We are approaching
the 30th anniver-
sary of the October
1967 death of Ernesto “Che”
Guevara in Bolivia-an event one
would think of as favorable for the
appearance of remembrances,
homages, business deals and, hope-
fully, serious reflections. In fact, a
Carlos Vilas is a sociologist and historian at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), and a member of NACLA’s editorial board. His most recent book is Between Earthquakes and Volcanoes: Market, State, and the Revolutions in Central America (Monthly Review Press, 1995). Translated from the Spanish by NACLA.
number of seri-
ous books and films on Che are
in the works, and a few-Paco
Ignacio Taibo’s sensitive account
of Che’s ill-fated African cam-
paign, and a Swiss documentary on
Che’s last days in Bolivia-are
already out and in circulation.
Also among the authors of forth-
coming books, we find the mercur-
ial Regis Debray, the French intel-
lectual who did more than anyone
else to popularize the idea that
“Guevarism” was the one true road
to the revolution. In a widely circu-
lated essay which will surely boost
the sales of his soon-to-be-published
book, Debray paints a personally
and politically damning portrait of
the famed guerrilla of whom he was
once so fond. It is a portrait that
conflicts with the memories of
many people who knew Che per-
sonally, and with the image that
arises from countless testimoni-
als-those of individuals who
shared particularly difficult
moments with Che, as well as those
of his political enemies. “Che
believed in the people,” says one of
his compafieros of the African
guerrilla movement. “Che was
authoritarian and sectarian,” the
Vol XXX. No 3 Nov/DEc 1996 9
ny rA, nVILA
Vol XXX. No 3 Nov/DEC 1996 9ANNIVERSARY ESSAY/ CHE GUEVARA
once-adulatory French intellectual
now tells us. According to Debray,
Che was hard, implacable, and ex-
cessively demanding of the people
with whom he worked-an author-
itarian leader who overstepped the
bounds of severity.
Che undoubtedly had a strong
character. (“He could be so
Argentine…,” his ex-wife, the his-
torian Aleida March once told me.)
The guerrilla army, more than any
other kind of army, is hard.
Discipline becomes a fundamental
factor for survival and victory. But
all the first-hand testimony coin-
cides in identifying Che as a firm,
responsible and enormously human
leader. To what, then, can we
attribute Debray’s new attitude? Is
it simply a cheap recourse to sell
expensive books?
Aleida Guevara, Che’s daughter
and a doctor like her father, offers a
hypothesis: Debray is responsible
for the Bolivian army finding
Che’s column, and finally,
although indirectly, for his death.
In statements made this August to
the Buenos Aires daily Clarin,
Aleida suggests that Debray’s
statements upon being captured in
April, 1967 made the army’s work
easier. To facilitate Debray’s exit
from the jungle, she suggests,
Che’s column changed its original
plans, lost time, and all this was
taken advantage of by the military.
Is this the clue to the sudden
change in Debray’s long and sup-
posedly deeply held allegiances? It
is quite conceivably part of it.
Upon the publication of Aleida’s
comments, Debray counterat-
tacked, attempting to discredit
Che’s daughter: she was only a
child at the time; how could she
know what was happening; she is
repeating what others have told her;
she is obeying the orders of the
Stalinist Cuban government to dis-
credit him; these orders simply
Vol VIII, No 2, FebruarY 1974
NACLAI
LATIN
AMERICA
& EMIPIRE REPORT
F1
,, ‘
Encouraged by the undying militancy of Boivian workers, Che
foresaw the liberation of Bolivia as a strategic step in the liberation
of all Latin America.. Che encountered the same problem that has
plagued the Boifvian left since 1952; no political party existed to
direct and focus the struggle developing in the Nancahuazu region
of Southeastern Bolvia. The importance of this cannot be underes-
timated. Le Duan, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Workers’
party, has written: “The revolutionary army .. can only be the work-
ers’ and peasants’ army. .placed under the immediate and undivided
leadership of our Party, the party of the working class…. In general,
one can say that revolutionary violence is based on two forms of
struggle: armed struggle and political struggle, one combined with
the other.” Thus a greater danger exists for revolutionaries when
these two struggles are separated.
-Vol. 8, No.2, February 1974
prove the dictatorial character of
the Cuban regime.
