Though the victory of Alfonso Portillo in Guatemala’s December presidential runoff was fully expected, his resounding victory—and that of the extreme right-wing party he represents, the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG)—took many observers aback. The FRG, founded in 1988 by General Efraín Ríos Montt, who led a coup in 1982 and presided over a campaign of genocide and scorched-earth tactics in the countryside that resulted in more than 70,000 deaths, won a substantial majority in Congress and a large number of local governments. Ríos Montt, his past abuses notwithstanding, is the undisputed leader of the FRG, and was recently selected as the president of Congress.
The vote for the FRG was, first and foremost, a protest vote against the ruling Party of National Progress (PAN). Seen as the party of a wealthy elite, the PAN alienated voters with its dogmatic adherence to neoliberal economics. The left, on the other hand, divided and unable to present itself as a viable alternative, faltered in its bid to become a “third option.” The FRG, meanwhile, effectively co-opted the anti-neoliberal discourse of the left, presenting itself as the only real opposition to the PAN.
Portillo’s charisma and his populist attacks against the PAN also played an important role in the vote for the FRG. A former Christian Democrat, Portillo was able to move beyond Ríos Montt’s traditional base—active and retired hard-line army officers, civilians who participated in the army patrols during the country’s civil war, sectors of the oligarchy, fundamentalist churches and a conservative faction of Christian Democrats. He successfully appealed to the disenchanted middle and lower classes, who suffered greatly from the unemployment and growing inflation that characterized the last years of the PAN’s administration. Perhaps most surprisingly, Portillo was able to galvanize support among some progressive sectors, including many who had lost faith in the leftist New Nation Alliance (ANN), a coalition of the Guatemalan Revolutionary National Unity (URNG) and two smaller parties. This ability to appeal to a broad political base has allowed Portillo to maintain a certain degree of autonomy from FRG hardliners, including Ríos Montt himself.
This was evident in several of the measures taken by Portillo after his inauguration on January 14, 2000. He incorporated a handful of well-respected progressive personalities into his team, such as Edgar Gutiérrez, who worked for the Archbishop’s Office for Human Rights and is now in charge of the implementation of the Peace Accords, and Otilia Lux de Cotí, an indigenous intellectual and former commissioner of the Historical Clarification Commission, who is now Minister of Culture. Portillo also moved quickly to arrest two army officers and a former general accused of involvement in the brutal assassination of Bishop Juan Gerardi on April 26, 1998, which drew praise from the Catholic Church and human rights organizations.
Portillo has also taken some surprising economic steps. Breaking precedent, he appointed ministers to his economic cabinet who were not direct representatives of the powerful private-sector organization, the Coordination of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Finances (CACIF). Populist gestures—like Portillo’s announcement of a 200-quetzal ($25) salary increase for workers—represented shrewd attempts to solidify his support, although Congress later modified his proposal, suggesting the likelihood of future confrontations with hardliners in Congress loyal to Ríos Montt. His efforts to combat drug trafficking and other organized crime rings, as well as the launching of an investigation into the previous administration’s handling of the sale of the state-owned telephone company and a number of other transactions, has also won Portillo kudos from all social groups.
Portillo also took some bold moves to assure loyalty among the top brass of the Guatemalan military. He appointed two colonels as Minister and Vice-Minister of Defense, removing the old leadership from positions of command, and he is reportedly planning to replace the Presidential General Staff (EMP), his military guard, with a civilian team. Portillo could not trust the old military leadership, many of whom were close to the PAN government. Nor could he trust the EMP—a unit accused of serious human rights violations—with his personal safety.
Three distinct currents can be distinguished within the new government: extreme-right followers of Ríos Montt, who have a significant presence in Congress; followers of Vice-President Francisco Reyes, who favor oligarchic-national interests over foreign capital; and followers of Portillo and his populist approach to social and economic matters. For the time being, the three factions are advancing their respective agendas based on a handful of common goals: strengthening the role of the state as the director of social and economic policy; consolidating the FRG as the hegemonic political force; and weakening the PAN as a political party. Tensions between Portillo and Ríos Montt are already emerging, however, as are contradictions among the three factions.
While Portillo is trying to live up to his campaign promises and establish his political base, Ríos Montt is consolidating his power as president of Congress and leader of the FRG. In his inauguration speech, Portillo adopted the provisions of the Peace Accords as his own, and he promised to fully implement them in the shortest possible period. Ríos Montt, of course, has vehemently opposed the Peace Accords, though it may be untenable for him to try to revise them even though he has the power as head of Congress to do so. Portillo’s position regarding human rights violations perpetrated during the internal armed conflict, however, remains unclear. Portillo might stress compliance with some of the recommendations of the Historical Clarification Commission and a resolution to the Gerardi case, but few believe that he will have the will or the power to take action to prosecute past human rights violations.
The extreme right-wing of the FRG will likely prevail in Congress, where Portillo is limited to presenting legal initiatives. Two examples illustrate this. First, Ríos Montt—together with allies from CACIF—successfully challenged Portillo’s request for a salary increase for workers. He also arranged for the scuttling of the Code for Children and Youth, written in 1996 to comply with Guatemala’s obligations under the International Convention on the Rights of Children. Another ominous sign was a legal maneuver passed by the congressional majority authorizing the re-election of Ríos Montt as president of Congress. Previously, this post was limited to a one-year term.
The tensions within the government will doubtless continue and intensify. Portillo will likely continue with his populist initiatives and efforts to reach out to centrist and even some progressive sectors, such as his invitation to former guerrilla Pedro Palma Lau (Commander Pancho) to head the presidential office for land conflicts, in order to build his support base. Ríos Montt, meanwhile, will continue to push his right-wing agenda. Neither PAN, the main opposition party, nor the ANN, the third political force, is in a position to oppose the government or present alternative solutions to Guatemala’s many pressing problems. The PAN is internally split, and while the ANN is taking some important steps to consolidate itself, its inexperience and limited political presence (it won just nine of the 113 seats in Congress, and some 25 out of the 330 local governments) make this more of a long-term political project than a concrete alternative for the immediate future.
People’s trust in political parties and electoral democracy continues to fade, and today’s ideological confusion is contributing to the erosion of the political system. Populism provided an escape valve this time, but the government has a short time to show that it can address the most pressing needs of the population. The contradictions between Portillo’s short-term goals and Ríos Montt’s long-term project will likely exacerbate over time, particularly if Ríos Montt uses his position in Congress to try to undo the constitutional prohibition against former coup leaders running for president to clear the way for a 2003 presidential bid.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Raúl Molina Mejía is Coordinator of International Relations for FORUM, a new political association in Guatemala. He was Dean of the School of Engineering (1976-1980) and acting Rector (1980) of San Carlos National University in Guatemala City.
