When elections were held in El Salvador on March
28, 1982, over 700 reporters were there to record the
event through their unfamiliar eye. It has become
particularly important to examine media coverage of
that phenomenon, since new elections are projected
for November 1983. The Reagan Administration is
already beginning to gear up for another propaganda
victory, making it quite likely that again a swarm of
reporters will descend on that war-torn country, and
equally likely that we can expect no better reporting
than last time around. This examination is condensed
from a longer article titled “Media Coverage of El
Salvador’s Election,” which appeared in the March-
April 1983 issue of Socialist Review. Jack Spence is
professor of political science at the University of Mas-
sachusetts, Boston.
Dan Rather called it “a triumph.” Frank Reynolds
found it a “gratifying, even inspiring … exercise in
democracy.” The U.S. media story of El Salvador’s
1982 election was that massive numbers of citizens,
braving guerrilla attacks on polling places, cast their
vote in democratic and honest elections, in a clear
and profound repudiation of the left.’ “Thousands
Vote Despite Rebel Threats,” ran the Washington
Post subhead. “Salvadorans Defy Bullets to Vote,”
headlined the Boston Globe. “The guerrilla tactic,”
said Hillary Brown of ABC, “was to so terrify the
people that they would stay away from the polls.” 2
Exceptionally extensive coverage hammered home
the theme of rebel attacks, fair voting procedures and
a record turnout. Three major dailies ran a total of 34
front-page stories in the seven days surrounding the
election, and on election day and the day after, net-
work TV stories averaged eight minutes out of 22. By
contrast, the networks devoted about one-third as
much time to Mitterand’s election and failed to cover
the watershed 1972 Salvadorean elections at all. For
all this attention, however, the major conclusions of
the coverage do not hold up under close examina-
tion, even by the media’s own evidence.
Election Violence or War as Usual?
Time and The Washington Post had voters “dodg-
ing guerrilla bullets.” Extensive footage of fighting
and the aftermath of a firefight filled the nightly news.
But on examination, the three dozen print and TV
reports of election day fighting all came from the
same eight places. Given that there were 300 polling
places, that amounts to at most 2% to 3% of the
nation’s total.
Furthermore, there were no reports of civilians killed
at them and only two reports of slightly wounded
voters. The number of civilian deaths for the day. in
fact, would appear to have been well below the grue-
some daily average in El Salvador. In a country torn
by civil war, the story line could easily have been
about a voting day enjoying relative peace.
Even the reports of the eight confirmed firefights
offer, at best, weak support for the intimidation theme.
In the large city of Usulut&n, voting did not occur
because guerrillas had taken over the city several
days earlier. In four of the eight, the fighting was either
distant or had stopped before the polls opened. Four
were also poor neighborhoods on the north side of
San Salvador, regarded as centers of political sup-
port for the Left. 3 Why would guerrillas seek to terrify
their supporters? Reporters did not ask.
Only the attack on Apopa, according to interviews
with guerrillas on Guazapa Volcano right before the
election, make it apparent that it was designed to
disrupt the elections.’ But there was evidence, some
of it in media reports well before the election, sug-
gesting that guerrilla actions at election time could
have varying motives. Ideas of the different groups in
the FMLN ranged from fomenting a general insurrec-
tion, to continuing the fight “before, during and after
the elections,” thus denying the elections the dignity
of special attention, to focusing attacks on cities in
order to “showcase” their strength. 5 For ABC’s Hillary
Brown, the occupation of UsulutBn was designed
solely to stop the elections. Had her viewers been
informed that while the Left was united against partici-
pation in an electoral “farce” but divided over how to
respond to the elections, they might have concluded
as easily that Usulutin was a “showcase” battle, or
simply continued fighting.
The media also said destruction of buses before
election day was intended to prevent voters from
getting to the polls, but it was also true that guerrillas
had been attacking the transportation system, includ-
ing buses, for months, and continued to do so after
the elections. An attack on a military convoy, and
even one which destroyed a soft drink truck, were
part of the reporters’ absurd efforts to fit military acts
into this news frame. Jack Smith of ABC featured a
close-up of a “captured” box of explosives intended,
he said, to disrupt the elections. Did the box tell him?
The media reported that guerrillas threatened vot-
In Santa Clara itself the national
election, now two weeks away, is of
little interest to the people. Most do
not know the issues, the candidates,
or what’s at stake. If they vote at all it will be at the suggestion and direction
of the Army.
