When Ecuador’s Congress voted to impeach Presi- dent Abdalh Bucaram on the evening of February 6 by declar- ing him “mentally unfit to govern,” it was responding to political pres- sures welling up from virtually all sectors of society. After months of sporadic protests against neoliberal austerity measures, a broad spec- trum of social movements had called for a nation-wide 48-hour strike on February 5 and 6 to demand the President’s impeachment. As many as three million indigenous activists, organized by the Confed- eration of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), marched in
protest of Bucaram, saying he
betrayed the people who elected
him last May by ignoring his
promise to “put the poor first” and
by implementing harsh austerity
measures. Based on traditional
indigenous law-“Do not lie; Do
not steal; Do not be lazy”-the pro-
testers also condemned the rampant
corruption that had become perva-
sive under Bucaram’s rule.
On February 4, indigenous pro-
testers had closed the main roads
throughout the country in prepara-
tion for the strike, and they kept
Melina Selverston is director of the Coalition in Support of Amazonian Peoples and Their Environment, a Washington D. C.-based nongovernmental
organization.
them blocked for the duration of the
street protests. Quito was without
gasoline. Banks were closed. There
was no public transportation. Also
participating were public and pri-
vate trade unions, the national orga-
nization of teachers, women’s
groups, high school and university
students, small business associa-
tions and even the Catholic and
Anglican churches. Perhaps most
remarkable was the support of the
Chamber of Commerce, which
encouraged its members to close
their doors during the 48-hour
protest. In addition to pressure from
business as well as the popular sec-
tors, Congress had received a letter
from the country’s three past presi-
dents-Osvaldo Hurtado, Rodrigo
Borja and Le6n Febres-Cordero–
urging that Bucaram be impeached.
Complaints from some quarters
that Congress’ actions were uncon-
stitutional because no medical evi-
dence was provided to determine
Bucaram’s true mental state were
overlooked given this sweeping
mandate. (Some members of
Congress wanted to impeach
Bucaram on charges of financial
misconduct, but that would have
required a lengthy legal process.)
After the impeachment vote, it
became clear that the Constitution
had no process for naming a succes-
sor, and the ensuing power struggle
left the country with three declared
presidents for an entire day.
Bucaram dismissed the impeach-
ment as a conspiracy orchestrated
by the oligarchy and tried to rally
the military around him by promis-
ing a 25% salary increase. In the
meantime, Vice President Rosalia
Arteaga declared herself Bucaram’s
natural successor, while Congress
named its president, Fabian Alarc6n,
as Ecuador’s new head of state.
(Alarc6n, who has been elected to
his post three times with the back-
ing of three different parties, seems
more committed to power than to
any particular ideology.) U.S. media
coverage of the events bypassed the
months of popular protest against
Bucaram’s economic policies that
led up to his ouster, focusing instead
on this elite shuffling for power.
The media pitched the story as if it
were complaints of corruption from
the business sector that were the
principal force leading to Congress’
decision to rout Bucaram.
Elite sectors of society were
indeed enraged by Bucaram’s cor-
ruption and the resulting flight of
foreign investment. When he took
office last August, Bucaram placed
friends, allies and family members
in key commerce and customs posi-
tions, especially in his native port
city of Guayaquil. Importers com-
plained they were being charged
several illegal taxes, including a
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15% “party tax.” The Chamber of
Commerce said that the bribes
importers were forced to pay to
retrieve a shipment were often
worth more than the shipment itself.
One of Bucaram’s body guards,
who sometimes collected “party-
taxes,” says that Bucaram pocketed
up to $25,000 a day in this way for
his personal use-mostly to buy
votes.
