The Thirty-Year War

U S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA HAD A REMARK-
. able consistency over the span of seven presidencies
from Eisenhower to Reagan. It was rooted in three objec-
tives: to overthrow the Cuban government; to isolate and
“contain” Cuba; and to reduce the Soviet presence in Cuba.
Initially, U.S. policy-makers focused on the first goal. Isola-
tion was one of several means to that end. By 1971 isolation
and containment had become ends in and of themselves,
apart from the objective of overthrowing the Cuban govem-
ment, and Cuban ties to the Soviet Union became a primary
consideration.
At first, the Eisenhower Administration watched the
unfolding revolution without a clear determination about
what course the United States would follow. But even as
early as March 10, 1959-at a point when Cuba had not yet
nationalized the holdings of any U.S. corporations-the Na-
tional Security Council discussed ways of bringing “another
government to power in Cuba.”” By mid-1959, the admini-
stration clearly had opted for some form of antagonistic
relationship.
Cuba initially stayed quite distant from the Soviet Union,
which had shown little interest in the revolution. It was not
until February 1960 that a high-level Soviet delegation
travelled to the island. By this time U.S. public opinion had
begun to shift against the new Cuban government, because of
the “show” trials of former Batista soldiers and press reports
that Cuba might become socialist. In mid-1960, the United
States ordered U.S. oil companies in Cuba not to refine any
crude from the Soviet Union. Castro retaliated by nationaliz-
ing the refineries, and soon thereafter the United
States cancelled the quota on how much Cuban sugar could
enter the United States. (Though the total U.S. economic
embargo was instituted on February 6, 1962, nearly all trade
calculated attempt at military intimidation. State Depart-
ment officials asserted that such a high seas interdiction is
routine, and that State had received permission from
Panama (the country of registry) to board the boat.
Whether the order to fire at the Hermann emanated
from the “highest levels” of the U.S. government, as one
Cuban official said in an interview, or whether it was a
routine interdiction as the State Department claimed, the
incident illustrates what is striking about the Bush Ad-
ministration’s Cuba policy in general: a lack of rancor. No
Elliott Abrams in the State Department or Jos6 Sorzano in
the National Security Council revels in attacking Cuba, or
sees the overthrow of the Cuban government as a personal
mission.” Denunciations now are made with an almost
ritualistic banality that reflects both bureaucratic inertia
and the routine nature of hostility toward Cuba.
UBA’S DIMINISHING NATIONAL SECURITY
importance has had a curious effect on the way U.S.
policy is determined. Career foreign policy officials said
with Cuba ended shortly after the United States set the Cuban
sugar quota at zero, in July 1960. In 1964 the United States
persuaded the Organization of American States to institute a
hemispheric embargo against Cuba. 2 )
On January 3, 1961, President Eisenhower broke diplo-
matic relations with Cuba. Ten months earlier he had author-
ized preparations for an invasion of the island by 1,500
Cuban exiles, who were trained and supplied by the CIA. The
invasion became the ill-fated Bay of Pigs episode of April 17-
19, 1961, in which the invading forces were routed in 72
hours.) President Kennedy’s policy response to the defeat
came seven months later when he authorized a covert war
against Cuba.
One element of the war was diplomatic pressure to
undermine the legitimacy of the Cuban government. In
January 1962, at U.S. urging, the OAS suspended Cuba’s
membership. The OAS contended that Cuba had become a
member of the “Sino-Soviet bloc of countries,” and in fact
Cuba had turned to the Soviet Union, China, and other
socialist countries when the United States cut off trade and
aid. Castro responded to the OAS vote with the Second
Declaration of Havana on February 4, 1962, saying, “The
duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution.” 4
The Kennedy Administration’s covert war developed out
of a well-orchestrated, multifaceted plan named Operation
Mongoose intended to “bring about the revolt of the Cuban
people…[which] will overthrow the Communist regime and
institute a new government with which the United States can
live in peace.”‘ Operation Mongoose involved the follow-
ing: several attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro; weekly
landings in Cuba of arms, supplies, and mercenary soldiers
for anti-government forces fighting largely in the Escambray
Mountains; the creation and maintenance of a large CIA base
in Florida to support the war; and the sabotage of Cuban
agriculture and industry, including the destruction of ma-
chinery, the burning of fields, and the poisoning of harvested
crops bound for export. 6 Operation Mongoose planners rec-
ognized that to succeed in destabilizing the Cuban govern-
VOLUME XXIV, NUMBER 3 (NOVEMBER 1990) 17RCubaeo o AmIeia
Cuba II
in interviews that the policy has been taken out of their
hands and is being made in the White House. That would
suggest Bush has attached great importance to the policy.
