When the new Costa-Gavras film State of
Siege opened in commercial theaters in 1972 (a
scheduled premier showing at the federally-funded
J. F. Kennedy Arts Center was cancelled because
of official displeasure), U.S. movie critics
generally confined their comments to the “aesthe-
tic” qualities of the film and avoided discussion
of the movie’s charges of U.S. complicity in
right-wing police terrorism in Latin America.
Now, over a year later, comes new evidence that
State of Siege was unerringly accurate in its
portrayal of U.S. counterinsurgency programs in
Latin America.
At one point in the film, an Uruguayan
police officer is shown receiving training in the
manufacture and use of explosive devices at a
secret training school in the Southwestern United
States. Later, the same officer is linked to a
rightist “Death Squad” implicated in multiple
murders–some performed with explosives–of pro-
minent Uruguayan radicals. For most American
viewers, these scenes must have appeared as mere
cinemagraphic flourishes in a controversial film.
But State Department documents unearthed by Sena-
tor James Abourezk (D-S.D.) show beyond a doubt
that the U.S. Government has trained foreign
police officers in bomb design at a remote camp
in Texas, and that at least 16 Uruguayan police-
men received such training.
The existence of the Abourezk papers was
first disclosed in Jack Anderson’s syndicated
column for October 8, 1973; subsequently, NACLA
received a full set of the documents which were
used in preparing the following story.
In a memorandum to Senator Abourezk,
Matthew Harvey of the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID) acknowledged September
25, 1973 that AID’s Office of Public Safety (OPS)
provides instruction for foreign policemen in
the design, manufacture and employment of home-
made bombs and incendiary devices at the U.S.
Border Patrol Academy in Los Fresnos, Texas. At
least 165 policemen–mostly from Third World
countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America–have
taken this “Technical Investigations Course”
since it was first offered in 1969. All costs of
the training–rated at $1,750 per student–are
borne by AID.
According to the AID documents, students in
the Technical Investigations Course first attend
a four-week preliminary session at the Interna-
tional Police Academy (IPA) in Washington, D.C.,
where they are treated to lectures on such sub-
jects as: Basic Electricity (“Problems involving
electricity as applied to explosives are given”),
Introduction to Bombs and Explosives (“A lecture/
demonstration” on “the various types of explosives
and explosive systems”), Incendiaries (“A lecture/
demonstration of incendiary devices”), and
Assassination Weapons (“A discussion of various
weapons which may be used by the assassin”).
After completion of the preliminary course,
the “trainees” are flown to Los Fresnos for the
four week “field sessions.” Here, all lectures
are delivered at an outdoor “laboratory” presided
over by CIA instructors. Lecture/demonstrations
encompass such topics as: Characteristics of
Explosives; Electric Priming; Electric Firing De-
vices; Explosive Charges; Homemade Devices; Fa-
brication and Functioning of Devices; and Incen-
diaries. According to AID, these sessions include
“practical exercises” with “different types of
explosive devices and ‘booby-traps.”‘ (In State
of Siege, sample bombs are exploded in buildings,
automobiles, and in a ‘public plaza’ filled with
dummies.)
In its memo to Senator Abourezk, Harvey
argues that the Technical Investigations Course
was set up to help foreign policemen develop
“countermeasures” against terrorist attacks on
banks, corporations, and embassies. In order to
develop countermeasures, however, the trainee
must first study “home laboratory techniques”
used “in the manufacture of explosives and incen-
diaries”–only then, according to AID’s argument,
will he be able “to take preventive action to
protect lives and property.”
Although Harvey stresses the “defensive”
nature of the training program, he admits that
the Department of Defense found the subject mat-
ter so inherently sensitive that it refused to
provide instructors for the course–thus forcing
AID to get help from the CIA. Indeed, once a
“trainee” becomes proficient in bomb techniques,
there is no stopping him from using them offen-
– 19TABLE I:
FOREIGN POLICEMEN TRAINED
AT U.S. BOMB SCHOOL
LOS FRESNOS, TEX.
1969-73
Number
Country: Trained:
LATIN AMERICA
Bolivia ……………….
Brazil ………………..
British Honduras ……….
Colombia ………………
Costa Rica …………….
Chile …………………
Ecuador ……………….
El Salvador ……………
Guatemala ……………..
Guyana ………………..
Honduras ………………
Jamaica ……………….
Mexico ………………..
Panama ………………..
Rep. Dominicana …………
Trinidad ………………
Uruguay ……………….
Venezuela ……………..
E. ASIA & PACIFIC
Guam ………………….
Korea …………………
Philippines ……………
Thailand ………………
Vietnam ……………….
NEAR EAST & S. ASIA
Afghanistan ……………
Iran ………………….
Jordan ………………..
Pakistan ………………
Saudi Arabia …………..
