When former president Daniel Ortega told the Nicaraguan people that the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) would “rule from below” following their 1990 electoral defeat, few supporters ques-tioned his logic. The Sandinistas were braced for a frontal assault by the new administration of Violeta Chamorro and were gearing up for a battle to defend the sweeping changes they had achieved during the 1980s in land reform, health care and education. The mandate from the FSLN’s base was clear: to oppose government policies aimed at reconcentrating wealth and property, create an alternative to the neoliberal economic model being imposed by international financial institutions, and devise a strategy to win the 1996 national elections.
The complexity of the challenges facing the FSLN became apparent within weeks of their handing over power. Differences of opinion among party leaders—on questions of both strategy and philosophy—about how to fullfill this mandate set the stage for an identity crisis that in large measure remains unresolved. The debate over whether the party should be working constructively with the government to create stability or defending the interests of the poor majority by organizing strikes and protests highlighted the difficulty of reconciling the various roles that the party was expected to play. The FSLN’s second electoral defeat in 1996 by Arnoldo Alemán, the former mayor of Managua whose allies include associates of the Somoza dictatorship as well as the Somoza family itself, brought this debate to the forefront once again.
The underlying question was how to adapt the FSLN’s internal structures and strategies to the new realities facing the party. While it was generally accepted that the FSLN had been run in a top-down fashion during the 1970s and 1980s due to the demands of war, many members saw the 1990 defeat as an opportunity to democratize the party and develop new leadership. Significant changes were in fact implemented during the early part of the 1990s, such as the election of all leadership posts within the party. Yet in spite of the move toward democratization, a majority of the party’s historic leaders found it difficult to let go of the vanguardist tradition.
In this context, the FSLN Congress, the highest decision-making body of the party, convened on May 22 and 23 to elect new leadership and discuss proposed reforms to the party statutes. Faced with growing attrition among the party membership, the Congress was initially expected to put in motion a number of changes aimed at continuing the democratization of the FSLN and rejuvenating its base. Given the sharp decline in the Nicaraguan population’s support for Alemán, which many observers attribute to allegations of his involvement in drug trafficking as well as to his government’s wholesale capitulation to the demands of the International Monetary Fund, many within the FSLN saw this as an opportunity for the party to reactivate its membership and to reaffirm its legitimacy among the Nicaraguan people as a viable political option for the 2001 presidential elections.
Discussions over the proposed changes began six months before the Congress. A committee was appointed which, in consultation with both the party leadership and the rank-and-file, prepared a document entitled, “A Proposal for the Transformation of the FSLN.” The document represented an effort to modernize the party’s positions on issues such as socialism, foreign investment and private property, as well as to reshape party structures in order to allow for greater representation for the popular sectors and members active at the departmental and municipal levels. Another proposal called for replacing the National Directorate with a number of secretariats focusing on specific issues, such as elections and finances. There was little debate on these proposals prior to the Congress, however, making it difficult to gauge how much support they had among the party membership. The silence of the party leadership, moreover, made it appear that they opposed any significant reforms.
What little open debate that was taking place was almost totally overshadowed by the allegations of sexual abuse brought against FSLN Secretary General Daniel Ortega by his stepdaughter Zoilamérica Narváez in early March. In a letter published in the Nicaraguan press, Narváez accused Ortega of sexually and psychologically abusing her for the past 20 years, beginning when she was 11 years old. The Ortega family held a press conference the day after the allegations were made public, but Ortega himself remained conspicuously silent on the issue. Instead, Ortega’s wife and Narváez’s mother, Rosario Murillo, spoke in his defense, vehemently denying the charges. Narváez has since filed criminal charges of sexual abuse, rape and sexual harassment against Ortega. Because he enjoys parliamentary immunity, it is unlikely that he will have to face these charges before the courts.