But these officials also say that inside the White House,
little attention is being given to Cuba.
One official explained the seeming paradox by re-
marking that “the President is letting himself be pushed
by external forces because he is comfortable about the
direction in which they are pushing him.” In effect, he has
delegated Cuba policy to an active congressional group,
inspired by domestic lobbies, that regularly pushes the
administration into a position of aggressive posturing.
While State, Treasury and Defense Department actions
against Cuba reflect a bureaucratic imperative to continue
thirty years of animosity, Bush’s hostility toward Cuba is
largely a reaction to domestic pressures.
Notably, the most hostile efforts directed against Cuba
have originated in Congress. T.V. Marti did not emerge
from the White House. It was spearheaded by Sen. Ernest
Hollings (D-SC). Proposals to expand the embargo against
ment, the United States would likely have to use its own
military forces. 7 In an incredible historical irony, the target
date set for the revolt and possible U.S. invasion was October
1962, when the so-called Cuban Missile Crisis occurred.
Notably, planning for the revolt began before either the
Cubans or Soviets ever discussed missiles.”
The missile crisis has become the stuff of legend. But
Operation Mongoose is usually missing from the legend.
Most accounts exclude Cuba and begin the confrontation
between the superpowers on October 14, 1962, when a U-2
spy flight confirmed reports that the Soviet Union was
building a facility for Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
at San Crist6bal. From the Cuban perspective, the crisis
began when Mongoose was approved in 1961; Cuba saw the
missiles as a way of deterring the impending U.S. aggression
envisioned in Mongoose.
On October 22, President Kennedy announced that the
U.S. had initiated a naval quarantine to prevent completion
of the missile sites, and he demanded the facilities be dis-
mantled. Tension mounted as Soviet ships steamed toward
Cuba and the waiting U.S. warships, and finally broke when
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to the demands on
October 28. This came shortly after an errant Soviet com-
mander gave the order to shoot down a U-2 with a surface-to-
air missile, which nearly led to a U.S. invasion.
In return for Khrushchev’s concession, President Ken-
nedy promised not to invade Cuba.’ But the crisis actually
ended a month later, after Cuba agreed to allow the Soviet
Union to remove IL-28 bombers from the island as well as the
missiles.
The missile crisis may have chastened the superpowers
about the danger of nuclear war. But it continues to stand as
an enduring irritant in U.S.-Cuban relations. It was a confron-
tation that gave the United States an unprecedented sense of
vulnerability, and Cuba was the locus of this threat. Though
the confrontation ended peacefully, and included a no-
invasion pledge, Cuban leaders did not believe the United
States would adhere to its promise. And the removal of Soviet
Cuba by including third country U.S. subsidiaries, and by
mandating that vessels be seized in U.S. ports if they had
docked in Cuba within six months, were initiated by Sen.
Mack and Rep. Smith.
These efforts were focal points for the Cuban Ameri-
can National Foundation, a tax-exempt organization, and
its lobbying arm, the Cuban American Foundation. Cre-
ated in 1981, CANF modelled itself on the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), by establish-
ing local chapters throughout the country and developing
active ties to Congress.” 4 AIPAC reportedly even trained
CANF staff in tactics for transforming a foreign policy
issue into a domestic one that would be susceptible to
interest group pressure.
CANF’s greatest influence lies with the Florida con-
gressional delegation because of the large Cuban-Ameri-
can and conservative Latino population there. Rep. Smith,
for example, has been especially solicitous of CANF and
chairman Mis Canosa during congressional hearings, and
his foreign policy voting record shifted to the right after an
weaponry vital for Cuba’s defense against potential U.S.
aggression exposed their own vulnerability.”‘
The remainder of the decade after the missile crisis was a
period of cold war between the United States and Cuba.