AFRICA
Kenya …………………
Nigeria ……………….
Sudan …………………
Tunisia ……………….
Zambia ………………..
EUROPE
Germany ……………….
3
6
1
19
4
5
6
7
18
1
4
2-
2
7
4
5
16
3
1
3
5
10
1
1
2
2
1
6
3
2
2
4
6
3
TOTAL ………………….. 165
Source: U.S. Agency for International
Development, memo to Senator J.
Abourezk, Sept. 19, 1973.
– 20 –
sively–against criminal enterprises or, as in
State of Siege–against opponents of the ruling
oligarchy.
Such concern becomes justified when one
examines a list of countries represented at the
Texas bomb school: almost every country in
Latin America is on the list, as are such conser-
vative Middle Eastern nations as Saudi Arabia
and Jordan. Prominent entries include Bolivia
(3 students), Brazil (6), Guatemala (18), the
Dominican Republic (4), Chile (5), Uruguay (16),
Korea (3), Thailand (10), Iran (2), and the
Philippines (5). (See Table I.) Indeed, there
is mounting evidence that some Third World police-
men (particularly in Latin America) are themselves
engaged in terrorist activities, utilizing their
U.S.-supplied training in vigilante assassination
teams like La Mano Blanca (White Hand) and Ojo
por Ojo (Eye for an Eye) in Guatemala, La Banda
(The Band) in the Dominican Republic, and the
“Death Squads” in Brazil and Uruguay.
It is generally acknowledged that the Death
Squads are made up of “off duty” policemen and
representatives of the civil and military intel-
ligence services. (“The members of the Death
Squad are policemen,” Sao Paolo’s top criminal
judge affirmed in 1970, “and everyone knows it.”)I
As depicted in State of Siege, these groups en-
gage in kidnapping, torture, assassination and
bombing; their victims range from petty criminals
to students, folksingers, academicians, and poli-
tical activists. 2 Week after week, the Latin
American press announces the death of yet another
body; some estimates of the number of persons
executed by the Death Squads in Brazil exceed
1,500.3 Frequently, the bodies of these victims
are found with cards boasting of the work of the
Death Squad–clearly the intent is to intimidate
the population and discourage the development of
any opposition to the established regime. 4
The use of terrorism to intimidate Third
World populations is considered an essential ele-
ment of America’s post-Vietnam strategy for
social control in the Third World. Since it is
obvious that the American public will not permit
massive numbers of U.S. ground troops to be
employed in future counterrevolutionary wars,
the Nixon Administration seeks to eliminate all
threats to pro-U.S. Third World regimes without
deploying U.S. combat forces. By building up a
powerful and ruthless police force in each
country, the United States can insure that radi-
cal movements will be destroyed before they pre-
sent a significant military threat. This “pre-
emptive” strategy was described by Under Secre-
tary of State U. Alexis Johnson in a 1971 speech
to IPA graduates as follows: “Effective polic-
ing is like ‘preventive medicine.’ The police
can deal with threats to internal order in their
formative states. Should they not be prepared
to do this, ‘major surgery’ may be required in
the sense that considerable force would be needed
to redress those threats. This action is painful
and expensive and often disruptive in itself.” 5With Johnson’s words in mind, it comes as no sur-
prise that the countries with the most active
para-police assassination squads–Brazil, Guate-
mala, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay–are
also the recipients of the largest U.S. police
training grants in the region. (See Table II.)
U.S. involvement in the organization, train-
ing and equipping of Uruguay’s Death Squad is
abundantly described in the testimony of Nelson
Bardesio–a police photographer and Death Squad
member who was kidnapped and interrogated by
Tupamaro guerrillas in 1972. In his testimony
(which was recorded in the presence of the Presi-
dent of Uruguay’s Chamber of Deputies), Bardesio
affirmed that the Department of Information and
Intelligence (DII)–a government agency which
provided an official “cover” for the Death Squad–
was set up with the advice and financial assis-
tance of U.S. Public Safety Advisor William Can-
trell. Bardesio also testified that Cantrell
(who he sometimes served as chauffeur) made daily
trips between the DII, Montevideo police head-
quarters and the U.S. Embassy to insure the
steady transfer of intelligence data and effec-
tive coordination of extra-legal operations. As
part of this process, U.S. Embassy personnel
periodically solicited specific informat on from
the DII for their own intelligence work.
Bardesio also speculates that Cantrell was
in fact working for the CIA–which is highly
possible given the fact that ex-AID official
David Fairchild revealed that the CIA used the
Public Safety program in the Domigican Republic
as a cover for six of its agents. In addition
to Cantrell, Bardesio identified other U.S.
Embassy and Public Safety personnel as intelli-
gence operatives who met regularly with members
of the DII.
