That morning,
in an act of military
precision, ten Zapatista
sympathizers drove into
San Andras, jumped
onto the kiosk where
the two polling stations
were located, burnt
them
and quickly left.
On July 6, the day of its mid- term elections, Mexico un- derwent a seismic political change as the long-ruling Insti- tutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its congressional majority as well as the governance of Mexico City for the first time in nearly seven decades. In the state of Chiapas, however, low-intensity
war, intimidation and severe local
conflict continued as usual. More
than 550 voting booths along with
the accompanying ballots were ei-
ther not installed or were systemati-
cally removed and destroyed in a
coordinated protest movement call-
ing attention to the lack of secure
conditions for holding elections.
“The Change” did not occur uni-
formly throughout Mexico. The
state of Chiapas remains akin to a
separate country.
While people in Mexico City con-
tinued their celebrations into the fol-
Lynn Stephen is Professor of Anthropology at Northeastern University During the summer of 1997, supported by grant #6168 of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research, she observed
the elections in Chiapas and the tense con-
ditions surrounding them. Her latest book
is Women and Social Movements in Latin
America: Power From Below (Texas, 1997).
lowing day, in Chiapas I witnessed
more than 300 angry-looking mem-
bers of the PRI, some holding large
sticks, blocking the roads in the
town of San Andr6s Larrainzar. The
day before this blockade-the
morning of election day-in an act
of military precision, ten Zapatista
sympathizers drove into San Andr6s,
jumped onto the kiosk where the
two polling stations were located,
burnt them and quickly left. It all
took place in three minutes. The day
after, tensions were high. The
townspeople talked about everyone
being so heavily armed; no one was
sure what would happen next.
San Andr6s, the government seat
of an indigenous Tzotzil Maya
county, and a core region of support
for the Zapatista National Liberation
Army (EZLN), had been the site of
the second round of peace negotia-
tions between the EZLN and the
Mexican government. The! Zapa-
tistas broke off the negotiations in
August, 1996 due to the absence of
secure conditions for the talks. The
EZLN believes those same insecure
conditions now make fair elections
impossible.
Like many towns in eastern
Chiapas, San Andr6s is distin-
guished by having two govern-
ments-one governing in rebellion,
supported by the majority of the
community (in this case under the
banner of the opposition Party of
the Democratic Revolution (PRD))
and the other under the banner of
the PRI. These two governments
have survived an uneasy co-exis-
tence since 1995. But the night be-
fore the elections, an angry mob of
PRI sympathizers had ransacked the
municipal building, broken a dozen
windows, fired into an adjacent
building, bashed the door of a
women’s craft cooperative and en-
circled the community for 24 hours.
Now the streets were abandoned,
people were hiding in their houses,
and the main square was blocked
off. Outside the municipal building,
some 20 supporters of the PRD gov-
ernment-in-rebellion were half
asleep on benches, having stayed
awake the entire night to guard
against further onslaughts from the
PRI mob. Another 20 from the same
group were on watch behind the
building occupied by the govern-
ment-in-rebellion.
This scene is a mild version of
what daily life is like in communities
within the “conflict zone,” a term
NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
10UPDATE / MEXICO
used to refer to areas of Chiapas in
which there are civilian supporters
of the EZLN. Since the Zapatista
uprising in 1994, more than a third
of the state has been heavily milita-
rized. The army has completed a
major road project connecting pre-
viously inaccessible communities to
main population centers and facili-
tating troop movement, and has
built permanent installations in
dozens of communities. All this has
significantly altered the local econ-
omy and culture.
There are now between 25,000
and 30,000 soldiers permanently in-
stalled in the regions of the state that
are Zapatista strongholds. The army
has taken over the state police forces
of Chiapas, and is further augmented
by the presence of thousands of fed-
eral “public security” and judicial
police. There are 17 major military
barracks and 44 semi-permanent
military installations in the conflict
zone-and a soldier for every three
or four inhabitants in many commu-
nities. In addition, the Coordinating
Group of Nongovernmental Organ-
izations for Peace (CONPAZ) has
identified seven different paramili-
tary groups operating in the area. In
the two months prior to the elections,
dozens of people were killed and
wounded in local confrontations be-
tween the PRI and the PRD, and as
victims of paramilitary and federal
police forces.
Prior to the elections in Chiapas, a
wide range of independent organiza-
tions, as well as PRD officials, re-
peatedly tried to call attention to the
insecurity and violent conditions in
many parts of the state. As late as
July 4th, the PRD protested the lack
of proper conditions to the indepen-
dent Federal Electoral Institute
(IFE), but to no avail. IFE declared
that conditions were good enough to
install all but 18 to 23 voting booths
in the state and that the elections
would be held as scheduled.
With an electoral climate that re-
sembles a low-intensity war, many
communities announced their inten-
tions not to vote and to prevent the
installation of voting booths in
places where the vote could not be
guaranteed to be “free and secret.”
Since the warnings of unsafe condi-
tions went unheeded, a coordinated
strategy was carried out-primarily
by civilian sympathizers of the
EZLN-to remove the polling sta-
tions so that the elections results
would have to be annulled. Voters
abstained in many places, and more
than 550 voting booths and accom-
panying voting materials were re-
moved in an orderly fashion.
Contrary to press reports, ob-
servers who work with the Civic
Alliance, a respected NGO, reported
that many of these actions were car-
ried out by unarmed individuals.
(Ironically, the paramilitary group
“Peace and Justice” which operates
in the north of Chiapas carried out
similar actions, but used arms to in-
timidate voters.) In at least one vot-
ing district that includes the munici-
palities of Ocosingo, Altamirano,
and Las Margaritas, the strategy of
EZLN sympathizers appeared to be
successful. More than 30% of the
polling stations were either de-
stroyed or not installed. Mexican
law requires that if 20% of the
polling stations are not properly
functioning throughout the voting
period, the elections in that district
must be annulled. Annulments are
also possible in three other of
Chiapas’ 12 electoral districts.
The clearest solution to the con-
flict in Chiapas and other states with
significant indigenous popula-
tions-including Oaxaca, Guerrero,
and Hidalgo-is the implementa-
tion of the Accords on Indigenous
Rights and Culture signed by the
Mexican government in February of
1996. The Accords laid the ground-
work for significant changes in the
areas of indigenous rights, political
participation, and cultural auton-
omy. Above all, they recognized the
existence of political subjects called
There are now between
25,000 and 30,000
soldiers permanently
installed in the regions
of the state that are
Zapatista strongholds.
The army is augmented
by thousands of federal
“public security” and
judicial police.
“pueblos indios” (Indian peoples)
and gave conceptual validation to
the notions of “self-determination”
and “autonomy” by using these ex-
plicit terms in the signed accords.
The PRD, with its new political
power, can act as a political bridge
in this critical political moment to
bring the continued violence, mili-
tarization, and poverty of these
southern states to national political
attention. The party can also work
to jump-start the stalled peace talks
in San Andr6s. The political space
won by the PRD this past July is in
part due to the Zapatista rebellion
and the national political mobiliza-
tion it engendered among Mexico’s
civilian population. If the party ig-
nores Chiapas, the situation in the
state will further deteriorate. The
desperation felt in Chiapas has
nowhere to go. Another armed up-
rising would clearly spell suicide
for the EZLN and its base commu-
nities, but with no other options in
sight, it is being seriously consid-
ered by some. Now is the moment
for the PRD to extend a hand to the
south of Mexico and guarantee that
the transition to democracy reaches
all Mexicans-not just those in the
center.
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