There was little direct contact, and the contact that did occur
only served to deepen antagonisms. Despite Kennedy’s
pledge, the United States maintained some support for the
counter-revolutionaries who actively fought inside Cuba
until 1966. The attempts on Fidel Castro’s life also continued
until at least 1965.” Meanwhile, Cuba supported revolution-
aries in Latin America who were attempting to overthrow
U.S. client states.
N 1970, THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTED THE
Soviet Union again, in a mini-missile crisis, over the con-
struction of a submarine base at Cienfuegos. National Secu-
rity Advisor Henry Kissinger “quietly” demanded that the
base be dismantled, and the Soviets complied.” The incident
was a harbinger of the reduced tension that marked much of
the decade.
A movement to relax the hostility between the two
countries began in the U.S. Congress in 1971, and it gained
force over the next four years.” The United States appeared
isolated, while the intent of the policy had been the reverse–to
isolate Cuba. A growing number of Latin American coun-
tries were breaking the trade embargo and calling for a
change in the OAS prohibition on trade with Cuba.
While congresspeople acted independently, the admini-
stration signaled its support for their activities at key junc-
tures. The United States signed an anti-hijacking treaty with
Cuba in February 1973. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger named William Rogers–an advocate of negotia-
tions with Cuba-as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs. By the end of 1974, Rogers was meeting
with Cuban U.N. diplomats in New York. In 1975, the Ford
Administration relaxed its position on economic sanctions
by voting to lift the OAS embargo. While the United States
chose to continue its bilateral embargo, it did begin to allow
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICASinitial pattern of liberalism. Smith’s South Florida district
was considered to be a closely contested one in the mid-
1980s, partly because of the increasing number of Cuban-
Americans moving into it. But there has been no signifi-
cant Cuban-American opponent to challenge him, and
CANF continues to praise him. He is also a stalwart
supporter of aid to Israel.
President Bush’s son, Jeb Bush, also figures into the
equation of CANF influence. Prominent in Florida Re-
publican politics, the younger Bush has worked closely
with CANF in promoting T.V. Marti. Last year, he was the
campaign manager for Ileana Ros-Lehtinin (R-FL), who
became the first Cuban-American member of Congress.
She succeeded Democrat Claude Pepper in a hotly con-
tested race that featured an appearance by the President.
CANF’s greatest achievement is its ability, like AIPAC,
to move beyond a narrow constituency. It has succeeded
in making anti-Castro politics a litmus test of conserva-
tism used by other right-wing organizations. Indeed, as in-
creased military spending and anti-Sovietism lose their
third country subsidiaries of U.S. corporations to trade with
Cuba.
These efforts to reduce tension were dashed by the war in
Angola. Kissinger perceived Cuba to be thwarting
U.S. interests there, and saw little reason to “reward” Cuba
with relaxed tension. In October 1976, terrorists-several of
whom were Cuban-Americans previously on the CIA
payroll-blew up a Cuban civilian airplane, killing the 73
passengers. Cuba then abrogated the anti-hijacking agree-
ment, which included provisions that mandated each country
to try to prevent such attacks.
The Carter Administration moved quickly to reduce the
renewed tension with Cuba. By April 1977, the United States
had signed a fishing and maritime boundary agreement with
Cuba, and in September the two countries exchanged diplo-
mats, though without formal recognition. Carter also eased
currency restrictions and permitted charter flights, which
facilitated tourist travel to Cuba. In turn, Cuba permitted a
large number of political prisoners to emigrate to the United
States, and allowed the return in 1979 of more than 100,000
exiles for family visits.’ 4
However, by then the warming trend had been reversed,
largely because of the Carter Administration’s reaction to
Cuban support for Ethiopia in its 1977-1978 conflict with
Somalia, and Cuba’s alleged training of Katangese exiles
who invaded the Shaba province of Zaire in 1978. Carter
railed against Cuba over the Shaba incident, though his
charges proved unconvincing to the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.” From then on, the administration reverted
to the traditional posture that Cuba was a major enemy of the
United States. To underscore that view, the president issued
a policy statement-Presidential Directive 52 in October
1979-that ordered national security agencies “to devise
strategies for curbing Cuba’s activities [in the Third World]
and isolating it politically.” 6 This followed on the heels of
the U.S.-Cuban confrontation overan alleged 3,000-member
Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, which turned out to be a
Soviet training group that had been stationed in Cuba since
potency for arousing conservative ire, anti-Castroism has
become an even readier vehicle for these groups. Thus,
conservative Cuban-Americans can credibly threaten
electoral retaliation around the country through their links
to nationwide conservative organizations. In fact, talk of
a strong conservative opponent facing Sen. Hollings in
1992 has faded since Hollings championed T.V. Marti.