In his testimony (which served as the basis
for several scenes in State of Siege) Bardesio
named Uruguayan police officers and military of-
ficials who participated in specific Death Squad
assassinations and bombings with the approval of
government officials–including the Minister of
the Interior. He also reported that the Death
Squad had ample supplies of explosive materials
used in the manufacture of homemade bombs and
booby traps.
The Brazilian Death Squads–notorious for
the mutilation of their victims–are closely
linked to the police and the military intelli-
gence service and operate with the tacit approval
of the military junta. For years no one dared
testify against the Death Squad members, but in
1970 the incidence of murders increased dramati-
cally: the “Ten for One” (reprisal) dictum had
become a basic tenet of police work in Brazil,
and, following the murder of a Sao Paulo police
investigator, nearly 20 people were summarily
executed by the police. After event, several
dozen police officers were arrested and later
convicted of murder and other terrorist crimes
During their trials, links were established be-
tween the Death Squads and numerous military
officers, officials, and even a state governor.
The investigation was finally suspended when wit-
nesses implicated Sergio Fleury–a top officer of
the political police–in Death Squad executions. 8
(Fleury, a leader in the campaign against Brazil’s
urban guerrillas, has been identified by hundreds
of political prisoners as the man who supervised
their torture.) 9
Considering the extent of U.S. involvement
in the Brazilian police apparatus, it is safe to
assume that U.S. AID officials knew of and sup-
ported police participation in Death Squad raids
against Leftists. The Public Safety program in
Brazil has assisted in training locally over
100,000 federal and state police personnel, while
an additional 600 high-ranking officers received
training at the International Police Academy and
other schools in the United States. In addition,
the United States can take credit for the con-
struction, equipping and development of curricu-
lum, staff and faculty for Brazil’s National
Police Academy, National Telecommunications Center
and National Institutes of Criminalistics and
Identification. 1 0 In line with the Nixon Doc-
trine, it is likely that these institutions are
also being expanded to take over the training of
other Third World policemen because of the grow-
ing criticism of such training in the United
States. Already the relationship between the
– 21 -r
U.S. Public Safety Program, 1961-72
Dollars in Thousands)
Officers
Expend- Trained
itures in U.S.b
U.S.
Public
Safety
Advisorsd
WORLDWIDE, Total …. 308,623 7,480 419
EAST ASIA, Total 212,487 1,600 352
Burma 195 – –
Cambodia 2,583 – –
Guam – 3 –
Indonesia 10,121 240 –
Korea 7,432 47 –
Laos 4,567 61 9
Philippines 5,106 215 8
Thailand 88,436 561 39
Vietnam (S.) 94,047 439 196c
Other Countries – 34 –
N. EAST & S. ASIA 14,014 731 8
Greece 129 34 –
Iran 1,712 218 –
Jordan 2,536 65 –
Lebanon 149 15 –
Nepal 188 – –
Pakistan 8,553 125 1
Saudi Arabia – 75 7
Turkey 200 41 –
United Arab Rep. 312 97 –
CENTO/Region 235 61 –
AFRICA, Total
Cent. African Rep.
Chad
Dahomey
Ethiopia
Ghana
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Liberia
Libya
Malagasy Rep.
Niger
Nigeria
Somali Republic
25,802
241
527
323
2,924
131
743
697
3,464
444
454
398
3,400
4,560
983
11
12
22
116
43
3
16
113
22
1
16
43
125
16
2
3
Region/Country Expend- Officers U.S. itures Trained Advisors
Tunisia 924 118 1
Upper Volta 219 14 –
Zaire (Congo) 4,729 139 10
Other countries 1,624 169 –
LATIN AMERICA, Total 54,285 4,170 43
Argentina 120 84 –
Bolivia 2,141 119 2
Brazil 8,612 654 1
Chile 2,386 107 –
Colombia 6,584 446 5
Costa Rica 1,794 150 4
Dominican Rep. 4,091 206 3
Ecuador 3,715 229 3
El Salvador 2,040 220 1
Guatemala 4,480 373 7
Guyana 1,299 45 –
Honduras 1,625 102 3
Jamaica 695 72 1
Mexico 745 65 –
Nicaragua 224 28 2
Panama 1,979 336 3
Paraguay – 21 –
Peru 4,142 151 –
Uruguay 2,188 141 4
Venezuela 3,375 583 4
Other countries 582 38 –
Regional costs 1,468 – –
NON-REGIONAL 2,025 –
“aSource: U.S. Agency for International Development,
Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1972;
b and previous editions. Includes training at the International Police Academy, the FBI Academy, and other schools. CAll U.S. police advisers were officially with- drawn under the terms of the Jan. 1973 peace settlement. dSource: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ap- propriations, Foreign Assistance Appropria-
tions for FY 1973, Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., Part II, 1972, p. 805.