It’s been a year since moderates
won El Salvador’s national elections
and offered a hope of bringing peace
to that Central American nation torn
by war. CBS News, March 27, 1983
CBS News, March 14, 198 2 Free and Open Elect:ione?
ers and much was made of the government technique of painting voters’ fingers with ink visible only to in-
frared lamps to protect against such reprisals while
preventing double voting. The New York Times and
the Post quoted the same 74-year-old woman who
claimed to have slammed the door in “subversive”
faces when they told her not to vote.’ No reporter
pointed out that such an example did not render the
guerrillas too intimidating.
Completely unreported was the FMLN’s Radio Ven-
ceremos broadcast, two days before the election, advising citizens that it did not matter if they voted or
not in the farsical election. Even a month earlier, with a
different position, the guerrilla radio had hoped, not
demanded, that despite the pressures to vote voters
would stay home. It warned only to steer clear of
military patrols. President Reagan and Time informed
of a wall slogan saying “Vote in the Morning, Die in the
Afternoon,” but a reporter with extensive experience
in El Salvador told me he had been unable to find it.
Assuming its meaning was not a sardonic comment
on a morning’s “democratic” interruption of ongoing
death squad activities, it would seem that, at best, it
was not a widespread slogan.
Intent on celebrating election day as a victory for
democracy, the media remained uninterested in the
opposition assertion that the election was a “farce.” In
the days preceding it, a few reports mentioned in
passing that the Left felt its candidates would not be
safe. These scattered comments, never analyzed,
never featured, were forgotten by election day. Lest
even this give a false sense of balance, it should be
pointed out that ABC’s March 26 broadcast had one
brief Left assertion that its candidates would have
been attacked amidst eight characterizations of Left
disruption themes. That night and the next, NBC had
14 assertions of the disrupt and threaten theme and
10 optimistic comments on the elections, and no
mention of the Left safety theme.
In short, what passed the media examination for a
free and open election was one in which State De-
partment-invited observers testified that they had
seen no signs of fraud, or of voters being intimidated
at the polls. Unreported was the massive government
media blitz to get out the vote, portraying the election
as the only road to peace; and ignored were the
explicit statements by military and civilian officials
equating failure to vote with “treason,” to use the word
of then Minister of Defense Garcia, or support for
“terrorism,” according to Napole6n Duarte.
Reporters newly arrived on the scene perhaps
didn’t know what all Salvadoreans had learned in the
preceding two years of civil war: an I.D. card is a
document that must be carried at all times and serves
as a safe-conduct pass through army checkpoints.
Since voting in El Salvador is compulsory, and since
the electoral law stipulates that authorities can de-
mand proof of having voted for a period of ten days
following the election, that I.D. card would be stamped
on election day. Moreover, a list of voters would be
compiled at each polling place. Given the role of
“lists” in El Salvador’s history of political assassina-
tions, this was one list that everyone wanted to be on.
Two days before the elections, NBC’s Tom Brokaw
did interview a voter who said he felt pressured to
vote, and balanced this by saying he also felt pres-
sure not to vote. The day after the election, NBC gave
two sentences to an FDR/FMLN spokesperson, who
said voters had felt afraid not to vote, but Brokaw
characterized this as a typical tough propaganda
line.
The Numbers Game
Reporters served up numbers issued by politicians,
all of whom shared a common interest in conveying
the impression of a high turnout. When Ambassador
Hinton said that five or six hundred thousand would
be a splendid turnout, it was widely reported without
The media zoom in on the elections. 1982.
comment. That would be only 38% of the reported 1.3
million eligible voters. Even this eligibility figure was
repeated without question, though the World Bank
put the over-18 population at 2.2 million. When, three
days after the election, the vote total had grown to 1.5
million-exceeding the reported number of eligible
voters-very few reported it. Reporters had lost in-
terest and many, along with the U.S. election observers,
had since gone home, while the Election Commission
churned out ever-mounting totals.
It took only a few weeks for various political figures
to issue statements alleging fraud, and for serious
academic institutions to release a major study detail-
ing irregularities in voting procedures and tabulations.!
But by then the media had long since moved on to the
Falklands War or the siege of Beirut. Only the Times
gave attention to the claim that vote totals had been
inflated-on page 5.
Referendum on the Left?
By ignoring faults with the election and death-threats
to the Left, and focusing instead on guerrilla military
actions, it was easy for the media to characterize the
election as a referendum on the Left. The highly dubi-
ous conclusion: every vote of the “record” turnout
was a vote against the Left.