The scandal provoked an almost immediate closing of ranks, with both the FSLN leadership and large sectors of the rank-and-file dismissing the allegations as a political conspiracy to destroy Ortega. The party has argued that the case is a “family matter,” eliminating the possibility that the charges will be taken up by the FSLN Ethics Commission. Nevertheless, the scandal has served to highlight many of the obstacles that the FSLN faces in carrying out a meaningful transformation. Among these is the personality cult around Ortega, the failure of established mechanisms to deal with charges of ethical failings against party members, and entrenched patriarchal attitudes and values. The editor of the political journal envio, María López Vigil, observed that the leadership’s response to the allegations demonstrated that the FSLN “was not prepared to face and reflect maturely” about a crisis of this magnitude.
As the date of the Congress neared, expectations that profound changes would result from the meeting dissipated. The party leadership stated that the work of this Congress would be limited to electing a new National Directorate and reforming the by-laws. In other words, it was generally accepted that the Congress would reform—rather than transform—the existing party structure.”The party has already been greatly democratized,” said National Directorate member Victor Hugo Tinoco. “All of the leadership positions are elected. What we have to do now is perfect the system.”
The Congress itself, while bringing no major surprises in terms of changes made to the party structure, clearly exposed the tensions that have developed between the “old guard” and those sectors who believe that a transformation is crucial if the FSLN is to survive. While the orthodox sector of the party led by Daniel Ortega and Tomás Borge undoubtedly came out ahead in the Congress, their efforts to preserve the status quo were met with more than just nominal resistance.
The tension between these currents was most apparent during the debates over proposed reforms to the party statutes. One of the first proposals that was brought to the floor was a motion to eliminate the secret ballot in those elections where there is only one candidate running for a post. If passed, this would have meant that the election for Secretary General would have been carried out by a show of hands.
Although the FSLN Electoral Commission explained that the aim of the motion was to expedite the processing of the election results, a large number of the delegates felt that it represented a threat to the internal democracy of the party. The proposal was rejected by an overwhelming majority.
Proposals aimed at creating space within the party structures for women and youth, traditionally underrepresented in the party, were scuttled. The Sandinista Youth’s proposal to increase the youth quota within the party from 15 to 20% was defeated by three votes. When delegates from the Sandinista Youth demanded a re-vote, the measure was passed by 60 votes. Hoping to duplicate the successful efforts of the youth, a group of women demanded that their proposal to increase the quota for female representation from 30 to 40%, which bad been defeated by 68 votes, also be reconsidered. Debate on this issue quickly became heated, and Vice-Secretary General Tomás Borge, who presided over the Congress, deferred the request to the Electoral Commission. Claiming that party statutes do not allow for re-votes, the commission ruled against the women’s demand and declared the re-vote on the youth initiative null and void.
A measure to increase the participation of departmental and local level party members, on the other hand, passed easily. The memberships of both the Congress and the Sandinista Assembly, the highest decision-making body of the party between Congresses, were expanded, and now larger numbers of representatives will be elected at the departmental level. The only leadership body that was not expanded was the National Directorate, which continues to have 15 members.
The results of the elections for National Directorate, and in particular for the positions of Secretary General and Vice-Secretary General, are perhaps the clearest evidence of the orthodox current’s continued dominance within the party. Ortega was re-elected as Secretary General-having run unopposed-with 418 out of 423 votes. Borge was reelected to the post of Vice-Secretary General, but only by a slight margin over Victor Hugo Tinoco. Outraged by Tinoco’s challenge, Borge reportedly urged Tinoco not to run against him. But after winning more votes than Borge in the election for National Directorate, Tinoco was emboldened to launch his candidacy—a direct effort to dethrone the only surviving founder of the FSLN in order to create space for a new generation of Sandinista leaders. Ortega publicly declared his support for Borge, who won with 224 votes to Tinoco’s 199. Although he lost the vote, Tinoco re-affilrmed the democratic principle that it is acceptable to challenge historic leaders-first established in the 1994 Congress when Henry Ruiz ran against Ortega for Secretary General.
Only four of the members of the newly elected National Directorate-Ortega, Borge, Tinoco and Rene Nuñez-were on the previous Directorate. This high turnover was mainly due to the fact that the majority of the outgoing members chose not to run for re-election. Eduardo Garcia of the Farm Workers’ Association (ATC) and Benigna Mendiola of the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG) were the only two members of the National Directorate who ran for re-election and lost. The remainder of the newly elected National Directorate is comprised of a mixture of historical figures, such as Father Miguel D’Escoto, Gladys Baez and Doris Tijerino, and new faces, including Sandinista Youth leaders Vladimir Soto, Maria Ester Solis and Roberto Calderón.
