques-
tionable whether they will have that
power.
But the most influential policy-
makers in the next few years appear
to be neither the new generation of
opposition officials nor the military
government. Shortly after the elec-
tions, a delegation from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) arrived
in Brazil, seeking concessions from
the government in exchange for
much needed loans. Brazil has ap-
proached the Fund-the first time it
has done so since the 1960s-only
reluctantly. Backed against a wall
by a $90 billion foreign debt, Brazil
needs $14 billion to service the debt
in the next few months. It appears
the Brazilians will make good use of
unequivocal U.S. support to secure
a better deal with the IMF. During his
December trip to Brazil, President
Reagan announced a $1.2 billion
emergency short-term loan for the
regime, emphasizing that the coun-
try deserves special treatment. It is
most likely that the Fund’s terms will
emphasize investment incentives
and the development of cash crops
for export.
For Brazil’s immediate future,
power will rest where it has since
1964-with the generals who have
succeeded one another in smooth
succession. But with the opposi-
tion’s clear appetite for political ex-
pression heightened by their signifi-
cant gains, the generals will have a
very hard time turning back the
clock.
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