The media’s “ballots over bullets” news frame
could not encompass an analysis suggesting that a
civil war distorts the election process in the direction
of those who control the polling places. In Rhodesia,
Bishop Muzorewa, a “moderate” anti-guerrilla black,
gained 67% of the vote in an election controlled by the
white government, which The New York Times head-
lined a 65% turnout. When guerrilla victories pres-
sured a new election the next year, with guerrilla
candidates, Muzorewa won 8% of the vote. Guerrilla
leaders Mugabe (63%) and Nkomo (24%) won 87%
of the vote and 77 out of 80 seats in Parliament. The
Times did not headline that 50% more votes had been
cast than in 1979.8
The media did not ignore the war in El Salvador, or
the desires of the Reagan Administration, but reporters
failed to report facts which would have provided news
consumers the opportunity to see the election in a
broader framework. Rather, the FDR/FMLN emerged
in this phase of the Salvador story as the sole per-
petuators of violence and inherently opposed to elec-
tions. Those participating in elections tended toward
“moderation” even if from “extreme” parties. Thus,
even Roberto D’Aubuisson, burdened by the media be-
fore the election with ex-Ambassador White’s “patho-
logical killer” tag, became a “bom-again politician,”
“legitimized” by the voters in post election analyses
(though the media certainly had reservations about
his success). As long as votes were cast and candi-
dates received their fair share, the election became
an exercise in democracy.
In this sense, the media’s analysis of the elections
paralleled precisely that of the Reagan Administra-
tion. This was reinforced by innumerable “straight”
reporting of statements from a wide variety of Ad-
ministration officials and U.S. election observers. For
the Reagan Administration, this was perhaps the
most crucial juncture to have the media “on board.” In
addition to the Cold War framework, the chief ideo-
logical prop the President has used to support U.S.
intervention in El Salvador is that of support for a
democratically elected government. By contrast, he
justifies support for contras invading Nicaragua with
the notion that the Sandinista government is illegitimate.
THE GREAT SALVADOR ELECTION BLITZ
1. The review analyzes election coverage of the Boston
Globe, New York Times, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World
Report and videotapes of the evening news shows, March
25-30, of the three major networks, plus the 30-minute
election specials of NBC and CBS.
2. The Washington Post, March 29, 1982; Boston Globe,
March 29, 1982.
3. The Washington Post, March 29, 1982.
4. Boston Globe, March 29, 1982.
5. The Washington Post, March 6, 1982; The New York
Times, March 2, 1982; CBS News Special, March 30, 1982.
(The quote is from Ruben Zamora on the CBS special and
is the only expression of an opposition viewpoint on the
30-minute show. It is portrayed in a context that makes
him appear to contribute to an analysis that the guerrillas
were fighting against the people and against the elections.
6. The Washington Post, March 29, 1982; The New York
Times, March 29, 1982.
7. A comprehensive evaluation of the March 1982
elections was conducted by the Documentation and INfor-
mation Center at the Central American University in San
Salvador. See “Las elecciones de 1982: Realidades detras
de las apariencias,” in Estudios Centroamericanos, no.
403-404 (May-June, 1982), Universidad Centroameri-
cana, San Salvador.
8. The New York Times, April 15 and 22, 1979, March 4
and 5, 1980.
THE GREAT SALVADOR ELECTION BLITZ
1. The review analyzes election coverage of the Boston
Globe, New York Times, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World
Report and videotapes of the evening news shows, March
25-30, of the three major networks, plus the 30-minute
election specials of NBC and CBS.
2. The Washington Post, March 29, 1982; Boston Globe,
March 29, 1982.
3. The Washington Post, March 29, 1982.
4. Boston Globe, March 29, 1982.
5. The Washington Post, March 6, 1982; The New York
Times, March 2, 1982; CBS News Special, March 30, 1982.
(The quote is from Ruben Zamora on the CBS special and
is the only expression of an opposition viewpoint on the
30-minute show. It is portrayed in a context that makes
him appear to contribute to an analysis that the guerrillas
were fighting against the people and against the elections.
6. The Washington Post, March 29, 1982; The New York
Times, March 29, 1982.
7. A comprehensive evaluation of the March 1982
elections was conducted by the Documentation and INfor-
mation Center at the Central American University in San
Salvador. See “Las elecciones de 1982: Realidades detras
de las apariencias,” in Estudios Centroamericanos, no.
403-404 (May-June, 1982), Universidad Centroameri-
cana, San Salvador.
8. The New York Times, April 15 and 22, 1979, March 4
and 5, 1980.
