U.S. Cuba Policy
About a year ago, one of your
contributors took me to task
for being ignorant of how politics
operates in the United States [see
the exchange between Webber and
Van Gosse, Sept/Oct, 1995].
Perhaps with good reason; it is
beyond my understanding how one
of the most prestigious left-wing
publications in the United States
could respond to the latest North
American economic aggression
against Cuba with an editorial
headlined: “Hard Liners Gain the
Upper Hand in the United States
and Cuba” [May/June, 1996].
Let’s recall what the completely
bipartisan U.S. “hard-line” has con-
sisted of-terror bombings, biolog-
ical warfare, plots to assassinate
Fidel Castro, a mercenary invasion, a naval blockade that brought the
world to within 48 hours of nuclear
destruction, and-the center-
piece-an economic blockade over
three decades old, now reinforced
by the Helms-Burton Act. How
exactly did these Cuban “hard-lin-
ers” interfere in U.S. internal affairs
to justify such a grotesque head-
line?
The 1994 immigration accord to
which the editorial refers as “help-
ing to normalize relations between
the two countries” did nothing of
the sort, if “normalizing” means a
lifting of the blockade. In fact, the
editorial recognizes that the U.S.
government maintained the eco-
nomic embargo, but claims it
“encouraged cultural exchanges
and above all supported Cuba’s tiny
human rights movement.” There is, however, no contradiction between
strangling a country’s economy and
encouraging a few dozen fifth
columnists within it. At best, the
accord achieved a limited, albeit
valuable objective, by breaking off
the immediate threat of U. S. mili-
tary aggression against Cuba, but
only thanks to the firmness and
flexibility displayed by the Cubans.
It will, indeed, come as news to
the Cuban people that there existed
any “possibility of rapprochement”
for the downing of the planes to
derail. While Clinton had since
January, 1993 to lift the blockade, he did not do so. The eagerness of
his administration “to shore up the
Cuban-American vote,” in fact,
predates the February 24 incident,
and is something over which the
Cuban government has absolutely
no control.
The editorial continues, “U.S.-
Cuban relations are once again
extremely polarized.” Once again?
Did I blink and miss the time since
1959 when they’ve been anything
else but polarized? Perhaps for a
few months, in the first half of
1959, when the Yankee rulers
entertained the illusion that the
pledges the Cuban revolution had
made to the workers and peasants
were just words, as in so many
other instances in the Americas.
Once they determined that the rev-
olution was for real, they set out to
destroy it.
The editorial’s final paragraph
thoughtfully splits the blame 50-50.
The United States is to blame for its
latest illegal aggression, while
Cuba is to blame for defending
itself. The balance is perfect.
Mike Webber
Aylesbury, England
Pierre LaRam6e responds:
Deidre McFadyen’s Taking Note
column on Cuba was not about
Helms-Burton and economic
aggression, as Mike Webber seems
to suggest. Rather, the essay was an
attempt to put Cuba’s crackdown on
internal debate and “loyal dissent”
into context in the aftermath of the
Brothers to the Rescue shoot-down
and the subsequent signing of the
Helms-Burton bill by President
Clinton. Mr. Webber sees the col-
umn’s headline as “grotesque” since
he assumes that Cuban interference
in the United States’ internal affairs
should serve as the only possible cri-
terion for describing Cuban policy
as “hard-line.” However, NACLA
has always considered it legitimate
to be critical of the internal policies
of the countries within the range of
our coverage, and we saw the head-
line as merely descriptive.
Contrary to Mr. Webber’s allega-
tion, there was no known military
threat against Cuba occasioned by
the balsero crisis of 1994. The
Clinton administration’s willing-
ness to negotiate a solution to the
crisis, however, demonstrated for
the first time in some years flexibil-
ity in U.S. Cuba policy. It also led
to a severe straining of relations
with the right wing of the Cuban-
American lobby. The accord was
clearly seen by the Cuban govern-
ment as a significant opening, and
it was followed by a concerted,
though ultimately unsuccessful,
effort to exploit this opening by
widening its scope.
Mr. Webber is, of course, correct
in stating that the Clinton adminis-
tration-motivated by electoral and
financial concerns-has demon-
strated the same intransigence on
the embargo as its predecessors.
There were, neverthe-
less, indications of
growing rapproche-
ment prior to the Other
downing of the plane. governrr
More moderate voices those ir
in Cuba policy within
the administration and Pan
were having their say; spare it was becoming clear that the restrictions on pressure
travel and currency their poli
transactions -tight- already A A ; t
balsero crisis-would
be relaxed; U.S. cor-
porate leaders were
visiting the island, many returning
as advocates for normalization; and
there was still a real possibility that
Clinton would veto Helms-Burton.
Mr. Webber may not agree, but
the Cubans themselves recognize
that there have been periods of
detente and depolarization in U.S.-
Cuban relations over the past 30
years. This is not to deny or down-
play U.S. hostility to the revolution,
which continues to this day. The
point is that the shoot-down and
subsequent purge of moderate voic-
es for change ill serves the Cuban
people, who have demonstrated a
desire to adapt to a globalized capi-
talist, post-Cold War economy but
without sacrificing the gains of the
revolution. Cracking the whip of
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and
blindly reasserting Communist
Party hegemony, however U.S.
conduct may seem to justify it, is
not a viable long-term strategy for
survival in this brave new world.
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Narcodollars in Colombia
A na Carrigan’s description of the
attitude of the Colombian pop-
ulation regarding the political and
legal consequences of the financing
of Ernesto Samper’s presidential
campaign [“An Unlikely Hero,”
July/August, 1996] doesn’t take
into account the local interpretation
of the story. I have just returned
from Colombia and the only “pro-
gringo” converts I found are those
who over the years
have seen their status
and influence disap- orrupt pear under the
ents, like avalanche of drug dol-
Mexico lars. Among the peo- ple, there is the gener- Ima, are alized belief that had
U.S. the election been won
because by Conservative Party candidate Andres icians are Pastrana, a candidate
n Uncle with very strong ties
ocket. to U.S. politicians and
business, the issue of
obscure funds financ-
ing political cam-
paigns would have been a minor
thing. Other corrupt governments,
like those in Mexico and Panama,
are spared U.S. pressure because
their politicians are already in Uncle
Sam’s pocket.
For many years in Colombia, the
central bank has bought U.S. dollars
without asking where they have
come from. These dollars of
obscure origin have backed the
national currency, subsidized the
operations of legal economic
groups, and filled the gaps produced
by trade deficits. As a consequence,
there is little that is not contaminat-
ed by the drug traffic, and the dif-
ference between what is legal and
illegal is just a matter of the heart.
So people believe that the current
situation is just a game about a clos-
er control of the country’s economy
by the United States, and the stricter
implementation of IMF policies.
Juan Alonso Crosby
Port Jefferson Station, NY
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