Yet the routing of Bucaram had as
much to do with the demands made
by civil society against the imple-
mentation of neoliberal austerity
measures as it did with the displea-
sure of big business over wide-
spread corruption. Without the mas-
sive and sustained protests demand-
ing Bucaram’s removal, it is unlikely
Congress would have impeached
him given the questionable constitu-
tionality of its actions. Nor was this
the first time that the majority of
Ecuadorians rejected free-market
oriented economic reforms. A dra-
matic indigenous uprising in 1993
forced then-President Sixto Durdn
to roll back his plans to privatize the
agrarian sector. Similar protests
since then have stopped the planned
privatization of other state enter-
prises such as utility companies,
and the social-security system.
n what seems to be an emerging
pattern in Latin American poli-
tics, Bucaram, former mayor of
Guayaquil and prominent member
of the Arab community of
Ecuador’s coastal region, got elect-
ed by proclaiming his rejection of
neoliberalism only to abandon his
populist promises in favor of eco-
nomic austerity once in office. In
presidential elections last May, he
beat out leading candidates Jaime
Nebot, who reeked of the tradition-
al oligarchy, and Freddy Ehlers, a
popular TV talk-show host who was
endorsed by the country’s powerful
indigenous movement. Bucaram’s
populist antics-which included
singing on television with scantily
clad women-made him seem a
refreshing alternative to traditional
elite politicians and earned him the
nickname, “El loco,” “the crazy
one.” His promise to make popular
participation a core part of his gov-
ernment, moreover, seemed to chal-
lenge Ecuador’s entrenched oli-
garchy, which was appealing to
poor Ecuadorians. Bucaram won
the broadest victory in Ecuadorian
electoral history, capturing 20 out of
21 provinces.
Not long after becoming president
in August, 1996, Bucaram’s popu-
larity began to slip. While his pop-
ulist theatrics continued (such as the
hero’s welcome he gave Lorena
Bobbit, the Ecuadorian American
who cut off her husband’s penis), he
quickly ditched his campaign
promises and began implementing
classical neoliberal measures to re-
duce the state’s role in the economy.
To the delight of international
investors, Bucaram hired the former
chief economist of Argentine
President Carlos Menem, Domingo
Cavallo, to assist in developing fis-
cal austerity measures. In November
he raised gas and utility prices, and
he planned to peg the local currency
to the dollar, a move that would sta-
bilize the currency at the expense of
popular buying power.
Despite its initial enthusiasm,
international business was soon dis-
mayed by the blatant corruption that
Bucaram seemed to condone.
“Unless a dramatic attack is rapidly
made on the systematic corruption
now afflicting this country,” said
U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador Leslie
Alexander in a highly publicized
speech in January, “it will be my
duty to officially warn my fellow
citizens of the dangers of investing
here.” This was a dire warning for a
country in which about two-thirds
of all foreign investment comes
from the United States.
Given the chaos surrounding
Bucaram’s ouster, and the tense
competition between Arteaga and
congressional leader Alarc6n to suc-
ceed him, some feared that the mili-
tary would be tempted to take con-
trol and install its own brand of
order. Instead, the military publicly
withdrew its support for Bucaram
late on February 8 and urged the
country’s political leaders to find a
peaceful solution to the crisis.
Ironically, it was the military that
brokered an agreement, which
allowed Arteaga to run the country
for a few short days until Congress
modified the Constitution so that it
could legally choose a new president
until popular elections are held in
May, 1998. As soon as the constitu-
tional changes were made, Congress
named Alarc6n president for the sec-
ond time. The agreement also called
for a scaling down of economic aus-
terity measures, including a reduc-
tion of utility prices to their previous
levels.
t soon became clear, however,
that this latter concession was
less a commitment to rethinking
the viability of neoliberal policies in
Ecuador than an attempt to assuage
angry protesters. Indeed, since
Alarc6n took over, he has focused
his efforts on proving Bucaram’s
corruption, while the questioning of
neoliberal policies that prompted
the popular mobilizations against
him has barely been addressed.
Civil society remains shut out of
ongoing negotiations over econom-
ic reform. And while Alarc6n
ordered cuts in the price of gasoline
and utilities, he is continuing with
other austerity measures.
The election of Alarc6n, it seems,
was a successful response to elite
concerns over finding a status-quo
leader who would support the
structural-adjustment policies re-
quired by the international finance
system. The people of Ecuador won
the impeachment of Bucaram, but
for many, the struggle to defend
their rights in the face of neoliberal
economic reform has just begun.
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