Over the past 30 years, Debray
has always adopted a more or less
progressive stance, in contrast to
his current attitude. But his present
criticism is not that of someone
who demands more or another type
of socialism. Rather, it is Mas
Canosa-style invective-the invec-
tive of those who condemn social-
ism under its difficult Cuban condi-
tions. What had led Che’s one-time
popularizer to draw this caricature
and to spew invectives against his
daughter and the besieged Cuban
regime?
The outbursts of Regis Debray
oblige us to ask ourselves just who
Debray is, and in particular, what
role he played in Che’s Bolivian
guerrilla movement. In the publici-
ty campaign for the sale of
Debray’s book, some news
sources-like the progressive
Mexican daily La Jornada-have
elevated the figure of Debray to
“comrade in arms” of Che in
Bolivia, and even to “Che’s advisor.”
This is not the reality that emerges
from the pages of Guevara’s own
diary. Regis Debray spent less than
a month with Che in Bolivia, and it
isn’t certain that he was involved in
any military confrontations or deci-
sion making. But better yet, let’s
allow Che to speak through his
diary.
The first mention of Debray
(identified as “Danton” and “the
Frenchman” until his capture by the
army was confirmed) was in refer-
ence to his arrival at the guerrilla
camp on March 20, 1967. On
March 21, Che wrote: “The
Frenchman…comes to stay, but I
asked that he return to organize a
support network in France, and that
on the way he stop in Cuba, some-
thing that coincides with his desire
to marry and have a child with his
compaihera.” [My emphasis.] In
other words, Che locates Debray in
external solidarity; he understands
10 NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICASANNIVERSARY ESSAY/ CHE GUEVARA
A continent in arms. NACLA illustration, 197
his desire to marry and be a father,
and he offers him the opportunity to
satisfy this desire at the same time
that he continues his support work.
Where is the arbitrary leader who
Debray now paints?
The next mention of “Danton” is
on April 19 in an entry concerning
an English reporter who arrives at
camp. Che and others suspect that
the reporter is a spy or an infiltrator.
Debray proposes instead that the
reporter may be useful in allowing
him (Debray) and Bustos (referred
to as “Carlos” or “El Pelado”
(“Baldy”)) to leave the guerrilla
zone. Bustos accepted “unwillingly
and I washed my hands of the mat-
ter,” writes Che. Debray, Bustos
and the Englishman leave. Four
days later, the 23rd, Che notes:
“The unknown hangs over Danton
and El Pelado and the English jour-
nalist; it is not known what has hap-
pened to them.” April 27: “It is con-
firmed that Danton is a prisoner
near Camiri.”
April 30, in his “Summary of the
Month,” Che writes: “Danton and
Carlos fell victim to their haste,
almost desperation, to leave, and
also to my lack of energy to deter
them, so that the lines of communi-
cation with Cuba have been cut
(Danton), and the plan of action in
Argentna nas oeen lost (Carlos).” [My emphasis.] We
have to emphasize the soberness
with which Che refers to the mat-
ter, above all because he is writ-
ing for himself. The reference to
Debray and Bustos’ “almost des-
peration” to leave suggests that if
Debray had in fact come to stay
with the guerrilla forces (note of
March 21), the desperation to
leave would have been due to a
decision made by someone else,
though it is possible that the man
was very interested in getting
married. In any case, Che recog-
nizes his own “lack of energy” in
the face of the decision of
0o Debray and Bustos to leave, con-
sistent with the principle that
participation in a guerrilla organi-
zation is voluntary.
On May 5, Guevara notes that
according to the radio, “Debray is
to be judged by a military court in
Camiri as the alleged leader and
organizer of the guerrillas.” This is
possibly the first instance of the
inflation of the figure of Debray.
By presenting him as the guerrilla
“leader,” the Bolivian army inflates
its own importance.
1___ L
The countryside and the agricultural proletariat remain central in
the [Nicaraguan] struggle. But new forms of organization are
necessary, as the base in the urban proletariat is becoming more
important (and not merely a support for the rural struggle). Even in
as agrarian a country as Vietnam, that proletariat, though small, was
considered to play the leading role in the Vietnamese Workers’
Party. In evolving from a guerrilla foco to being part of a revolu-
tionary party, guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, representing the
worker-peasant alliance, the Frente can gain the capacity to struc-
ture and lead mass struggles.