Such electoral clout may have moved the usually
unshakable Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI) to flip his position
on U.S. Cuba policy. In June, he joined 27 senators in
demanding that President Bush ask Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev to terminate Soviet military aid to
Cuba. Characterizing Cuba as “the Albania or the North
Korea of the Caribbean,” he also endorsed the Mack
amendment. This came shortly after Pell, who is in a tough
re-election fight against Republican Congresswoman
Claudine Schneider, met in Miami with Mis Canosa. 1 5
Pell is the CANF’s biggest catch. His stature as chair
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and his long
advocacy of negotiations with Cuba and eventual nor-
the 1962 missile crisis. President Carter demanded that the
Soviets withdraw the brigade, and he ordered the creation of
the Caribbean Joint Task Force, a small military unit on Key
West. to counter the supposed danger.
On top of these strains, the Mariel boatlift of April-May
1980 helped push United States-Cuban relations to the heights
of tension they had reached in earlier years. Approximately
120,000 Cubans emigrated from the port of Mariel when the
Cuban government permitted essentially unrestricted exo-
dus from the island-the United States welcomed them. The
United States charged that the Cuban government forced
some prisoners and mental health patients to emigrate.
EVERAL REAGAN OFFICIALS HAD ADVOCATED
harsh measures against Cuba long before they assumed
office. In 1981, Cuba quickly became the focal point of their
anticommunist crusade, as they pursued a “get tough” pol-
icy.” Secretary of State Alexander Haig set the tone in a
February 1981 declaration, saying that the United States
must “deal with the immediate source of the problem [in El
Salvador]-and that is Cuba.” “‘ This sort of rhetoric shaped
public debate about Cuba, but Reagan Administration policy
depended on time-worn techniques that included economic
pressure, propaganda broadcasts, military intimidation and
diplomatic isolation.
The Reagan Administration enforced the economic
embargo more stringently by threatening to confiscate any
imported goods that contained Cuban nickel. It also pres-
sured European allies not to renegotiate Cuba’s outstanding
loans.” In 1982, President Reagan effectively revoked per-
mission for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba by banning the
expenditure of dollars in Cuba except by scholars, journal-
ists, and Cuban exiles who wished to see their families. 2 0
First proposed by the arch-conservative Committee of
Santa Fe as Radio Free Cuba, Radio Marti was embraced by
the Reagan Administration in 1981 as a means of exacerbat-
ing tensions within Cuba through propaganda broadcasts. In
its original form, it was to be akin to Radio Liberty and Radio
VOLUME XXIV, NUMBER 3 (NOVEMBER 1990) 19RCet bn td Am4eAL4a
Cuba II
malization of relations, had effectively provided legiti-
macy for others who supported a moderate stance. Pell’s
turnabout undoubtedly will shift congressional debate to
the right and enhance CANF’s reputation.
Conservative Cuban-Americans also have used cam-
paign financing to gain footholds outside of their Florida
base.’ Sen. Hollings received $5,000 from the Free Cuba
PAC, a political action committee with many of the same
board members as CANF, and “sizable supplements
from foundation directors” in his 1986 campaign.” 7 Of the
$165,897 total contributions given during the 1987-1988
electoral cycle, the Free Cuba PAC donated only $46,350
to Florida candidates.'”
ONLY WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION SEES
real foreign policy interests at stake in dealing with
Cuba, has it eschewed ideological posturing and tried to
regain control over policy from Congress. The State
Department opposed the Mack and Smith amendments,
for example, by arguing that “U.S. allies and trading
Free Europe, and was to be housed in their agency–the
Board for International Broadcasting. Congress forced the
administration to run the station as part of the Voice of
America..