Toward the end of the Congress, another controversial episode erupted during a discussion about FSLN-owned businesses. Political Secretary for Managua Emmett Lang submitted a proposal which would bar any FSLN member who holds a public post from managing an FSLN-owned business. Delegates immediately pointed out that this proposal was based on the assumption that the FSLN did in fact own businesses, and demanded full disclosure of the party’s assets. The party leadership has consistently denied that the FSLN own businesses, with the exception of Radio Sandino and the now-bankrupt newspaper Barricada. At one point during the debate, a delegate, apparently offended by the motion, marched up to the table where the members of the executive council of the Congress were seated and tore the written proposal to pieces. Although the proposal was passed, the leadership gave no indication that a report on FSLN assets was forthcoming.
Despite the tensions that have developed in the party, the Congress voted nearly unanimously in support of the FSLN’s continued identifiication as a socialist party, defining socialism as “an attempt to provide all Nicaraguans with a digni-fied life, access to employ-ment, health care, housing, culture, sports and in gen-eral terms, to establish a just distribution of wealth by taking advantage of the country’s natural re-sources” While there is a consensus that the FSLN’s ideology should be modernized to reflect the cur-rent reality, there was no call to move the party in a more social democratic direction-not even from those sectors that would like to see substantial changes made in the party structures.
It is still too early to determine whether this Congress was another step in the ongoing transformation of the FSLN or a sign of stagnation. Much depends on the leadership’s willingness and ability to create processes and spaces for continued analysis and discussion of the problems facing the party. It also depends on the kinds of actions taken by those sectors dissatisfied with the outcome of the Congress. It seems unlikely that there will be any sort of split within the party, primarily because there are few viable alternatives. Henry Petrie and William Rodriguez, the two members of the FSLN Managua committee removed from their posts for their open support of Zoilamérica Narváez, have started the “Initiative for the Resurgence of Sandinismo,” a movement to address the FSLN’s “ethical crisis” and “lack of strategic vision” from within the party structures. While many Sandinistas may agree in principle with their goals, few are willing to identify with this movement.
Instead, it is becoming more common for disillusioned members of the FSLN to opt not to continue their activism within formal party structures and to shift their energies into social movements that continue to espouse allegiance to the broader goals of Sandinismo. Such is the case with human rights activist Vilma Núnez, who challenged Daniel Ortega for the 1996 presidential candidacy to promote the democratization of the party. She chose not to attend the Congress because she felt that there was no opening for change. In an open letter, Núnez said that while she will not participate in any leadership body, she will not leave the party and will continue to defend the principles of the FSLN through her work with the poor.
Sociologist Orlando Núnez Soto estimates that 80% of those Nicaraguans who identify themselves as Sandinistas are not currently active within the party, a fact that he says reflects the limtations of modern political parties more than those of the FSLN. Indeed, the efforts of those who are actively promoting social justice within civil society and outside the formal party structure complement the goals of the FSLN. At the same time, they move beyond their dependency on the party leadership to develop strategies and initiate change. Ultimately, Núnez predicts, the FSLN leadership will have to transform the party if it is to continue to be a vital part of the progressive movement.
As is clear in Núnez’s arguments, the gains of the revolution are still alive, even if not always within the FSLN itself. What we are witnessing now is the FSLN’s struggle to nurture these gains, especially when it means possibly jeopardizing revolutionary mystique and historic symbols. The challenge at hand is to devise a way to preserve the legacy and ideals of the Revolution while allowing for the emergence of new leadership and a new way of doing politics. Both sides of the equation must be present if the FSLN is to once again lead the country toward social and economic justice.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Lisa Zimmerman is the National Coordinator of the Nicaragua Network, which is based in Washington, D.C. She was an observer at the FSLN Congress held on May 22 and 23 of this year.