-Vol.10, No.2, February 1976
LATINRICA
$1 & EMPIRE
L~i.RPO~lr
Vol XXX, No 3 Nov/DEc 1996
On June 29, Guevara makes a
serious notation: “On the political
level, the most serious thing is the
official statement of Ovando [the
army’s commander-in-chief] that I
am here. Furthermore, he said that
the army is confronting well-
trained guerrillas among whose
ranks are Vietcong commandos
who have defeated the best U.S.
regiments. This is based on the dec-
larations of Debray who, it seems,
spoke more than necessary,
although we can’t know what
implications this has, nor the cir-
cumstances under which he said
what he did.” [My emphasis.] July
10: “The declarations of Debray
and El Pelado are not good, above
all, they have confessed the interna-
tional intentions of the guerrilla,
something they didn’t have to do.”
[My emphasis.] There are neither
epithets nor outbursts nor anger in
Che’s notation. But the careful
choice of words clarifies his assess-
ment of the conduct of Bustos and
Debray.
From that point onwards,
Debray is presented by the
Bolivian government as the princi-
pal protagonist of the matter.
August 19: “The news is full of
Debray. There is not a word of the
other accused. October 3: “An
interview with Debray was broad-
cast, very courageous before a stu-
dent provacateur.” [My emphasis.]
Five days later, Che is captured and
assassinated.
It is undeniable that Che died
convinced that Debray confessed
to more than he had to, but in fair-
ness he ventures no judgements
regarding the circumstances (tor-
ture? complicity? simple fear?)
under which he did so. The final
reference to Debray is positive: a
recognition of his valor in a public
confrontation with a provacateur,
with the same soberness with
which he earlier noted that Debray
had talked too much with his cap-
tors. The image of Che that arises
from all this is not the obsessive
authoritarian that Debray now
wishes to sell us; on the contrary, it
reveals the deep humanism of Che.
In these difficult circumstances, his
capacity for human sympathy
allows him not to rush any judge-
ments against the failings of
individuals.
Guevara’s diary entries
also reveal a different image
of Debray than the one cur-
rently being sold-a Debray
who is less central than his
reputation would suggest. A
look at Debray’s theoretical
background gives more hints
as to who he is and the basis
for his ideological position.
In the 1960s, Debray stud-
ied at the University of Paris
with the Marxist theoretician
Louis Althusser, and was
greatly influenced by his pro-
fessor’s abstract conception
of the capitalist economy.
According to Althusserian QtlrtltrJlienm -nit4alm I F I wore
upon the appropriation of tra-
ditional peasant lands and the con-
version of peasants into wage labor-
ers, creates the conditions for its
own negation-the proletarian revo-
lution. Once the objective conditions
mature, that is, once the capitalist
mode of production consolidates
By the early 1970s, [U.S.] operations in the Guatemalan highlands had decimated the guerrilla bands there. Similar successes were
scored in Bolivia and Venezuela. Pentagon planners were encour-
aged by the results. After all, the man who had become a symbol
of guerrilla struggle in Latin America, the man who countered the
green beret with a black one emblazoned with a small red star, was
dead. But these successes were more a testimony to the errors of
the foco theory of struggle than to the effectiveness of counterin-
surgency. These small guerrilla organizations had tried to be cata-
lysts for revolution, to spark a reaction from the masses without
ever being a part of them. A painful and costly lesson had been
learned. Che Guevara’s death marked the beginning of a new era
for Latin America.
-Vol. 15, NoI. 3, May/June 1981
rs Power. From the NACLA archives, 19/2.
itself and the historical subject of its
destruction-the proletariat-arises,
the conditions for liquidating capi-
talism and, by way of a proletarian
revolution, of constructing socialism
are at hand. The fundamental tasks
of a proletarian party, according to
this conception of the world, are to
make the masses aware of their
exploitation and convince them of
the historical-structural role that his-
tory calls upon them to play. If the
situation is “ripe for revolution,” the
role of the vanguard consists simply
of shaking the tree.
Carried to Latin America by
Debray, this perspective saw
in the rural guerrillas the
equivalent of the “vanguard party”
rising out of advanced capitalism.