– 22 –
(By Fiscal Year;
Region/Country
r IUruguayan and Brazilian police forces is very
strong, with one Brazilian diplomat offering to
install equipment for direct radio communications
between Brasilia.and Montevideo. 1 1 In addition,
according to Bardesio, two Uruguayan intelligence
officials received Death Squad-type training in
Brazil.
A macabre legend has emerged surrounding
the operation of such para-police groups as “Ojo
por Ojo”, in Guatemala, “La Banda” in the Domini-
can Republic and other Death Squad organizations.
Thus a recent article in a conservative Costa
Rican newspaper called for the formation of a
native Death Squad to deal with the growing crim-
inal violence in that country.1 2 Often, the pro-
government press has portrayed the Death Squads
as executing petty criminals in an effort to wipe
out crime in the streets; but this myth only pro-
vides a cover for the kidnapping and assassina-
tion of political activists, and their sympathi-
zers, while creating a climate of terror in the
country.
Despite such obfuscation, there is a grow-
ing consciousness in Congress that the United
States is deeply involved in political terrorism
in Latin America. Thus in hearings on the Foreign
Aid program, Senator Proxmire summed up the re-
sults of the Public Safety Program in Brazil as
follows: “The biggest program we had was in
Brazil, a program which went on for more than 10
years–at the end of a 10-year period we have an
account of a death squad in which 15 police have
been arrested.”l 1 3 In a report of U.S. aid pro-
grams to Guatemala and the Dominican Republic,
Pat M. Holt, a staff assistant to the Senate
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, re-
ported that “The U.S. is politically identified
with police terrorism.” The police assistance
program in Guatemala, where right-wing paramili-
tary organizations have run rampant for many
years and have carried out nearly 1,000 murders,
“has cost the United States more in political
terms than it has gained in improved Guatemalan
police efficiency.” Holt concluded that the ef-
fect of the public safety program has been mar-
ginal. 1 4
As a result of such findings, and the grow-
ing opposition to U.S. police programs abroad,
Congress in December 1973 took the first steps
toward abolition of the Public Safety program,
400
– 23 –
After defeating more decisive measures (the
“Abourezk Amendment” calling for complete term-
ination of all police programs), the legislature
voted, in the Foreign Assistance Authorization
Bill (S. 1443) to require an orderly phase-out of
existing police training programs abroad and a
oan on any new programs. The compromise measure
failed to affect training at the International
Police Academy, however, and it is already ob-
vious that opponents of the Public Safety program
will have to watch very carefully for Administra-
tion maneuvers designed to evade the intent of
the bill. Nevertheless, passage of these restric-
tions indicates a new determination on the part
of some Congresspeople to obstruct Administration
efforts to strengthen the repressive forces of
favored Third World dictatorships.
FOOTNOTES:
1. Nelson Fonseca, quoted in the Miami Herald,
July 24, 1970.
2. For the script of State of Siege and sup-
porting documents, see State of Siege (New
York: Ballantine Books, 1973).
3. See: Jeff Radford, “The Brazilian Death
Squads,” The Nation, July 30, 1973, pp. 71-3.
4. “Rio’s Death Squads,” Newsweek, August 9,
1971
5. U. Alexis Johnson, “The Role of Police
Forces in a Changing World,” Department of
State Bulletin, September 13, 1971, p. 282.
6. Bardesio’s testimony was inserted in the
Uruguayan Congressional Record and subse-
quently published in Marcha (Montevideo),
April 28, 1972. The material on U.S. in-
volvement appears in: “Uruguay Police Agent
Exposes U.S. Advisors,” NACLA’s Latin A-
merica & Empire Report, July-August, 1972,
pp. 20-5.
7. “USAID in the Dominican Republic – An In-
side View,” NACLA’s Latin America & Empire
Report, November, 1970, pp. 1-10.
8. Charles Antoine, “Indicting the Death
Squad and the Regime,” Le Monde, Weekly
English Edition, May 6-12, 1971; and,
Joseph Novitaki, “It Doesn’t Pay to Take on
the Death Squads,” The New York Times,
August 8, 1971.
9. “Tortures Continue Unabated,” Brazilian In-
formation Bulletin, August-September, 1971,
p. 11.
10. “AID Police Plan for 1971-72,” NACLA’s
Latin America & Empire Report, July-August,
1971, p. 18.
11. “Uruguay Police Agent,” p. 25.
12. El Grafico (Guatemala City), October 30,
1973.
13. U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Foreign Assistance and Related Programs
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, Hear-
ings, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, p. 748.
14. The Washington Post, January 3, 1972. For
full text of the report, see: U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Guatemala
and the Dominican Republic, Staff Memoran-
dum, 92d Cong., 1st Sees., 1971.
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