On October 30, 1981 the U.S. Navy began extensive
maneuvers in the Caribbean. A week later, the New York
Times reported that Secretary of State Haig “has been
pressing the Pentagon to examine a series of options for
possible military action in El Salvador and against Cuba and
Nicaragua,” including with respect to Cuba, ‘”an invasion by
American and possibly Latin American forces.” 2 ‘ Six months
later, in April 1982, the U.S. Navy again demonstrated a
show of force in the Caribbean. Called “Ocean Venture 82,”
the three-week set of maneuvers involved 45,000 troops, 350
airplanes, and 60 ships. It included an exercise to evacuate
non-combatants from the U.S. naval base at Guantinamo. 2 2
Cuba responded by placing the country on full military alert.
It also requested more military aid from the Soviet Union and
began to reorganize the island’s defenses with a new militia.
The United States encouraged Latin American countries
to break the ties they had developed with Cuba in the 1970s.
Jamaica and Colombia, which had recently elected conserva-
tive governments and which were in great need of
U.S. assistance, complied and broke relations in 1981. The
United States successfully blocked Cuban participation in
major international conferences.
During the Reagan Administration’s first term, Cuba
returned the verbal attacks with equivalent calumnies.
However, Cuba generally welcomed any possibility for
negotiations with the United States, although it refused to
discuss the return of 2,700 “excludable” exiles who had
entered the United States during the Mariel boatlift. 2 3 Only in
1984 did Cuba indicate a willingness to discuss this issue.
The agreement reached in December 1984 specified that
2,746 exiles would be repatriated to Cuba, and 20,000
Cubans would be allowed to emigrate to the United States an-
nually. 2 4
However, within hours of Radio Martf’s first broadcast in
partners are likely to object strongly to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. Canada, Japan, Mexico, and
Argentina are major allies likely to protest. Indeed, Can-
ada has already contacted us.”” By restricting the behav-
ior of a foreign company (even a U.S. corporate subsidi-
ary) in another country, the proposed law would challenge
the sovereignty of that country. In effect, the State Depart-
ment appears to have developed its position from a
practical consideration of U.S. foreign policy interests,
rather than from a narrow calculus of gains linked to Cuba
or from an ideologically rooted posture.
Similarly, State and Commerce Department officials
have worked quietly to oppose propaganda television
broadcasts to Cuba because these challenge the legiti-
macy of international law, a key to restructuring post-
Cold War relationships with U.S. allies. It is striking that
the usually conservative deputy editorial page editor of
the Washington Post, Stephen Rosenfeld, also came out
against the project in a signed column. He is well known
for his close contact with the State Department and for his
May 1985, Castro suspended the immigration agreement,
and he announced Cuba would no longerpermit exiles to visit
the country.” In response, Reagan issued a decree barring
virtually any Cuban from the United States, thereby closing
the door on contact in the United States between Cubans and
U.S. citizens. 2 6
By 1987, relations were at their lowest ebb since the 1962
missile crisis.” As the year began, Cuba denied U.S. diplo-
mats the right to land cargo charter planes, thus making the
shipment of cars, office equipment and similar large items
more difficult. In March, the United States aggressively
pursued passage of a resolution in the United Nations Human
Rights Commission which accused Cuba of persecuting
political dissenters. It failed when Latin American members
of the Commission supported Cuba. Then in July, Cuba aired
a television documentary which detailed in an unprece-
dented fashion espionage activities by personnel in the U.S.
Interests Section. 2 8
Yet in November 1987, the two countries restored the
immigration agreement that Cuba had cancelled in 1985.
Two months later, U.S. and Cuban representatives met for
the first time to discuss the war in Angola. (The United States
previously had refused to attend any meeting about Angola
with Cubans present.) This led to the historic accord at the
end of the Reagan Administration in which Cuba agreed to
withdraw troops from Angola, and South Africa agreed to
withdraw from Namibia and allow free elections to occur
there. Though the Reagan years ended on this positive tone,
officials were quick to dispel any suggestion that the agree-
ments could lead to normal relations.
This relatively unchanged policy over thirty years has
generated what historian Thomas Paterson calls a “fixation
with Cuba.” Cuban resistance to U.S. pressure and attacks
has made Cuba a threat to U.S. hegemony. That has provided
an ongoing rationale for hostility, which has been buttressed
by a bureaucratic imperative to resist change. This was the
legacy handed to the Bush Adminstration as it began to chart
U.S. policy toward Cuba.
The Thirty-Year War
1. Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York: Morrow,
1986), p. 480.