The guerrilla enlightened the rural
proletarianized masses (peasants
without land, agricultural wage
laborers, the poor of the country-
side…) as to the road to follow and
their own role along that road. At
the same time, the guerrilla organi-
zation constituted the objective
realization of the Leninist theory of
“dual powers.” Contrary to the
urban and legal strategies of the tra-
ditional Communist and socialist
NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 12ANNIVERSARY ESSAY/ CHE GUEVARA
parties, Debray affirmed that only
“from outside” of the state would it
be possible to effectively smash
and destroy it.
In two books which achieved a
wide circulation, Castroism, the
Long March of Latin America, and
Revolution in the Revolution?,
Debray affirmed that the only pos-
sible and authentic revolutionary
path was the guerrilla foco. The
vulgar image of Che’s thought (vol-
unteerism, Guevarism, foquismo)
comes from these books. The repu-
tation of the young French intellec-
tual was built up by the pro-Cuba
solidarity networks and perhaps by
the ideological apparatus of the
Cuban Communist Party as well.
This was a moment in which Cuba
was isolated in the Western
Hemisphere, and in which many
Communist parties had rejected the
armed struggle. In this context, Debray’s arguments were debated
and rejected by many organizations
which, without denying their soli-
darity with and/or political debt to
Cuba, had other designs more
appropriate to their countries.
The abstract and hyper-
rationalist character of Debray’s
Structuralist approach prevented
him from taking note of the socio-
logical, historical, anthropological
and cultural characteristics of rural
Latin American capitalism and of
its working masses. Debray’s
about-face, in which he goes from
being an absolute ideological fol-
lower of the Cuban revolution to a
sworn enemy of all it represents,
suggests that the man never held a
well-considered position with
respect to Cuba’s revolution and
socialist experience. When was
Debray honest? When he followed
the line of the left, or now that he
follows the line of the right?
In the face of these spectacular
turnabouts, it is impossible for me
not to recall the similarly volatile
behavior of General Augusto
Pinochet in regard to the Popular
Unity government of Chile. The
testimony of ex-foreign minister
Orlando Letelier just before his
assassination at the hands of the
Pinochet regime reveals a genu-
flecting and opportunist military
officer who surprisingly turns to the
extreme right and heads the fascist
coup of 1973.
The attitude of Debray towards
Che Guevara and the Cuban politi-
cal system shows similar, if more
slowly moving pirouettes. Don’t get
me wrong, I am not comparing indi-
viduals, but rather, styles of political
behavior. Pinochet betrayed a live
man. Debray betrays a dead one.
The EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor – Guatemala) was one of a Inew breed of revolutionary organizations that had taken to
heart the defeats of the 1960s. The foquista efforts of that decade
had failed for lack of a clear strategy for mass involvement in the
war; military action had not ignited mass insurrection and, in the
end, the guerrilla organizations had been destroyed by the Army.
– Vol.17, No.2, March/April 1983
In the early 1980’s, Soviet attitudes toward Latin American revolu-
tionaries shifted toward selective, low-key support in a few coun-
tries. The Sandinista revolution convinced most Soviet analysts that
“political-military fronts” were more effective than traditional CPs
in overthrowing entrenched right-wing dictatorships. A number of
new works appeared praising Che Guevara, including one by the
USSR’s leading Central American historian and another that pur-
ported to prove Guevara’s sympathies for the Soviet Union. In
Guatemala and El Salvador, the CPs opted to join broad fronts
engaged in guerrilla struggle that were more effective in popular
organizing and confronting government repression.
– Vol.21, No.1, January/February 1987
In retrospect, armed struggle was a grave error…Even in his book
on guerrillas, Che Guevara says-almost on page one-that even in
an imperfect democracy, it’s useless to start a guerrilla war.
Interview with Teodoro Petkoff, a leader of the Venezuelan
guerrilla movement of the 1960s
– Vol.21, No.3, May/June 1987
We insist that armed struggle is the only way, because we’ve
tried everything else and it got us nowhere. It’s only when
armed struggle erupts that the country becomes affected and is
shaken, even at the level of international relations.
Interview with Subcomandante Marcos
– Vol.28, No.1, July/August 1994
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