To date, U.S.
taxpayers have
provided nearly
$290 billion for
the war on drugs,
yet cocaine and
heroin are more
readily available,
and at cheaper
prices, than ever
before. Aoove, uenerai Barry mvicLarrey, uvirecror or mne ivaIuonal urug rouCy utre–he ruy Zd.
Below, Mexican Federal Judicial Police cross a river on a marijuana eradication mission.
In the coca-growing Guaviare region of Colombia,
U.S.-supplied turbo-thrush spray aircraft take off on
a daily basis to drop a potent herbicide on fields of
illicit coca. On a good day with no rain, the coca will be
dead within four hours. Colombia is the only country in
the Andean region that presently engages in aerial fumi-
gation to eradicate coca, but according to the U.S. State
Department, coca production in that country increased
by a staggering 32% over the course of 1996.’ Even a
quick visit to the region illustrates why. As bluntly
stated by the local Bishop, Belarmino Correa, “the peo-
ple fear that if they stop growing coca, they will die of
hunger.” 2 Having no other economic alternative, small
coca farmers whose fields wither up and die have just
Coletta Youngers is Senior Associate at the Washington Office on
Latin America in Washington, D.C
two options; to go deeper into the jungle to grow more
coca or to join the growing ranks of Colombia’s largest
insurgency, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC).
That U.S. international drug policy actually perpetu-
ates coca production should come as no surprise. To
date, U.S. taxpayers have provided nearly $290 billion for the “war on drugs,” yet cocaine and heroin are more
readily available, and at cheaper prices, than ever
before.’ Analysts of the industry point out that interna- tional drug-control efforts are based on fundamentally
flawed assumptions about the coca and cocaine mar-
kets-an argument that does not go over well in
Washington where politicians of all ideological stripes
seek political advantage by being “tough on drugs.” The popular perception on Capitol Hill is that there is a lot to lose and little to gain by proposing alternatives.
VOL XXXI, No 2 SEPT/OCT 1997 13
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