2. Paul Hoeffel and Sandra Levinson, eds., The U.S. Blockade:
A Documentary History (New York: Center for Cuban Studies,
1979); Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United
States and Cuba, 1952-1986 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), pp. 191-202; Donna Rich, The U.S. Embargo Against
Cuba: Its Evolution and Enforcement, A Study Prepared for the
Commonwealth Countries (Washington, D.C., July 1988), pp. 24-
37.
3. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1979) provides the best detailed study of the
operation. For reference to the President’s authorization, see p. 25.
4. Fidel Castro, “The Duty of a Revolutionary is to Make the
Revolution: The Second Declaration of Havana,” in Martin Kenner
and James Petras (eds.) Fidel Castro Speaks (New York: Grove
Press, 1969), pp. 8 5 – 1 0 6 (esp. p. 104); Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make
the World Safe for Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1989), pp. 115-16; H. Michael Erisman, Cuba’s International
Relations (Boulder: Westview, 1985), pp. 20-1.
5. Brig. Gen. E.G. Lansdale, “The Cuba Project,” (Program
Review for The President and ten others) Jan. 18, 1962, p. 1,
(classified Top Secret, partially declassified 5 Jan. 1989), available
at the National Security Archive (Washington).
6. U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Op-
erations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, “Alleged Assassina-
tion Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,” Report No. 94-465, 94th
Cong. 1st Sess., Nov. 20, 1975, pp. 71-180.
7. Brig. Gen. E.G. Lansdale, “The Cuba Project,” p. 2.
8. Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, “Essence
of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,”
International Security (Winter 1989/1990); Raymond L. Garthoff,
Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Revised Edition (Washing-
ton: Brookings, 1989).
9. Herbert Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976); Graham Allison, Essence
of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).
10. Philip Brenner, “Cuba and the Missile Crisis,” Journal of
Latin American Studies, Vol. 22 (Feb. 1990), pp. 134-138.
11. Senate Intelligence Committee, “Alleged Assassination Plots,”
pp. 174-180.
12. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little
Brown, 1979), pp. 635-651.
13. Philip Brenner, The Limits and Possibilities of Congress
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 45-52.
14. Wayne S. Smith, The Closest ofEnemies (New York: Norton,
1987), pp. 161-162.
15. Ibid, pp. 137-140; New York Times, June 10, 1978; William
M. LeoGrande, Cuba’s Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, Policy Papers
in International Affairs, No. 13 (Berkeley: University of California,
1980), pp. 26-27.
16. Barry Sklar, “Cuba: Normalization of Relations,” Archived
Issue Brief #75030, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Re-
search Service, Jan. 13, 1980,p. 13; New York Times, Oct. 17,1979.
17. For good reviews of the first two years of administration
policy, see: William LeoGrande, “Cuba Policy Recycled,” Foreign
Policy, No. 46, Spring, 1982; Wayne S. Smith, “Dateline Havana:
Myopic Diplomacy,” Foreign Policy, No. 48, Fall, 1982.
18. Jane Franklin, Cuban Foreign Relations: A Chronology
1959-1982 (New York: Center for Cuban Studies, 1984), pp. 36-37.
19. Washington Post, April 20, 1982; Miami Herald, Sept. 5,
1982.
20. The travel ban had little practical effect. Its purported ration-
ale was to deny hard currency to Cuba, but the largest number of
U.S. citizens spending money in Cuba had been exiles who were
able to continue their travel there under the new regulations. Miami
Herald, June 29, 1984.
21. New York Times, Nov. 5, 1981.
22. Philip Brenner, “U.S.-Cuba: Ambiguous Signals,” Cuba-
Times, Summer, 1982; Washington Post, June 10, 1982.
23. Wayne Smith, “Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy,” p. 161.
Also see New York Times, April 6, 1982.
24. Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1984; Miami Herald, Dec. 24,
1984.
25. Miami Herald, May 21, 1985.
26. Ronald Reagan, “Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants by
Officers orEmployees ofthe Government ofCuba or the Communist
Party of Cuba,” Proclamation 5377, Oct. 4, 1985, Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, No. 41, Oct. 14, 1985, p.
1210.
27. New York Times, Feb. 27, 1987 and May 2, 1987.
28. Miami Herald, March 12, 1987; Washington Post, July 27,
1987.